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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Upon his capture in 1934, legendary bank robber Willie Sutton was asked 
by FBI agents, “Why do you rob banks, Willie?”  Sutton, regarding the question 
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as rhetorical, replied, dryly, “Because that’s where the money is.”1  In other 
words, Sutton understood the inquiry to be why he robbed banks rather than 
homes, or gas stations, or church offering plates.  Had he understood it as 
intended—what was it about Willie Sutton that impelled Willie Sutton to crime 
when others, struggling to survive the Great Depression, were not?—Sutton 
could not have offered so pithy a response.  This Article poses a similar 
question—”Why do you rob corporations?”—to ten chief executive officers 
(CEOs) ensnared in circumstances analogous to Sutton’s in the hope of 
generating answers more useful to the explanation, prediction, and suppression 
of corporate crime than “because that’s where the money is.” 
In the last dozen years, scandals involving insider trading, accounting 
fraud, fictional business entities, bribery, lavish perquisites, and outright theft 
destroyed over $1 trillion in shareholder value, eliminated millions of jobs, and 
felled corporate giants.  Outrage at these breaches of the public trust prompted 
prosecutors to imprison many executives and Congress to impose yet stricter 
obligations upon public firms and the individuals who run them.  The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX), enacted in 2002, enhanced civil and criminal penalties for a 
wide array of corporate misdeeds and imposed duties of transparency, honesty, 
and accountability upon key firm personnel.  Each CEO and chief financial 
officer (CFO) must certify the truthfulness of each financial report on pain of 
perjury and disclose on a “rapid and current basis such additional information . . 
. [as] is necessary or useful for the protection of investors[,] and in the public 
interest,” in-house counsels must now report to CEOs and boards of directors 
any evidence of a material violation of any Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) law or regulation as well as any breach of a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, and public accounting firms must certify the accuracy of financial 
reports.2 
Although SOX is associated with a sordid parade of handcuffed executives 
“perp walking” to prison, it may come to be better remembered as the machine 
that privatized public firms.  As much as a quarter of every dollar a public firm 
earns is consumed complying with a panoply of laws and regulations.  SOX has 
cost firms $4 trillion, driven capital away from riskier firms, deterred mergers 
and acquisitions, and increased the compliance burden fivefold.3  While some 
hail SOX as a significant weapon in the battle against corporate crime, others 
believe its price for reducing managerial malfeasance is far too dear. 
Other tools have been tried.  Many post-“Enron Era” firms tout their 
                                                
1 See WILLIE SUTTON, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1970). 
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), PUB. L. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002), at §§ 302, 
309, 404(b). 
3 David Henry, Will Directors Morph Into Corporate Constables?, BUSINESS WEEK, June 14, 
2004, at 38. 
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compliance management programs (CMPs), which consist of written codes of 
ethics, protections for whistleblowers, and employee training, as proof against 
future criminality.  Regulators have encouraged this trend, reducing liability for 
firms that implement CMPs.4  Still, many view CMPs as cynical attempts to 
pose firms as corporate good citizens and reduce regulatory oversight without 
requiring behavioral transformation.  Indeed, many of the more egregious 
offenders had robust CMPs in place.  Other reform proposals, including 
enhanced balance sheet transparency, ethics classes, and more independent 
boards of directors, have been hastened into the breech, yet corporate crime 
endures.  This should come as scant surprise: over the centuries, commentators 
have complained that “laws are like spider webs, which may catch small flies 
but let the wasps and hornets break through.”  Inducing compliance with the 
legal regimes they craft has long been the thorniest problem facing legal 
architects, as: 
The mere existence of a rule, a law, a moral standard, a social norm, or 
any other behavioral prescription does not guarantee that those subject to it will 
actually comply with it . . . [and] [e]ven those who acknowledge the 
authoritativeness and generally favor the existence of [laws] frequently find it 
advantageous to violate them in practice.5 
Indeed, noncompliance can be profitable.  Corporate executives 
experience tremendous financial incentives to cheat.  Managers feeling pressure 
to produce results are perfectly positioned to cook the books and audits, thus 
boards of directors and government regulators cannot hope to amass enough 
timely information to identify and address every incidence of noncompliance.  
Executives of U.S. firms operating overseas feel pressure to pay bribes lest they 
lose business to non-U.S. rivals who are not prohibited from doing so.  One 
would be naïve to believe SOX or any other legislation could relieve these 
pressures.  One might conclude corporate criminality is eternal and recent 
exemplars are remarkable only insofar as one beholds their magnitude. 
Still, noncompliance is an ethical cancer that drives away investment, 
destroys firms, and compromises sustained domestic growth.  Simply put, 
noncompliance is bad for business, for the firm, and for the nation.  Yet, as 
injurious as noncompliance is, and despite all the measures instituted to combat 
it, the phenomenon is ubiquitous.  At least two-thirds of public firms have 
engaged in serious illegal conduct in the past decade.6  Is law simply 
                                                
4 Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1523, 1534 (2009). 
5 ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY, 1 (1979).  “Compliance” refers to 
adherence to and conformance by relevant actors with the prescriptions and proscriptions of the 
behavioral regime established by the state in respect to a particular issue-area.  Id. at 3. 
6 Saul W. Gellerman, Why Good Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices, in LEADERSHIP AND 
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epiphenomenal to firm behavior?  Is illegality part of the business of business?  
Or, can a well-designed legal regime induce a degree of corporate compliance 
sufficient to protect the integrity of the market and the state?  Why, and under 
what conditions, will firms comply with the legal regimes governing corporate 
conduct, particularly when rules run contrary to parochial interests?  These are 
among the most pressing questions in public governance. 
Unfortunately, in subjecting these questions to empirical analysis, and in 
redesigning legal regimes to enhance compliance, epistemological and 
methodological problems abound.  First, a paucity of empirical studies testing 
general propositions regarding relationships between legal rules and firm 
behaviors hampers investigation.  The few existing studies of firm compliance 
are insufficiently rigorous to offer deep insights.  The field is a young, largely 
descriptive discipline that has treated the firm itself as the level of analysis; few 
testable hypotheses or nomothetic propositions are offered in the literature.  As 
such, compliance with the legal regime governing public firms remains a largely 
idiopathic phenomenon.  Second, compliance is not typically an “on-off switch,” 
and a particular issue-area within a broader regime may present no clear 
demarcation.  Compliance may be a matter of interpretation, negotiation, and 
contestation between firms, regulators, and prosecutors.  Therefore, any theory 
must operationalize compliance by specifying objective criteria for rendering a 
determination of the obligations created by complex and ambiguous sources of 
law.  Third, firm misconduct occurs clandestinely, and firms have incentives to 
self-report better compliance records than they in fact earn.  Investigators must, 
therefore, pre-establish protocols to guide interpretation of partial or 
unintentional compliance and give direction when reliable information is 
unavailable. 
Even more crucially, the study and regulation of firms per se as agents of 
compliance may be misguided.  Firms are abstractions that exist only in the 
legal, and not the natural, sense, and, as such, utterly lack decisional capacity.  
Firms do not decide whether to comply with law; people, specifically officers 
who exercise decisional authority on their behalf, do.  Any theory that would 
explain or predict firm compliance must account for the individual level of 
analysis.  However, most corporate legal compliance research minimizes the 
salience of personality.7  Accordingly, Part II traces associations between 
personalities of CEOs and firm compliance with obligations arising under 
corporate law.8  Part III presents historical data to test heuristically the proffered 
theory and offer explanations and predictions of firm behaviors regarding 
                                                
GOVERNANCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 79 (Robert Gandossy & Jeffrey Sonnenfeld eds. 2004). 
7 Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with 
Law, 17 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2002). 
8 See infra Part II and accompanying notes 11–98. 
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corporate legal compliance (CLC).9  Part IV, followed by a Conclusion, 
anticipates criticisms and suggests future research to build upon evidence that 
selection of CEOs on the basis of CLC propensities bears on firm survivability 
and prosperity, as well as on the orderly and legitimate function of the political 
economy.10 
II. TOWARD A THEORY OF CLC 
A. Personality Theory 
Personality theory (PT) posits the individual as not merely causally 
significant but central to explanations and predictions of the “external” behavior 
of collective entities.  Individuals are not prisoners of fell circumstances, but 
rather are capable of exerting positive influence on the world.  Although 
variables drawn from other levels of analysis factor into explanations of the 
behavior of the sociolegal abstractions called firms, because individual corporate 
elites, and not firms, develop and implement the policies that shape the business 
universe, PT regards all firm behavior as subject to the influence of the complex 
interaction of psychological phenomena in the minds of the individuals 
responsible for those behaviors.  Thus, the psychology of individual decision-
makers is the orienting focus for the study of CLC.  Because the psychologies of 
decision-makers have decisional correlates, and because each individual is 
endowed with a unique personal psychology, PT explains how “who” the 
decision-maker is translates into decisions he or she has made and will make.  
Thus, a personality theorist models the causal relationship between relevant 
psychological variables, decisions, and outcomes, and accounts for variance 
across a range of decision-makers. 
1. General Premises and Assumptions 
“Personality” refers to all aspects of an individual qua individual that 
influence his or her behavior.  Within PT, each individual is an aggregate of a 
unique complex of constructs that drive a constant process of selection from 
among decisional alternatives.  Choices are made to satisfy motivational, 
evaluative, or attitudinal dispositions and preferences and to shape the 
environment, and the decision-maker’s personality dictates the substance and 
process of these choices and yields behavioral and consequential effects.11  
                                                
9 See infra Part III and accompanying notes 99–607. 
10 See infra Part IV, V, and accompanying notes 608–611. 
11 DAVID O. SEARS & ROBERT JERVIS, EDS. OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
21 (2003). 
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Although PT regards decisions as deliberate and conscious, it emphatically does 
not presume rationality.  In making decisions, individuals perform a series of 
complex tasks, including the search for information, the ordering of preferences, 
the development of alternatives, and the making of choices, and most are 
incapable of absorbing sufficient information and undertaking adequate 
evaluation to reach decisions that consistently maximize their welfare.12  The 
human mind is a limited instrument; under conditions of uncertainty and 
complexity, individuals simplify the decision-making process to avoid cognitive 
overload and reach closure.13 
To lighten their burdens, decision-makers unconsciously resort to 
heuristics.  Certain mechanisms—beliefs, images, values, motivations, attitudes, 
perceptions, and traits—represent the basic constituents of personality and the 
primary determinants of decisions.  Identifying the relevant set of mechanisms, 
or constructs, operative in the decision-making context facilitates explanation 
and prediction of behavior.  Establishing the process whereby these constructs 
determine decisions generates testable propositions. 
2. Personality Constructs 
a. Beliefs 
 
“Beliefs” are internalized scripts about reality and about expected or 
preferred future outcomes that shape the manner in which incoming information 
is processed and interpreted.  Individuals acquire a systematic tendency to see 
what they expect to see on the basis of the content of beliefs acquired early in 
life.  Beliefs exert great influence upon the individual’s interpretation of events, 
and, thus, the individual’s identification of when there is a need or opportunity 
for making a choice, the individual’s choice and use of information, the 
individual’s definition of what constitutes realistic alternative courses of action, 
and what values are considered in a choice between alternatives.  Beliefs 
“influence the actor’s definition of both the objectives and alternative courses of 
action available to his [or her] opponent, and the actor’s perception of the likely 
consequences of his [or her] own and his [or her] opponent’s actions.”14 
Individuals are systematically more receptive to information consistent 
with their beliefs than to information that contradicts them and prone to process 
                                                
12 YAACOV Y.I. VERTZBERGER. THE WORLD IN THEIR MINDS: INFORMATION, COGNITION, AND 
PERCEPTION 21 (1990). 
13 ERIC SINGER & VALERIE HUDSON, EDS., POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY 96 
(1992). 
14 DANIEL HERADSTVEIT, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO 
PEACE 11–20 (1979). 
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information selectively so as to support their belief systems, particularly under 
conditions of complexity, uncertainty, time pressure, and stress.  Decision-
makers selectively ignore or fail to integrate information, building bias into their 
decision-making.15  When confronted with repeated inconsistencies between 
belief systems and the empirical world, individuals, to avoid cognitive 
dissonance, must either modify their beliefs or disconfirm the validity of 
inconsistent information.  However, so powerful are beliefs in dictating 
perceptions that individuals tend to resist adaptation and structure their 
interactions with others consistent with the content of their beliefs regardless of 
contrary empirical evidence. 
b. Images 
 
“Images” are the accumulated understandings about him- or herself and 
the world an individual organizes into an affective and evaluative structure to 
simplify decision-making.  Although images may reflect empirical reality, they 
are subjective: individuals “respon[d] not only to the ‘objective’ characteristics 
of a situation, but also to the meaning the situation has for [the]m.”16 
Perhaps the most relevant image is the stereotype, defined as:  
 [A] simplistic, unsophisticated belief about an individual or group that 
can be used to determine the proper way to think about individuals or groups and 
to enable decision[-]makers to fit a broad range of events into well-defined, 
narrow categories, allowing speed and economy of mental effort . . . and 
justifi[cation of] particular patterns of behavior and thinking.17 
Stereotypes artificially rationalize decisions by attributing admirable 
qualities to allies and venality to opponents, thus introducing bias and 
increasing the likelihood of decisional failure.18  Patterns of behavior 
directed toward a given individual or entity are congruent with images held 
by the decision-maker about the individual or entity: a positive image 
corresponds with friendly, cooperative behavior, whereas a negative image 
corresponds with hostile, conflictual behavior.19 
                                                
15 RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF 
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). 
16 JOHN C. FARRELL & ASA P. SMITH, EDS., IMAGE AND REALITY IN WORLD POLITICS 16 
(1967). 
17 VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 127. 
18 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 112 (1982). 
19 WILLIAM O. CHITTICK, THE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY OUTPUTS 52 (1975). 
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c. Values 
 
“Values” are normative statements about behaviors, objects, and situations 
that are situated along a continuum, superimposed upon information, and used to 
evaluate information.20 
d. Attitudes 
 
“Attitudes,” defined as ideational formations having affective and 
cognitive dimensions that create a disposition for a particular pattern of behavior 
toward categories of objects and social situations, are intimately connected to 
images and beliefs.21  Individuals tend to discard information incongruent with 
their attitudes and search for information that supports attitudinal proclivities, 
particularly predispositions to feel or act positively or negatively toward peers.22 
e. Traits 
 
“Traits” are the observable consistencies of style that form first 
perceptions, as well as the adjectives and adverbs of everyday language used to 
describe an individual.  Traits such as energy level, self-confidence, 
organizational capacity, impulsivity, sociability, emotional expressiveness, 
intelligence, and sensitivity23 exert latent influence upon individual choices and 
behaviors.24 
f. Motives 
 
“Motives” are latent dispositions that direct decision-makers to define 
situations, make judgments, mobilize resources, and selectively pursue ends.25   
g. Summary 
 
Beliefs, images, values, attitudes, traits, motives, and other attributes 
create mechanisms in the mind of an individual faced with uncertainty and time 
constraints that filter, order, simplify, and explain the decisional universe while 
                                                
20 VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 124. 
21 ALAN C. ELMS, PERSONALITY IN POLITICS 11–14 (1976). 
22 Id.  
23 JERROLD M. POST, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS 31 (2003). 
24 DAVID MAGNUSSON, PERSONALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 13 (1977).  
25 JAMES N. ROSENAU, COMPARING FOREIGN POLICIES 248 (1972). 
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facilitating identification, evaluation, and selection of alternatives.  For 
simplicity, the term “personality construct” references each of these elements of 
personality individually and collectively. 
3. Measuring Personality 
Problems with data access hamper development and testing of PT models 
of decision-making.  An attempt to specify the manner in which personality 
translates into CLC decisions requires opening the black box of the firm to 
ascertain precisely what senior decision-makers think, say, and do during 
decision-making, yet this is possible only post-hoc.  Moreover, firms tend to 
zealously guard corporate secrets—particularly when facing legal exposure—
and what data does leak into media, public trials, memoirs, biographies, and 
other secondary sources tends to be less than completely reliable.26  Similarly, 
assessments of the link between personality and CLC decision-making that rely 
on literature reviews, insider interviews, and biographies are subject to validity 
problems due to temporal and spatial distance from the subject, deception, faulty 
interview designs, and human fallibility.  For these reasons, available data may 
not perfectly reveal the true beliefs, images, values, traits, or motives of 
decision-makers, and may thus fail to offer an unimpeachable accounting of 
their personalities.27 
Establishing the role of personality in decision-making requires a 
measurement protocol.  Direct measurement is possible through interviews, 
observation, and psychometric testing, but otherwise personality must be 
inferred from behavior.  The psychobiographical approach gathers all available 
sources, including letters, speeches, interviews, newspapers, autobiographies, 
anecdotal evidence, and observation, to generate an explicit, valid, and reliable 
assessment of personality.28  Psychobiographers engage in an iterative process of 
data collection, aggregation, and testing, comparing sources to judge reliability 
and validity.29  Psychobiographical data are used to “score” decision-makers on 
personality constructs hypothesized to give rise to variance in the decisions 
under analysis, with the ultimate objective the explanation of how particular 
combinations of personality constructs, or “personality profiles,” cause specific 
decisions and consequent outcomes. 
                                                
26 SINGER & HUDSON, supra note 13, at 220. 
27 LAWRENCE FALKNOWSKI, PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 8 (1979). 
28 Dean K. Simonton, Presidential Style: Personality, Biography, and Performance, 55 J. PERS. 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 928 (1988).   
29 JEANNE N. KNUTSON, ED. HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 307–18 (1973). 
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4. Conditionality and Contingency: Other Levels of Analysis 
The relationship between personality and firm behavior is one of 
contingency: assertions of causality are couched as true only in some cases and 
under certain conditions, and caution must be exercised in generalizing from 
their findings.  Individuals are constrained and influenced by political, 
economic, and social realities, as well as by the culture of relevant 
constituencies and by public opinion.  No firm, ergo no decision-maker, is 
omnipotent.  Still, the influence of exogenous constraints upon CLC decision-
making is bounded.  The role occupied by the individual is relevant to assessing 
the weight attributable to personality.  The closer the individual is to the apex of 
the corporate hierarchy the more he or she is invested with the decisional 
autonomy in selecting goals, committing resources, and ordering firm actions.  
The most senior decision-makers (SDs)—CEOs, CFOs, and CLOs—are 
invested with the greatest quantum of power relative to other employees, and, as 
decisional freedom increases, exogenous constraints diminish. 
Furthermore, situational context is crucial.  During situations of 
ambiguity, instability, and uncertainty, PT accords greater causal weight to 
personality than to other variables, and an absence of precedent, increased time 
constraints, and emotional stress further diminish the theoretical significance of 
other factors.30  Responsibility follows power, and SDs tend to rely less upon 
external guidance when their firm is subject to threat or opportunity.  Because 
the role of firm constituencies and the influence of public opinion contracts 
during conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, and because determinations of 
whether to comply with ambiguous laws that hamper the immediate pursuit of 
material self-interest and specify serious civil and criminal sanctions for their 
violation implicate the highest of stakes and trigger great stress, the salience of 
exogenous constraints is at a nadir and the role of SD personality in the chain of 
causation resulting in firm behaviors is at a zenith in the issue-area of CLC. 
Although PT does not advance the naïve view of decisions as the mere 
projection of personalities, neither does it accept the simplistic view that 
personalities have no effect.  While the relationship between personality and 
decision-making is contingent and conditional, it is positive, and firm behaviors, 
including CLC, reflect the personality of the SDs at the helm. 
                                                
30 JOAN OFFERMAN-ZUCKERBERG, ED., POLITICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 141 (1979). 
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B.  A Theory of CLC 
1.  Introduction 
Personality theories treat empirical behaviors as the explanandum—the 
things to be explained—and one or more personality constructs as the 
explanans—the explanatory variables.  In other words, firm behaviors are 
dependent variables (DVs) that are the end result of a chain of causation running 
through the personality of the individuals who set the course the firm will 
follow, and the personality constructs that constitute this unique personality are 
independent variables (IVs).  A theoretical model that allows for 
psychobiographical measurement of policy-relevant personality constructs may 
enable enriched explanations of CLC decisions while retaining parsimony.  In 
developing this model, efforts will be made to enumerate and define the 
personality constructs operant in the personalities of CEOs responsible, via CLC 
decisions, for particular outcomes; next, a set of preliminary hypotheses based 
upon associative linkages between personality constructs and outcomes shall be 
offered and heuristically tested. 
2. Independent Variables: Personality Constructs 
The proposed pre-theory of CLC hypothesizes that the presence or 
absence of four constructs in the personalities of CEOs are responsible for firm 
compliance with or violation of the legal regimes governing corporate behavior; 
these personality constructs, which serve as IVs, are “militarism,” “anomism,” 
“hostility,” and “adventurism.” 
a. Militarism 
 
“Militarism” is a global construct that taps a set of beliefs, values, images, 
and attitudes.  The militarist is more likely to consider forceful or anti-social 
alternatives than his or her non-militarist counterpart, more prone to escalate 
conflictual situations, and more likely to lead the firm to violate the law in 
pursuit of his or her objectives.31  Nationalism and a favorable attitude toward 
power have been identified as most predictive of the level of conflict associated 
with decision-makers; nonetheless, all ten sub-constructs that typify the 
militarist, specifically nationalism, a favorable attitude toward power, 
aggression, authoritarianism, competitiveness, dogmatism, introversion, 
isolationism, ambitiousness, and low self-esteem, are incorporated in the 
                                                
31 FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING 108–09 (Donald Sylvan & Steve Chan, Eds. 1984). 
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theoretical model.  The ideal-typic32 militarist scores high, indicating the 
presence of the sub-construct in his or her personality profile to an extent 
significantly greater than the average person, on each sub-construct.  
“Militarism” does not imply a decision-maker who embodies these traits is 
enamored of or has served in the military, nor does it necessarily imply he or she 
believes imposing military solutions on problems is always desirable; rather, it is 
an apt term for the global personality construct that captures the aforementioned 
dimensions of personality.  
i. Sub-constructs of Militarism 
 
“Nationalism” is a belief that one’s nation is superior to other nations by 
virtue of its culture, tradition, race, ethnic composition, philosophy of 
government, or other characteristics,33 as well as the motivation to “develop, 
protect, maintain, or refine” this culture, tradition, race, or philosophy.34  
Nationalists are more prone to defend fellow nationals in word and deed and 
more likely than non-nationalists to serve in the armed forces.35  On the other 
hand, nationalists are less able to make subtle distinctions and gradations.36  The 
behavioral outputs of nationalists tend to be more conflictual than those 
associated with their non-nationalist counterparts, and these effects are 
heightened by cultural dissimilarities between the nationalist and the target of 
the behavior. 
“Favorable attitude toward power” is a composite sub-construct, which 
refers to beliefs regarding the desirability and utility of possessing and 
employing force or coercion in the pursuit of objectives.  “Throughout history, 
[decision-makers] who attain legendary status often tend to be those who have 
conquered other nations, won major wars, forcibly transformed their societies, 
and imposed their own beliefs on their subjects[;]”37 decision-makers seeking 
this status tend to have positive attitudes toward the military, nuclear weapons, 
                                                
32 “Ideal types” are theoretical constructs that model selected aspects of the empirical world and 
permit comparative assessment of the extent to which those aspects exist in a particular, real case.  
Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A Finch trans. & eds. 1949). 
33 Paul C. Stern, Why do People Sacrifice for their Nations?, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 217 (1995). 
34 VAMIK VOLKAN, THE NEED TO HAVE ENEMIES AND ALLIES 88, 94–95 (1988). 
35 Hank Denker, Darina Malova & Sander Hoogendorn, Nationalism and Its Explanations, 24 
POL. PSYCHOL. 345, 350 (2003). 
36 David Winter, Margaret G. Hermann, Walter Weibtraub & Stephen G. Walker, The 
Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy, 12 
POL. PSYCHOL. 215, 231 (1991). 
37 A. LUDWIG, KING OF THE MOUNTAIN: THE NATURE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 3–4 (2002).   
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war, and control over others—the instrumentalities that achieve status.38  The 
decision-maker with a favorable attitude toward power believes power, rather 
than reason, is essential to preserving order. 
“Aggression” is the trait that directs an individual to engage in self-
assertive, self-protective, domineering, hostile, and/or violent interactions with 
others.39 
“Authoritarianism” is the belief that unquestioning obedience to authority 
is superior to freedom of judgment and that credibility of information is a 
function of the authority of the source, rather than its factual reliability.40  
Authoritarians rigidly adhere to conventional values, condemn violators of 
social tradition as threats, and preoccupy themselves with hierarchies and social 
cohesion.41 
“Competitiveness” is the drive to struggle against others for satisfaction of 
wants and needs.42 
“Dogmatism” is the degree to which an individual cannot identify or use 
conceptual linkages, tolerate and assimilate contrary beliefs, analyze 
contingencies, adapt to ambiguity, generate alternatives, perceive shades of 
grey, and think abstractly.43 
“Introversion” describes an attitude and trait in which an individual directs 
attention inward to his or her own thoughts and experiences rather than toward 
objects or people.44 
“Isolationism” is the negative value attached to establishing and 
maintaining emotional relationships with others.  Isolationists lack a 
predisposition to seek approval and to limit the type or degree of conflict, and 
they tend to be overly self-reliant.45 
“Ambitiousness” is the value attached to personal accomplishment, and 
ambitious individuals are predisposed to strive for success in tasks involving 
leadership and the demonstration of intelligence.46 
“Low self-esteem” is the absence of a belief in one’s own capability, 
                                                
38 DENNIS J.D. SANDOLE, CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITY OF CONFLICT: DEALING WITH VIOLENT 
ETHNIC CONFLICTS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 24 (1999). 
39 MAGNUSSON, supra note 24, at 165.  
40 VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 172. 
41 See T. ADORNO, E. FRANKEL-BRUNSWICK, D.J. LEVINSON & R. NEVITT SANFORD, THE 
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950). 
42 Joseph Badaracco, Jr., We Don’t Need Another Hero, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept. 1, 2001, at 1–12. 
43 MILTON ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND 62 (1960).  
44 VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 173. 
45 DAVID DOTLICH & PETER CAIRO, WHY CEOS FAIL: THE 11 BEHAVIORS THAT CAN DERAIL 
YOUR CLIMB TO THE TOP AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM 64–65 (2003). 
46 MAGNUSSON, supra note 24, at 412. 
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worth, and entitlement to respect; individuals with low self-esteem are not self-
confident, patient, or likely to perceive themselves as competent and well-
regarded by peers,47 but are more prone to violent behavior than those with high 
self-esteem and more likely to suppress constructive conflict.48 
ii. Summary and Operationalization: Militarism 
 
The ideal-typic militarist is a nationalist with prior military service who 
views the use of power favorably, is an aggressive competitor and keenly 
ambitious, and is authoritarian and dogmatic yet introverted, isolated, and beset 
with low self-esteem.  While the pure ideal-typic militarist may exist only in 
theory, militarists score high, indicating the presence of the sub-construct in his 
or her personality profile to an extent significantly greater than the average 
person, on a majority of the sub-constructs. 
b. Anomism 
 
“Anomism” consists of five sub-constructs—disregard for law, disregard 
for legal authorities, amoralism, ignorance of law, and ignorance of corporate 
law—that tap a set of intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, and attitudes 
regarding the rule of law.  The anomist has little regard for law or legal 
authorities, lacks moral or ethical qualms about violating law, and knows little 
of the substance of law generally and less about corporate law.  In brief, the 
anomist is a serial and unrepentant lawbreaker who holds dear no superordinate 
moral principles.  The ideal-typic anomist scores high on each sub-construct. 
i. Disregard for Law 
 
Although “[e]veryone breaks the law sometimes, and some people break it 
often[,]”49 for many individuals law is an object of reverence and obedience a 
quasi-religious duty.50  Many, and perhaps most, people quite simply believe 
law must be obeyed for the simple reason that it is law.51  The anomist, in 
                                                
47 LINDA O. VALENTY & OFFER FELDMAN, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FOR THE NEW CENTURY: 
PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR AMONG AMERICAN LEADERS 73 (1999). 
48 DOTLICH & CAIRO, supra note 45, at 128–30. 
49 TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YUEN J. HUO, SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 3 (1997). 
50 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1990). 
51 H.R. Rodgers Jr. & E.B. Lewis, Political Support and Compliance Attitudes, 2 AM. POL. Q. 
61 (1974). 
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contrast, accords no independent normative value to legal obligations and 
regards legal obedience in purely instrumental terms: if obeying the law suits his 
self-interest, he or she does so, but, if obedience thwarts the pursuit of his or her 
ends, law is but another objective impediment that must be overcome or 
negotiated away.52 
ii. Disregard for Legal Authorities 
 
Regard and respect for legal authority is widely diffused across 
demographic, cultural, and geographic domains.  Most people accord legal 
authorities, including the police and the judiciary, the presumption of integrity, 
competence, and legitimacy, and as a consequence cooperate and comply with 
them in their official capacities.53  By contrast, anomists treat legal authorities as 
inherently unworthy of respect or obedience and as constraints to be factored 
into calculations of how best to pursue self-interest. 
iii. Amoralism 
 
“Amoralism” refers to an absence of absolutism in the evaluation and 
judgment of character, conduct, ethics, and values.  Most people “d[o] not 
simply act in pursuit of gains[;] rather, their own personal sense of right and 
wrong influence[s] their behavior. . . [and] [t]hey . . . engage in the behavior that 
they think is morally right.”54  Such people consider non-compliance morally 
unjustifiable, and many consider the moral evil occasioned by noncompliance to 
be greater than the evil of obeying a law with which they disagree.55  The 
amoralist, however, accords no moral virtue to compliance and is agnostic, and 
thus amoral, regarding right and wrong.  Moral judgments are less consequential 
to the anomist than the perceived certainty or threat of punishment. 
iv. Ignorance of Law 
 
“Ignorance of law” is the absence of formal legal education—not the 
absence of legal knowledge.  Those with legal training may be more likely to 
regard legal obligations as binding.  Although legal training “does not assure 
                                                
52 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIOA CHAYERS, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 117 (1995). 
53 TYLER, ET. AL., supra note 45, at 38–39, 45. 
54 Id. at 116. 
55 IRVING JANIS & LEO MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, 
CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 28 (1977). 
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that [decision-makers] will cast their votes for law observance, . . . some 
knowledge of the law, some appreciation of its significance, and some attitudes 
and habits of respect for the law find a place in the process of decision.”56  
Although most decision-makers may know little about law, it stands to reason 
that the less ignorant a decision-maker is as to legal obligations the more likely 
he or she will be to comply with them. 
v. Ignorance of Corporate Law 
 
“Ignorance of corporate law” references the absence of training in the 
legal regime governing corporations.  Knowledge of corporate law is a 
determinant of CLC: the less a decision-maker knows about corporate law the 
less likely he or she will comply with it.   
vi. Summary and Operationalization: Anomism 
 
The ideal-typic anomist is ignorant of the law, regards compliance with 
legal rules and authorities in purely instrumental terms, and complies only where 
it serves self-interests; morality does not factor into the analysis. 
c. Hostility 
 
“Hostility” consists of nine sub-constructs that tap a set of intercorrelated 
beliefs, values, images, and attitudes regarding human relationships.  The ideal-
typic hostile scores high, indicating the presence of the sub-construct in his or 
her personality profile to an extent significantly greater than the average person, 
on each sub-construct. 
i. Distrust 
 
“Distrust” refers to a belief in the inherent badness of human beings.57  
Individuals with a high degree of distrust are more likely than those who are less 
distrusting, or more idealistic, to over-perceive, and overreact, to threats.58  The 
most distrustful decision-makers can be termed “paranoid,” defined as intensely 
suspicious of others, convinced that others are scheming to cause them harm, 
                                                
56 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 65–66 (1979). 
57 JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION: NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 47 (1973). 
58 Michele G. Alexander, Marilynn B. Brewer, & Richard K. Hermann, Images and Affect: A 
Functional Analysis of Out-Group Stereotypes, 77 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 78, 80 (1999). 
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and prone to see enemies in everyone.59  Paranoids resort unnecessarily to 
forceful responses to perceived threats.60 
ii. Narcissism 
 
“Narcissism” is the belief one is endowed with great power, physical 
appeal, and the right to exploit and dominate others.61  Narcissists crave 
attention and need to be perceived as powerful, appealing, and worthy of love 
and admiration; they are preoccupied with pathologically grandiose fantasies of 
wealth and fame, devoid of conscience or remorse, envious, spiteful, greedy, 
vindictive, and willing to use force to achieve goals.62  Malignant narcissists, or 
“antisocial personalities,” are reckless, sadistic, suicidal, and prone to 
depression.63  Narcissists are not possessed of deeply-held beliefs about the 
external world: their images of others are flexible, and other actors are of value 
only to the extent they enhance self-interest or present them in a good light.  For 
the narcissist, what is good for him or her is good for his or her firm and nation, 
and decisions are reducible to considerations of how results advance his or her 
concept of self.  Because they are detached from reality to the extent of their 
self-absorption, narcissists are systematically inclined to overestimate their 
capabilities and underestimate external constraints.64 
iii. Cynicism 
 
“Cynicism” is the belief others are self-interested, insincere, and 
motivated primarily by material considerations, and the corresponding negative 
general image of humanity.65  Cynics expect the worst of others, and 
consequently are more likely to perceive threats than are individuals who view 
others as inherently cooperative, sincere, and motivated by ideals.66 
                                                
59 ROBERT ROBINS & JERROLD POST, POLITICAL PARANOIA: PSYCHOPOLITICS OF HATRED 7–12 
(1997). 
60 J. DAVIS, THREATS AND PROMISES: THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 41 (2000). 
61 VERTZBERGER, supra note 12, at 174. 
62 ROBINS & POST, supra note 59, at 83–84. 
63 See THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL IV-REVISED 117 (W. John Livesley Ed., 
1995). 
64 DOTLICH & CAIRO, supra note 45, at 2–12. 
65 R.E. Agger, M.N. Goldstein & S.A. Pearl, Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning, 23 
J. POL. 477 (1961). 
66 JERROLD M. POST, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS 339 (2003). 
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iv. Misanthropy 
 
“Misanthropy” is a generalized dislike, and even hatred, of human beings.  
Simply put, misanthropes are antisocial, do not seek or enjoy the company of 
others, and actively seek to avoid or, in the alternative, to cause harm to other 
persons. 
v. Ethnocentrism 
 
“Ethnocentrism” is the belief one’s ethnic, racial, or cultural group is 
superior to others and association with persons of one’s ethnic, racial, or cultural 
group is preferable to association with other groups.  Ethnocentrics project their 
preference outward, and the degree of their cooperation and positive interaction 
with others is, to some extent, determined by the degree of ethnic, racial, or 
cultural similarity.67  Accordingly, justification for hostility is available to the 
ethnocentric who identifies dissimilarities between his or her own group and the 
target of his or her decision-making and attributes hostile intent on this basis; 
greater vigilance is required to protect against this threat.  Taken to extremes, 
ethnocentrism creates a culture of fear that rationalizes infliction of harm on out-
groups.68 
vi. Hostility 
 
“Hostility” is the perception others hold highly negative images of—and 
have strongly negative intentions toward—one’s self or group.  It is an 
assessment of the degree of distrust operant in the calculus of external actors.  
The greater the perception of hostility, the less likely a decision-maker will be to 
recognize disconfirming information and the more likely to perceive external 
actors as aggressive, to escalate threats, and to meet perceived aggression with 
force.69  Although heightened perceptions of hostility may correspond to 
empirical realities, most individuals can distinguish immediate and genuinely 
hostile out-groups without detecting hostility from the entire world.  Clinically 
hostile individuals are caught in a “siege mentality” that persists independently 
of reason.70 
                                                
67 CHITTICK, supra note 19, at 52. 
68 SANDOLE, supra note 38, at 111. 
69 SEARS & JERVIS, supra note 11, at 265. 
70 PATRICK J. MCGOWAN & HOWARD B. SHAPIRO, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN 
POLICY: A SURVEY OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS 53–60 (1971). 
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vii. Machiavellianism 
 
“Machiavellianism” is a set of values that denies the relevance of morality 
and embraces deception, stealth, and manipulation in the pursuit of power.71  
The Machiavellian is ruthless, devious, and amoral, and neither norms nor laws 
stand in his or her way. 
viii. Lack of Empathy 
 
Empathy is the capacity to project one’s own personality into that of 
another to understand him or her better and share in another’s emotions or 
feelings.  Empathy disposes an individual to seek out the views, interests, and 
values of others, ameliorate self-interest, and consider the consequences of his 
or her decisions for others.  “Lack of empathy” is the incapacity to form 
accurate perceptions and judgments of others and give regard to the concerns 
and interests of others.72 
ix. Selfishness 
 
Altruism is the value placed upon aiding others despite risks and costs and 
without expectation of external reward.73  The paradigmatic example is the self-
sacrifice of the soldier who saves his or her comrades from certain death by 
throwing him- or herself upon a grenade in their midst, absorbing the blow but 
ensuring his or her own demise.  “Selfishness” is the antithesis of altruism. 
x. Summary and Operationalization: Hostility 
 
The ideal-typic hostile is a self-absorbed, delusional, amoral individual 
who is deeply distrustful and suspicious of others and sees threats lurking 
everywhere.  He or she bears an animus toward humanity mitigated only in 
regard to in-group persons and is prepared to do anything and everything to 
defeat the omnipresent threats posed by out-groups about whom he or she knows 
and cares little. 
 
                                                
71 See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (W.K. Marriott trans. 1916). 
72 VOLKAN, supra note 34, at 121. 
73 HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE (1984). 
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d. Adventurism 
 
“Adventurism” consists of seven sub-constructs—risk tolerance, internal 
locus of control, impulsivity, anxiety, optimism, stress, and maleness—that tap 
intercorrelated beliefs, values, images, attitudes, and traits regarding tolerance of 
uncertainty.  The ideal-typic adventurist scores high on each sub-construct. 
i. Tolerance of Risk 
 
Risk is an immutable characteristic of the universe, and certain individuals 
are cognitively disposed to greater tolerance of it than others.74  “Tolerance of 
risk” is a measurement of the degree to which an individual will choose courses 
of action that, while they may offer the prospect of gains, carry with them 
significant possibilities of injury, damage, or loss.  Risk-tolerant individuals are 
more likely to expose themselves and their firms to danger than are risk-averse 
individuals, who seek the decision that satisfies minimal policy objectives with 
the least possibility for loss.75 
ii. Internal Locus of Control 
 
“Internal locus of control” is the belief one can exert positive influence 
over the world to bring about a future favorable result.  For individuals whose 
locus of control is external, the belief their destiny is preordained leads to 
decisional paralysis.  Individuals with an internal locus of control attribute 
causality of their behavior to themselves (Will) rather than the external world 
(Fate) and are more likely to challenge environmental constraints and less likely 
to remain passive or compromise. 
iii. Impulsivity 
 
“Impulsivity” is the trait characterized by the inability to self-modulate 
sensory input, inhibit sensation-seeking behavior, or consider the consequences 
of actions.76  Impulsives frequently make suboptimal decisions because they do 
not allow themselves time to think clearly and deliberately, seek advice, or 
                                                
74 Yaacov Vertzberger, Rethinking and Reconceptualizing Risk in Foreign Policy Decision-
making, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 347, 368-69 (1995). 
75 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON CORPORATE ETHICS 63 (2003). 
76 HANS J. EYSENCK & SYBIL B.G. EYSENCK, PERSONALITY STRUCTURE AND MEASUREMENT 
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employ moral reasoning.77 
iv. Anxiety 
 
“Anxiety” is the trait that makes an individual prone to evaluate stimuli as 
dangerous and to experience concomitant feelings of worry, distress, and panic.  
Anxious individuals are more likely than non-anxious individuals to perceive 
and react to threats.78 
v. Optimism 
 
“Optimism” is the belief the future will produce preferred outcomes 
regarding people and events. 
vi. Stress 
 
“Stress” is the aggregate response produced in unconscious adaptation to 
environmental stimuli.  Individuals vary in their ability to preserve cognitive 
functioning as stressors mount, yet all experience degradation in their ability to 
generate alternatives and choose optimal courses of action under threats to core 
values and interests.79 
vii. Male Sex 
 
Although sex-role differences may be socially constructed in part, rather 
than biologically determined by testosterone,80 men are more likely to be 
competitive, aggressive, ethnocentric, Machiavellian, distrustful, ambitious, and 
lack empathy.81 
viii. Summary and Operationalization: Adventurism 
 
The ideal-typic adventurist is an impulsive gambler so optimistic he or she 
can assert his or her will that he or she risks all for the sheer thrill of pursuing 
                                                
77 Badaracco, supra note 42, at 1–3.  
78 See generally C.D. SPEILBERGER, ANXIETY AND BEHAVIOR (1966). 
79 O. SVENSON & A.J. MAULE, TIME PRESSURE AND STRESS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 1–2 (2003). 
80 Sabina Nielsen & Morten Huse, The Contributions of Women on Boards of Directors: Going 
Beyond the Surface, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 136 (2010). 
81 CHRISTOPHER M. BYRON, TESTOSTERONE, INC.: TAKES OF CEOS GONE WILD 135 (2005). 
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victory no matter how small or unlikely.  He or she resolves tremendous anxiety 
and stress by trusting blindly and rolling the dice. 
3. Dependent Variables: Decisions and Outcomes Regarding CLC 
a. Introduction: Corporate Law and Major Sub-regimes 
 
The current pretheory of CLC regards the presence or absence of the 
personality constructs of militarism, anomism, hostility, and adventurism in the 
personalities of CEOs as IVs that determine firm compliance with corporate law.  
The theory treats these decisions and the resulting consequences as dependent 
variables. 
“Corporate law” is a complex amalgam of federal and state laws, 
regulatory rules, and judicial and agency opinions interpreting and applying 
these sources to the governance of firms.  Various substantive sub-regimes 
specify obligations in issue-areas ranging from the formation and dissolution of 
commercial entities; contracts; rights and duties of shareholders, managers, and 
directors; mergers and acquisitions; free competition and trade; securities; 
taxation; employment; industrial espionage; and environmental protection.  
Seven sub-regimes serve as the foundation for the study of CLC: 
 
• financial accounting and reporting; 
• securities regulations; 
• market behavior; 
• corrupt practices; 
• labor law; 
• environmental protection and social responsibility; and  
• cooperation with regulatory authorities. 
 
b. Dependent Variables (DVs)  
 
Fifteen DVs are organized around and tap compliance with the seven legal 
sub-regimes: 
(1) whether the firm violates financial regulations through fraudulent 
accounting practices,82 such as the creation of fictional business entities, failing 
                                                
82 The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) prescribe rules and regulations to 
which public corporations must adhere in the recording and reporting of financial information.  See 
http://www.fasab.gov/currenttext.html.  Despite the comprehensive regulatory regime, managers 
have considerable latitude in the financial assumptions and accounting decisions they make.  This 
Article does not consider good-faith interpretations of GAAP subsequently determined by regulators 
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to record material transactions, stating fictitious or fraudulent earnings, delaying 
or prepaying invoices to meet budgetary goals, booking operating expenses as 
capital expenses, intentional misclassification of transactions as to accounts, 
departments, or periods to misrepresent earnings,83 treating stock options or 
other liabilities as undisclosed or off-balance sheet entries or footnotes rather 
than as expenses, misstating option vesting dates to artificially inflate value, or 
any other false, artificial, or intentionally misleading statements of financial 
condition84 [hereinafter violate financial regulations] (sub-regime a); 
(2) whether the firm engages in misconduct by undisclosed insider trading 
in the firm’s securities or in other firms’ securities, by permitting trading by firm 
employees in puts and calls of the firm’s stock or short sales of the firm’s 
stock,85 or by illegally disclosing confidential information about movement in 
the price of the firm’s shares86 [hereinafter violate securities regulations] (sub-
regime b); 
(3) whether the firm lavishes senior managers with compensation, 
bonuses, or perquisites that are indefensible in reference to the market and 
unsupported by sound business judgment87 [hereinafter inflate compensation] 
(sub-regime a); 
(4) whether the firm engages in competition in violation of antitrust laws, 
including collusion with other firms to allocate territories or markets or 
customers or to fix price or production levels to drive competitors from the 
market,88 acquiring trade secrets or other privileged information through deceit 
or misrepresentation or in any other way constitutive of industrial espionage,89 
                                                
to be violations of financial regulations to be examples of noncompliance; only manifestly unlawful 
attempts to deliberately and materially deceive investors and regulators are treated as violations of 
law, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1351 et seq. (2012), and C.F.R. 240.13b2-
2. 
83 The “matching principle” requires income earned and costs incurred to be recorded in the 
same period.  See Federal Accounting Standards Board, 31—Accounting for Fiduciary Activities, 
SFFAS (Oct.24, 2006), http://www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/sffas_31.pdf. 
84 SOX, supra note 2, at § 409. 
85 These practices constitute illegal conflicts of interest because they enable employees to 
benefit, against the interests of owners, from nonpublic information about movement in the price of 
the firm’s shares.  See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 240.10b5-1,2, 65 F.R. 51716, 51737, 
Aug. 24, 2000. 
86 These practices are criminalized under 15 U.S.C. § 78, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1351 et seq., C.F.R. 
240.13b2-2, and 17 Fed Reg, § 240.10b-5. 
87 The “business judgment rule” creates a strong presumption in favor of a corporation’s board 
of directors against liability for breach of duties of care, loyalty, and good faith to the shareholders.  
See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
88 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
89 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839, criminalizes information 
theft for economic gain. 
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dumping,90 rigging of bids, or in any other way manipulating the free market 
[hereinafter manipulate the market] (sub-regime c); 
(5) whether the firm engages in corrupt business practices by accepting or 
offering cash, services, or gifts of greater than nominal value to customers, 
suppliers, or government officials to influence business decisions [hereinafter 
engage in bribery] (sub-regime d);91 
(6) whether the firm allows funds, facilities, or services to be used to 
support political candidates or parties in violation of state or federal law, or 
requires employees to make personal contributions to candidates or PACs 
[hereinafter buy political influence] (sub-regime d);92 
(7) whether the firm is in breach of federal, state, or local employment 
laws, including the Civil Rights Acts, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), human rights provisions, and whistleblowing statutes 
designed to protect employees who report noncompliance93 [hereinafter violate 
labor law] (sub-regime e); 
(8) whether the firm is deliberately noncompliant in its adherence to laws 
and regulations governing environmental protection94 [hereinafter violate 
environmental standards] (sub-regime f); 
(9) whether the firm resists regulatory authorities in the implementation 
and enforcement of corporate law by failing to (i) enact, implement, and train 
employees in a comprehensive CMP;95 (ii) employ a dedicated corporate legal 
                                                
90 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, vol. 6 
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
91 The U.S. bribery statute imposes criminal penalties for offering to or accepting from a public 
official any material inducement to influence the performance of any official act.  18 U.S.C. § 
201(a).  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 105 Stat. 366 (1994), criminalizes bribery in 
international commerce. 
92 Political contributions from employees are not presumptively unlawful but must be made in 
compliance with applicable state and federal laws.  The presumption here is the most elite rule 
breakers are also those most likely to cultivate the rich and the powerful. 
93 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (Dec. 15, 1967); Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1191(c) (2012); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (1935). 
94  “Violate environmental standards” means the firm has, more than the national average of 
firms of similar size, industry, and market capitalization, been successfully sued civilly or criminally 
for violations of laws or regulations aimed at the protection of the natural environment against 
despoilment. 
95 Simply drafting a code, without subsequent implementation, can actually enhance the 
penalties to which a firm is subject for violations of corporate law.  See 2006 U.S. Federal 
Sentencing Guideline Manual, Ch. 8, Section B2.1 UNITED STATED SENTENCING COMM’N 
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2006/2006-federal-sentencing-guidelines-manual (last 
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compliance officer with substantial independent oversight authority, (iii) subject 
senior management to the same obligations as other employees, (iv) enable 
confidential reporting of illegality by protecting whistleblowers,96 (v) retain 
business records if litigation, investigation, or audit is pending or imminent, and 
(vi) make reasonable efforts to provide accurate and complete information to 
auditors, regulators, and investigators97 [hereinafter obstruct justice] (sub-regime 
g); 
(10) whether, prior to discovery of substantial violations of law, the firm 
or its CEO have a reputation with employees, investors, lenders, customers, 
vendors, communities, or regulators for unethical or unlawful business 
practices98 [hereinafter earn bad reputation] (sub-regimes a–g); 
(11) whether, as a result of having engaged in any of the practices outlined 
in (1)–(9), the firm has had to restate earnings [hereinafter restate earnings] 
(sub-regimes a–g); 
(12) whether, as a result of having engaged in any of the illegal practices 
outlined in (1)–(10), the firm or its CEO are subpoenaed to testify before 
Congress [hereinafter subpoenaed by Congress] (sub-regimes a–g); 
(13) whether, as a result of having engaged in any illegal practice outlined 
in (1)–(10), the firm or its CEO have been subjected to civil or criminal 
penalties [hereinafter incur legal penalty] (sub-regimes a–g); 
(14) whether, as a result of having engaged in any of the illegal practices 
outlined in (1)–(10), the firm has had to declare bankruptcy or has otherwise 
been liquidated [hereinafter suffer legal death] (sub-regimes a–g); 
(15) whether, after being penalized for wrongdoing, the CEO expresses 
the belief he or she did nothing wrong, blames others, declines to express 
remorse or make apologies, and neglects to offer restitution [hereinafter deny 
wrongdoing and blame others] sub-regimes a–g).  
c. Operationalization 
 
Many of the statutes, rules, and regulations that constitute the corporate 
                                                
visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
96 Many firms retaliate against those who report legal violations, and, thus, the act of reporting 
such violations requires tremendous courage. 
97 The dependent variable “obstruct justice” contemplates situations where firms resist 
enforcement or commit perjury by providing false information to regulators and investigators 
examining firm compliance.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012) (criminalizing obstruction of justice); 18 
U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (criminalizing knowing misrepresentation of a material fact when under a duty 
to disclose the truth). 
98 See Christopher W. Morros, What is this Thing Called Reputation?, 9 BUS. ETHICS Q. 87 
(1999) (providing a discussion on the subject of corporate reputation). 
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legal regime are sufficiently complex and susceptible to interpretation that the 
legality or illegality of any particular business decision may be difficult, even 
for trained legal counsel, to discern.  A gray area between what is clearly 
permitted and what is manifestly unlawful complicates operationalization of the 
lawfulness of firm decisions, particularly at the margins.  Consequently, CLC is 
almost invariably appraised in light of, and following, specific applications in 
practice.  Moreover, many firm decisions are shielded from external scrutiny 
and, thus, emerge as subjects of investigation only after they are framed by self-
interested parties.  Operationalizing particular CLC decisions requires subjective 
judgments and interpretations, and it can be difficult to adjudge a particular CLC 
decision as illegal ipso facto, such as proffering a gift of relatively modest 
material value to a long-term customer in a culture that embraces gift-giving as 
part of its business identity.  On the other hand, certain CLC decisions—the 
statement of earnings from a non-existent business entity or the shredding of 
documents to obstruct justice—are manifestly unlawful.  Most cases fall 
between these polar extremes and must be judged casuistically.  Subject to these 
caveats, it is feasible to establish associative linkages between personality 
profiles and CLC outcomes.  Accordingly, each DV is dichotomized and scored 
as either “yes” for the presence of the outcome or “no” for its absence.  
d. Preliminary Hypotheses and Associative Linkages 
 
Linkages between IVs and DVs proposed at this juncture as preliminary 
hypotheses (PHs) are established by positing that the more each and every IV 
finds expression in the personality of a given decision-maker, the more likely 
will be the occurrence of each DV.  In other words, the more militaristic the 
decision-maker, the more likely he or she will be to manipulate or misrepresent 
the financial performance of his or her firm and the more likely to violate 
securities regulations, accept inflated compensation and so on for each DV.  The 
same relationship holds for each IV; thus, the more anomistic, hostile, and 
adventuristic the decision-maker, the more likely he or she will be to reject 
compliance with law as measured by each of the fifteen DVs.  These sixty 
hypothesized relationships are expressed in the following form: “1. The more 
militaristic the CEO the more likely he or she will be to violate financial 
regulations.” 
III. PERSONALITY AND CLC: HEURISTIC TESTING OF THE THEORY 
A. Data 
The nature of the inquiry is such that there is bias in favor of CEOs whose 
decision-making resulted in violations of CLC.  Scandal, not successful 
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governance, sells.  We know much less about firms that have better compliance 
records than Enron, WorldCom, and other certified corporate miscreants.  
However, at this stage, it is infeasible to attempt to do more than sample the 
most accessible data, which necessitates a focus upon corporate scandals and the 
CEOs who initiated them.  While recognizing the universe of firms and CEOs is 
broader than what is possible to examine in this phase, and conclusions are 
contingent and tentative pending further research, this study employs heuristic 
testing to analyze available psychobiographical data concerning prominent 
CEOs who made verifiable CLC decisions.  Availability of data restricts 
analysis to ten CEOs and the firms they led.   
1.  Enron 
a. CEO Jeffrey Skilling99 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
a. Militarism 
 
Although shyness, loneliness, and poor self-esteem remain from an 
emotionally “tortured” childhood, Jeffrey Skilling (JS) is an “incandescently 
brilliant”100 person who acted out his grand ambition to “change the world”101 as 
CEO of Enron.  For JS, deregulation of the natural gas industry was a superior 
philosophy of government and markets that required him to institute “brutal 
competition” inside and outside Enron to “make the world a fairer place.”102  To 
achieve what was at least as much an ideological crusade as a business goal 
required merely the application of brains: for JS, the world has a right and 
wrong answer to every question,103 and intelligence leads ineluctably to the 
proper solution. 
However, colleagues, noting JS’s ambition and zeal, were quick to 
identify his enlarged self-confidence, saying privately he was “[s]ometimes 
wrong, but never in doubt.”104  His intelligence, coupled with enormous risk 
                                                
99 Although Kenneth Lay was “Enron’s founding father,” he ceded his role as de facto CEO to 
JS as early as 1997, and “[m]ore than anyone else, [JS]…personif[ied] the Enron scandal.”  
BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM xix (2004). 
100 See id. at 105 (describing JS as a “nerd,” insecure about his body image and appearance); Id. 
at 28–29 (describing JS’s intelligence). 
101  See LOREN FOX, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 35 (2003) (reporting JS “wanted… 
recogni[tion]…as someone…who had changed the world”). 
102  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 419. 
103  Id. at 58. 
104  Id. at 35. 
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propensity, fostered arrogance105 and compromised creative dissent: 
[JS] used his brainpower not just to persuade but to intimidate . . . [He] had 
dangerous blind spots.  His management skills were appalling, in large part 
because he didn’t really understand people.  He expected people to behave 
according to the imperatives of pure intellectual logic, but of course nobody does 
that . . . [JS] also had a tendency to oversimplify, and he largely disregarded—
indeed, he had an active distaste for—the messy details involved in executing a 
plan.  What thrilled [JS], always, was the intellectual purity of an idea, not the 
translation of that idea into reality . . . Over time his arrogance hardened, and he 
became so sure that he was the smartest person in the room that anyone who 
disagreed with him was summarily dismissed as just not bright enough to “get 
it.”106  
Moreover, although JS presented himself as an ideological purist 
committed to deregulation and to creating a “well-oiled machine that generated 
steadily growing profits[,]” the difference between this and the Enron JS 
actually built and managed was vast: 
[I]n reshaping Enron[,] [JS] turned it into a place where financial 
deception became almost inevitable . . . because there were so many other kinds 
of deception taking place.  [JS] created a freewheeling culture that he touted as 
innovative—but didn’t rein in the excesses that came with it.  He preached the 
gospel of intellectual capital, claiming that it was critically important to give 
smart people the resources and freedom to let creativity flourish[] but looked the 
other way when this became a license for wastefulness and self-indulgence.  He 
bragged about Enron’s sophisticated controls but undermined them at every turn.  
He was openly scornful of steady, asset-based businesses that grew slowly but 
generated cash—then swept them away to make room for a series of ever-bigger, 
ever-riskier bets that brought in almost no cash at all.  Worst of all, [JS] created 
impossible expectations and unbearable internal pressures by holding Enron out 
to Wall Street as something that it simply wasn’t.107 
Whether out of cynicism or blindness, JS still clings to his idealized notion 
of Enron.108 
Furthermore, although JS was intensely loyal to his inner circle of 
subordinates, rewarding them with enormous cash and other perquisites, he did 
not foster loyalty or cooperation.  Teamwork was disdained,109 as were 
                                                
105 When asked by the Dean of the Harvard B-School whether he was smart, JS boldly replied, 
“I’m fucking smart!”  Id. at 31. 
106  Id. at 28–29. 
107  Id. at 114. 
108  See generally id. 
109  See id. at 55, 57 (“[JS] could care less whether people got along with each other. . . . In many 
cases, he felt it was better if they didn’t get along, [because] it created a level of tension that he 
believed was good for helping people come up with new ideas.”). 
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friendships, and rewards were granted solely on the basis of individual 
performance.110  JS deliberately set employees against each other and promoted 
internal conflict in the belief disharmony and ruthless competition fostered 
innovation and productivity.111  In his relations with peers, and in particular his 
rival Rebecca Mark, JS demonstrated the same tendencies, fighting a “guerrilla 
war” and employing devious tactics to undermine her and gain at her expense112 
but distancing himself from others when not battling them for power and status.  
JS was aloof and uncomfortable, preferring his inner circle or even solitary trips 
to bars over the ceremonial aspects of life as a CEO.113 
Although Enron “did strive for diversity” and welcome employees without 
regard to race, religion, or other protected statuses,114 it was a “boys’ club” 
under JS, where men earned more than female peers who performed the same 
jobs as well and where sexual harassment was tolerated, even encouraged.115  
JS’s Enron was a “hard place for a woman to work.  It was like a boys’ locker 
room.”116  Nothing in the literature addresses whether JS was a nationalist, yet 
his ideological and dogmatic commitment to deregulation and competition, 
favorable attitude toward the use of power, aggressive tactics in dealing with 
peers, authoritarian style of management, hypercompetitive and ambitious 
approach to business, and his natural introversion, isolationism, and low self-
esteem result in a score of high on all but one of the sub-constructs of 
militarism.  JS is thus scored a militarist. 
 
b. Anomism 
 
For JS, law and rules were something to manipulate, and the Enron culture 
he established encouraged an employee to play by his own rules.  According to a 
former trader, “We all did it.  We talked about it openly.  It was the school yard 
we lived in.  The energy markets were new, immature, unsupervised.  We took 
                                                
110 MIMI SWARTZ, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 59 
(2004). 
111  See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 66 (suggesting JS’s managerial style stems from 
his experience as a consultant at McKinsey). 
112  Id. at 110. 
113  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 223. 
114  FOX, supra note 101, at 87.  Enron’s commitment to diversity was likely motivated less by a 
sense of moral or legal obligation than by a profit motive: “Enron cared only about performance, so 
it didn’t matter if an employee had a nose ring or green hair, or was homosexual.”  Id. 
115  See id. at 93 (“Despite the company’s attempts to hire a mix of men and women, Enron had 
within it a boys’ club…that reveled in rowdy times involving members of the opposite sex and 
strippers.  Not surprisingly, sexual hi-jinks resulted in rumored sexual harassment complaints from 
some female employees.”).  Pictures of female employees were posted on a “hottie board,” and 
women who complained found threatening notes on their cars.  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 79. 
116  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 123, 419. 
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pride in getting around the rules.  It was a game.”117  For JS, law was something 
to be finessed if possible or outright ignored if necessary, and the successful 
violation of the rules was a matter of personal pride.  Indeed, it was a 
fundamental constituent of Enron culture to be hostile to authority.118  Moreover, 
JS personally introduced the concept of mark-to-market accounting, a violation 
of existing laws,119 to facilitate earnings growth, and the massive accounting 
fraud perpetrated by Enron actually stirred his pride: 
[I]nterpreting the [GAAP] . . . has always been more art than science, 
reliant in no small part on the good faith of those applying them in everyday 
situations.  For very smart people who saw the rules as something to be gotten 
around, well, it wasn’t all that hard to do—in fact, some former Enron 
employees argue that the rules themselves provided a road map.  And[,] Enron, 
which prided itself on employing only the very smartest people, took that view 
further than any company that’s ever existed.  “We tried to aggressively use the 
literature to our advantage,” admits a former Enron accountant.  “All the rules 
create all these opportunities.  We got to where we did because we exploited all 
that weakness.” . . . And[,] there was the ultimate problem.  With Enron’s 
financial team working feverishly to exploit the rules, there was no one willing 
to say that the duck was still a dog.  Because they could come up with plausible 
rationales for why a given structure was still technically valid, they believed they 
were on the right side of the law.120 
JS is hostile to authority as evidenced by his “harshly libertarian view of 
business and markets” and his belief markets, and not laws backed by 
government authority, were the only legitimate forms of social and moral 
regulation.121  Moreover, JS was “remarkably disdainful” of Enron policies, 
believing himself above and beyond regulation.122  Under JS, “We had the 
authority to do anything and everything we wanted to do,” recalls one [JS 
employee].123  “We thumbed our noses at any personnel policies that the rest of 
Enron had.”124  JS, in effect, wanted not only to deregulate the gas market; he 
wanted to “deregulate himself and his people from the rest of the company.”125  
Furthermore, JS values little but money.  Harvard classmates recall him 
                                                
117  Id. at 275. 
118  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 274. 
119  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 39 (noting JS urged mark-to-market accounting to 
show profits even before the underlying assets had been sold and before their costs had been 
recognized). 
120  Id. at 185. 
121  See SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 37 (describing JS as “hostile to the established order”). 
122 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 57. 
123 Id. 
124  Id. 
125  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 59. 
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expressing willingness to manufacture a product that might harm consumers on 
the sole ground that it was profitable, and fellow Enron employees recall JS 
saying on occasion, “I’ve thought about this a lot, and all that matters is money . 
. . This touchy-feel stuff isn’t as important as cash.”126  Finally, JS’s lack of 
formal legal training did not aid his unsuccessful criminal defense. 
Thus, JS scores high on all sub-constructs of anomism and is scored an 
anomist. 
c. Hostility 
 
To JS, potential rivals lurked in the halls of Enron, and he had to be on 
guard to protect his position if he was to continue “doing the Lord’s work” in 
creating a new kind of energy company.127  JS believes he is a special intellect 
and has no patience for his intellectual inferiors.  He believes human motivation 
is triggered strictly by material considerations and is disinterested in others 
unless they are instrumental in advancing his interests.128  JS is not ethnocentric-
—he dislikes most people regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity—yet he tends 
toward sexism129 and is decidedly hostile: in a conference call with analysts in 
2000, when pressed for information by an analyst who suggested Enron was 
“the only financial institution that [could not] produce a balance sheet or cash-
flow with their earnings,” JS lashed out and called the analyst an “asshole,”130 a 
position from which he did not retreat even when implored to.131  Finally, when 
Enron began to implode, JS sold vast shares of stock while falsely assuring 
shareholders of the financial soundness of Enron.132  JS has expressed no 
concern that reliance on his deceptive assurances cost thousands of shareholders 
their life-savings.  In sum, JS scores high on all sub-constructs of hostility save 
for ethnocentrism, and, thus, is scored a hostile decision-maker. 
                                                
126  Id. at 43, 55. 
127  Id. at 71. 
128  See id. at 55 (JS…”used to say that he liked to hire ‘guys with spikes.’  By this, he meant that 
if an executive had a singular narrow talent—a spike—[JS] was willing to bring him into Enron and 
lavish him with money, no matter what his other shortcomings.  Egomaniacs, social misfits, 
backstabbers, devotees of strip clubs: [JS] didn’t really care about their foibles so long as they had a 
skill he needed.”). 
129  When it appeared Rebecca Mark might be awarded the job as COO in 1997, JS threatened 
Kenneth Lay “if that bitch gets it, I’m outta here.”  Id. at 355. 
130  Id. at 325–26. 
131  JS, a natural misanthrope, “liked to say that he never wanted to be in any business where the 
customer had to like him.”  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 279. 
132  See FOX, supra note 101, at 300. 
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d. Adventurism 
 
For JS, “should” and “would” are “pretty much the same[,]”133 and he 
believes that he can accomplish objectives through force of will, no matter how 
risky or unlikely these objectives.  Perhaps his most obvious personality 
characteristic, evident even as a child,134 is his appetite for large risks.  “For all 
his analytical abilities, he was a gambler at heart and had been from an early 
age.  He always assumed that he could beat the odds . . . [T]hat was [JS]’s most 
dangerous blind spot of all.”135  Although JS claimed to have created a 
sophisticated risk management unit that allowed Enron to safely and profitably 
assume more risk than other firms, in fact, the unit and its leadership simply 
pressured deal makers to set “absurdly optimistic assumptions for the complex 
models that spat out the likelihood of various outcome for a transaction.”136  In 
practice, these deals often lost money, and JS simply quit and dashed into other 
deals that promised excitement, believing this time he could will risk away.  
Each year, JS would run NCAA betting pools of over $100,000, which he 
claimed to be part of an “intellectual exercise designed to teach young traders 
about risk and reward.”137 
Risk-seeking behavior did not come without a price: by 2001, many 
observers believed JS had become depressed and mentally unstable.  When an 
employee almost struck his car in the Enron parking lot, JS gave him the 
finger—an act completely outside the parameters of what is expected from the 
CEO of one of the nation’s largest companies; others report spotting him 
sprawled across numerous seedy bars in bad parts of Houston, drunk.138  During 
this period of time, JS was wildly optimistic the increasingly perilous position of 
the firm would improve, yet he was privately so anxious he could not sleep,139 
and on more than one occasion he stated that he “hated” his job and was 
thinking of retirement.140 
To summarize, JS is a highly risk tolerant, impulsive, anxious man whose 
overly-optimistic belief in his capacity to manage risk caused him to make poor 
decisions under great stress.  He thus scores as an adventurist on each sub-
construct of adventurism. 
                                                
133  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 27. 
134  FOX, supra note 101, at 33 (noting JS performed dangerous stunts as a child and chose 
dangerous recreation as an adult). 
135 Id. at 28–29. 
136  Id. at 116. 
137  Id. at 215. 
138  Id. at 338. 
139  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 13, 272. 
140  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 338. 
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e. Summary of Independent Variables: Jeffrey Skilling 
 
JS is scored as a militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic decision-
maker. 
 ii. DVs: CLC and Enron 
 
By the late 1990s, Enron had become the one of the world’s leading 
energy companies, with a market capitalization of nearly $70 billion, yet it rose 
to prominence through systematic illegality perpetrated at the very highest levels 
of the firm.141  The “free-for-all” culture established by JS contributed to his 
decisions, as charged and proven by indictment and conviction, to commit, 
authorize, or approve illegal accounting measures, creation of special purpose 
entities designed to hide debt and inflate earnings,142 fraudulent inflation of the 
price of the firm’s stock and other acts of securities fraud,143 money laundering, 
and other financial and securities crimes.144  As CEO, JS oversaw the 
manipulation of energy markets in California by Enron traders who were taught 
to use the firm’s near-absolute control over information to “force” vulnerable 
markets and generate monopoly prices on energy contracts.145  Foreign 
governments were bribed to facilitate deals,146 and politicians and parties were 
very generously endowed to curry favor.147 
                                                
141 Robin Sidel & Mitchell Pacelle, J.P. Morgan Settles Enron Lawsuit, WALL. ST. J. (June 15, 
2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111878962274259649. 
142  Enron created over 2800 SPEs to hide its financial conduct from investors and from the SEC.  
NOMI PRINS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: THE CORPORATE MUGGING OF AMERICA (2004). 
143  Gellerman, supra note 6, at xv. 
144  See United States v. Causey, Cr. No. H-04-25 (S-2) (S.D. Tex., Jul. 7, 2004), Indictment.  
The indictment resulted in conviction in May 2006 on nineteen counts of conspiracy, fraud, and 
insider trading and a sentence of twenty-four years in prison.  Id.  Months earlier, CFO Andrew 
Fastow pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud and agreed to pay 
$30 million in fines and cooperate with investigators, making the following admission with his plea:  
“I and other members of Enron’s senior management fraudulently manipulated Enron’s publicly 
reported financial results.  Our purpose was to mislead investors and others about the true financial 
position of Enron, and…to inflate artificially the price of Enron’s stock.”).  See United States v. 
Fastow, Cr. No. H-02-0665, Plea Agreement, Jan. 14, 2004, at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw. 
com/hdocs/docs/enron/usafastow11404plea.pdf. 
145  FERC found in 2000 that Enron had imposed “unjust and unreasonable” interference with the 
market in California and that there was “clear evidence of market manipulation” on the part of 
Enron, increasing the price of power and resulting in rolling blackouts.  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra 
note 99, at 276.  In 2000, Enron paid a fine and agreed not to “engage in substantially the same 
conduct” as it had previously, including market manipulation in California energy.  Id. at 269. 
146  Gellerman, supra note 6, at xiv.                                                                                                                                        
147  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 225 (reporting Enron donated $300,000 to the inauguration of 
President George W. Bush in 2000 and this was but a small fraction of the contributions to 
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Moreover, rather than discipline executives whose legal transgressions 
violated the Enron CMP, JS lavished them with grossly excessive compensation 
and perquisites, including millions of shares of stock and options.  In 2000, even 
as the financial health of the firm declined precipitously, the top 200 Enron 
executives earned an average base salary of $720,000, and twenty-six earned 
over $10 million each.148  JS’s Enron was not nearly so gracious to all 
employees; the firm had a decided preference for young over old, and each year 
the 15% it deemed least productive were terminated.149  Those who remained 
were subjected to a vulgar environment in which sexual harassment was 
common.  Worse, whistleblowers with the temerity to alert top management to 
illegality within the firm were not protected: Sherron Watkins, a senior manager 
whose efforts to expose violations of law earned her public acclaim for her 
courage, was subjected to an internal investigation, and Enron’s external legal 
counsel suggested one possible response to her claims might be to termination to 
silence and discredit her.150 
 Under JS, Enron was ideologically resistant to cooperation with 
regulatory authorities.  Although Enron developed a robust and holistic code of 
ethics to which the firm ostensibly expected all of its employees to adhere, JS 
developed a culture of noncompliance in which employees were rewarded, 
albeit indirectly, in proportion to their violations of that very code.151  
Employees received no specific training beyond the occasional public platitudes 
in favor of ethical conduct offered by senior executives, and the firm’s own in-
house legal department was at worst a co-conspirator and at best a grossly 
negligent party.  All employees profited from lawbreaking, but senior 
management hatched the conspiracy and claimed the greatest rewards from 
noncompliance. 
As evidence of its legal violations mounted and its stock price plummeted 
in 2000, investment banks became concerned about the “reputational risk” 
involved in “aid[ing and] abet[ing] Enron income st[atement] manipulation” 
through the use of SPEs, and rumors of the impending implosion of the firm 
began to circulate.152  Although JS ordered the restatement of the firm’s earnings 
in an attempt to mitigate the loss of investor confidence and to forestall 
regulatory investigation,153 once Enron’s noncompliance could no longer be 
                                                
politicians and parties made as a matter of course). 
148  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 240. 
149 Id. 
150  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 291. 
151  See id. at 14 (stating the its rampant noncompliance has rendered the firm’s name “Enron” 
into “shorthand for the excesses of American business.”). 
152  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 208. 
153  See SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 330 (reporting Enron filed an 8K restatement of earnings in 
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concealed and litigation was impending, the firm ordered Arthur Anderson, its 
external auditor, to destroy incriminating business records.154  However, in short 
order Enron could no longer service its debt, and the firm filed bankruptcy on 
December 2, 2001.155  Enron executives, including JS, were subpoenaed by 
Congress, sued by shareholders156 and employees, and prosecuted. 
Upon resigning, JS denied any responsibility for the death of Enron, 
stating instead the following: “I deserve a break.  If people come back and write 
the history of Enron Corporation, they’ll look at my tenure as CEO.  It was not 
great for the stock price . . . It is what it is.  I think what I would . . . hope people 
would look at, is what earnings did.”157 
In a 2001 interview, JS continued to withhold contrition, adding: “In the 
last two months, I’ve gone through everything in my mind that was done when I 
was here that could have been related to this . . . After much soul searching, . . . I 
would not have done anything different.”158  In his congressional testimony, JS 
claimed, as he was not an accountant, he could not have known Enron had 
violated GAAP by using its own stock to generate a gain and avoid a loss on its 
income statement and the failure of Enron was simply a liquidity problem 
similar to that which caused bank failures in the 1930s: 
Enron’s failure was due to a class run on the bank, a liquidity crisis spurred by a 
lack of confidence in the company.  At the time of Enron’s collapse, the 
company was solvent, and the company was highly profitable[] but apparently 
not liquid enough.  At the time I left the company, I . . . did not believe that the 
company was in any imminent financial peril.159 
In 2006, JS began serving a twenty-four-year sentence for conspiracy, 
accounting and securities fraud, and insider trading.160  Enron exists only as a 
legal fiction to pay creditors, and yet JS continues to admit no fault, insisting 
that “they killed a great company.”161 
                                                
2001). 
154  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 381. 
155  See In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG), 2006 WL 898031 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 
2006). 
156  See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. H-03-3624 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
157  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 350. 
158  Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Former Head of Enron Denies Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2001. 
159  SWARTZ, supra note 110, at 351. 
160 David Teather, Skilling to Report to Prison, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2006), http://www.theguard 
ian.com/business/2006/dec/13/corporatefraud.usnews. 
161  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 99, at 419. 
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2.  WorldCom 
a. CEO Bernard Ebbers 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
 a. Militarism 
 
WorldCom (WC) founder and CEO Bernard Ebbers (BE) is a 
hypercompetitive162 former athlete who hails from humble origins in rural 
Canada163 yet leveraged his work ethic and ambition to build one of the world’s 
largest and most profitable telecom firms.164 
While not of an academic or formal disposition, and despite a tendency 
toward shyness, BE cultivated a congenial public persona that motivated his 
employees to want to work hard for him in spite of the seemingly decentralized 
environment he inspired.165  As a result, employees and outsiders alike all 
wanted to be an “FOB—a friend of Bernie.”166  BE embraced one and all, with 
friendship and with money, and WC’s color-blind generosity extended far and 
wide across Mississippi. 
Despite his public image, however, BE had a strong need to accumulate 
and use power, and WC was not nearly the unstructured, unsupervised 
environment it appeared.  “Power was the drug of choice for [BE],”167 and his 
constant deal-making kept him supplied with control over the 
telecommunications industry.  With his taste for power came a tendency to 
authoritarianism.  WC was a hierarchical organization, and employees did the 
bidding of the boss.  One former employee compares WC culture under BE to 
her experience with that of a competitor as follows: 
MCI was much more open and willing to take chances, to let people propose an 
idea and move forward with it, or as we used to call it, the Catholic way of doing 
business—do something and then ask for forgiveness later—but at WC, it was 
not that way . . . If the idea didn’t come down from the top or one of the favored 
                                                
162  AMY JETER, DISCONNECTED 61–62 (2004) (“In competition, he is fierce and… he’ll cut your 
heart out.”). 
163  Id.  BE, a Canadian by birth, did not acquire U.S. citizenship and does not evince particular 
patriotism in regard to his land of origin or his adopted country.  Id. 
164  Id. at 3–10. 
165  Id. at 47 
166  Id. at 147. 
167  Id. at 154. 
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people, it didn’t happen.  Thinking was not encouraged.168 
Nothing suggests BE was aggressive, dogmatic, or low in self-esteem, and 
his social adroitness indicates he overcame childhood introversion.  Even after 
his resignation from WC, he remained engaged in the civic life of Mississippi, 
rather than slipping into isolation as do many fallen CEOs.  BE thus scores high 
on four sub-constructs of militarism and is scored a non-militarist. 
 
  b. Anomism 
 
BE came from a devoutly religious family and, as WC CEO, liked to 
preach that “doing the morally right thing happens to be good economics.”169  
He opened every WC meeting with a prayer, worshipped at area churches, and 
publicly testified on many occasions to his deep Christian faith.170  Despite these 
affirmations of commitment to a moral code as the foundation for his life and 
work, however, BE spent many nights drinking and often attended board 
meetings under the influence, and he took his marriage vows rather lightly, 
engaging in numerous and publicized extramarital affairs.171 
BE extended a general pattern of nonconforming behavior to his and his 
firm’s relationship to law.  BE had no legal training and no specific knowledge 
of corporate law, but neither would have attenuated his willingness to permit 
employees, particularly his accounting and financial teams, to blur legal lines to 
serve his material objectives.  As a WC insider recalls, BE tacitly approved 
noncompliance as a “remedy” to unfavorable business information: “When 
everything was going well, which it did for a very long time, Bernie was happy . 
. . When it didn’t, Bernie didn’t want to hear about it.”172  When the Justice 
Department intervened to block the proposed WC-Sprint merger, BE’s vicious 
lambasting of FCC Chairman William Kennard and the Assistant Attorney 
General earned him no favors, and, when the SEC and other agencies later 
focused their attention on corporate illegality at WC, BE’s disregard for legal 
authorities manifested yet again in harsh public commentary.173 
In sum, although it is difficult to score him high on amoralism, BE scores 
high on disregard for law and legal authorities, ignorance of law, and ignorance 
of corporate law and, thus, is scored an anomist. 
 
                                                
168  Id. at 87. 
169  Id. at 98. 
170  Id. at 91. 
171  Id. at 37, 91. 
172  Id. at 94. 
173  Id. at 120–24. 
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  c. Hostility 
 
BE is a study in contrasts and in the duality of personality.  Beneath the 
easygoing, God-fearing cowboy facade, he is a deeply moody and distrustful 
person who demands extreme loyalty from his employees and flies into fits of 
rage if he does not receive that loyalty or is otherwise denied his desires.174  He 
fired executives who sold WC stock, whatever their motivations, yet he would 
go out of his way to help troubled but loyal employees.175  Although he 
presented himself as a simple man who did not “put on airs” to impress 
others,176 he hobnobbed with celebrities and grew jealous of fellow executives 
who earned accolades or friends in high places, believing they were scheming 
against him.177  He had many “friends” yet kept an enemies list to remember 
petty slights that required redress and “was always somewhat confrontational, 
and in-your-face, compared to most . . . in the Deep South.”178  Although not 
ethnocentric or racist—he is comfortable with African Americans and Hispanics 
and spent time living on a Native American reservation179—he imagined 
enemies where none existed and enjoyed using power to intimidate those who 
were not useful to him.180 
Moreover, although BE fancied himself a master puppeteer in total control 
of a corporate giant, he vastly overestimated his ability to run WC; as one 
observer notes: 
Bernie was out of his league . . . He wasn’t qualified to be the CEO of a global 
telecom company.  You can try to spin it any way you want, but the bottom line 
is that he’s a peddler.  He likes to peddle and make deals.  But[,] when it came to 
actually organizing, operating, and managing a major corporation, he didn’t do 
very well.181 
When his power was challenged, as when the Justice Department denied 
his planned WC-Sprint merger, he could not temper his anger as good strategy 
                                                
174  See id. at 92 (“At least a dozen people who dealt closely with [BE] mentioned that he seemed 
to have a dual personality.”). 
175  Id. at 40, 104.  BE treated others according to a “pecking order” measured by how useful they 
were or could be to him and WC.  Id. at 92. 
176  See id. at 46 (recounting an episode when BE was mistaken for a “fax salesman” due to his 
unassuming manner and dress). 
177  Id. at 98. 
178  Id. at 60–62. 
179  Id. at 92 (“‘[BE] wasn’t prejudiced against race [or] religion,’ said a former employee.  ‘It 
simply depended on how important you were to his agenda.’”). 
180  See, e.g., id. at 61 (reporting, when a colleague mentioned a favorable article about BE 
written by a Newsweek reporter, “before I even finished the sentence, [BE] cut me off.  He said, 
‘Never met the son-of-a-bitch in my life.’”); id. at 98 (reporting his intimidation of others). 
181  Id. at 161. 
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dictated, and, when WC collapsed under the weight of the illegality he permitted 
during his tenure, his reaction was to ensure his own financial future, rather than 
preserve the value of the firm for its shareholders.  He continues to show no 
remorse.182  Beneath the veneer of sociability and compassion, BE is a 
distrustful, narcissistic, cynical Machiavellian lacking in empathy who scores 
high on eight sub-constructs and is scored as hostile. 
 
  d. Adventurism 
 
BE took great risks in starting WC, and he never missed an opportunity to 
buy an asset, whether hindsight determined that decision to be sound or not.  His 
business character is best described as wildly optimistic and impulsive, and this 
combination led WC to wealth and then into bankruptcy.  In the words of U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court examiner Dick Thornburgh: 
Few companies in the annals of American business have grown so large and so 
fast in such an intensely competitive marketplace.  WC did not achieve its 
growth by following a predefined strategic plan, but rather by opportunistic and 
rapid acquisitions of other companies.  The unrelenting pace of these 
acquisitions caused the company constantly to redefine itself and its focus.  The 
company’s unceasing growth and metamorphosis made integration . . . much 
more difficult.183 
In essence, BE was overly optimistic about his ability to exert positive 
control of external events, and his optimism and preference for risk simply 
lacked an objective foundation in business reality.  This overconfidence, coupled 
with impulsivity that even in his late fifties reportedly impelled him to engage in 
fistfights in bars,184 led him and his firm astray.  Although the available evidence 
does not compel the conclusion BE made decisions during periods of heightened 
anxiety, at the very least BE scores high on every other sub-construct of 
adventurism and, thus, is scored an adventurist. 
 
e.  Summary of Independent Variables: Bernard Ebbers 
 
BE is a non-militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic decision-
maker. 
                                                
182  BE drove his Mercedes to self-report to Oakdale (Louisian) Federal Correctional Institution 
on September 26, 2006.  CLARION LEDGER, Sept. 26, 2006. 
183  JETER, supra note 162, at 27, 202. 
184  Id. at 147. 
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ii. DVs: CLC and WorldCom 
 
Prior to its demise in bankruptcy in 2002,185 WC was the largest U.S. long 
distance telephonic service provider and the world’s largest Internet carrier, 
providing a ten-year annual rate of return on equity of 53% and enjoying a 
reputation as a friendly, clean, good employer and neighbor.186  BE denied 
unwarranted perquisites to WC executives and further restricted them after the 
failed merger with Sprint.187  Although WC, a major contributor to both political 
parties and to candidates for the Public Service Commission charged with its 
regulation,188 forestalled official scrutiny for a decade, a planned merger with 
Sprint, blocked by the Justice Department Antitrust Division on the claim the 
merger would “undermine the competitive gains achieved since the department 
challenged AT&T’s monopoly of the telecommunications industry [twenty-five] 
years ago[,]”189 opened the doors to a more thorough examination of WC’s legal 
compliance.  With WC stock price falling on news of the failed merger, a 
chastened BE stated as follows: 
We recognize that we, as a company, have let you down . . . We certainly don’t 
look at this as the best day of our life.  [The attempt to acquire Sprint] ended up a 
mistake—and I am certainly accountable for that mistake . . . I’m sure with the 
recent performance of this stock, people have a legitimate right to ask if I have a 
right to lead this company.190 
If the statement implied contrition on the part of a firm caught attempting 
to manipulate the market by achieving monopolistic power, BE’s and WC’s 
subsequent strategies belied this conclusion.  BE began borrowing what would 
amount to more than $408 million from WC to avoid selling his personal shares 
to meet margin calls—a decision that upon disclosure would lead to his 
resignation191—and, lacking sufficient cash reserves, WC began to engage in a 
                                                
185 WC declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 on July 21, 2002.  Luisa Beltran, WorldCom Files 
Largest Bankruptcy Ever, CNN MONEY (July 22, 2002, 10:35AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/ 
2002/07/19/news/worldcom_bankruptcy/. 
186  JETER, supra note 162, at xx, 70. 
187  See id. at 51 (writing executive perquisites were contrary to BE’s philosophy, which stressed 
cost-cutting to support the stock price); id. at 96–97, 127 (reporting, after the failed Sprint merger, 
BE eliminated perquisites such as first-class airplane seats, limousine service, four-star hotels, and 
high per diems). 
188 WC—in its corporate capacity—was convicted of a felony for illegal contributions to the 
Public Service Commission in 1995.  Id. at 57.  There is no information to suggest WC engaged in 
direct bribery. 
189  See United States v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 1:00CV02789 (RWR) (D.D.C., filed Nov. 17, 
2000), at Complaint. 
190  JETER, supra note 162, at 182. 
191  See id. at 127.  This practice is now prohibited under SOX.  See SOX supra note 2, at 1. 
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series of fraudulent accounting and securities-related practices, including double 
bookings of revenue; failure to report over $600 million in uncollectible 
accounts receivables; delayed payments to vendors; recording of capital 
expenses where operating expenses were required by law; and deliberate 
understatement of costs—all designed to illegally boost earnings and profits to 
compensate for the loss of the benefit of the merger.192  In 2002 the SEC, Justice 
Department, and the Mississippi Attorney General began investigating and 
eventually uncovered the world’s largest accounting and securities scandal.193  
Although WC hastened to restate and reduce past earnings by $7.8 billion,194 it 
was too late to stem the investigative tide.  The House Financial Services 
Committee issued subpoenas to top executives, including BE, even as the 
financial collapse of the firm destroyed the retirement plans of thousands of 
employees and investors. 
WC’s reputation—sterling prior to its slide into bankruptcy—suffered 
damage, leading some to brand it “WorldCon,” yet many held the view that it 
was a time to “circle the wagons, because Bernie’s a local guy.”195  During 
congressional testimony, BE disclaimed any knowledge of or responsibility for 
illegality at WC with the following statement: 
When all of the activities at WC are fully aired and when I get the opportunity . . 
. to explain my actions in a setting that will not compromise my ability to defend 
myself in the legal proceedings arising out of the recent events, I believe that no 
one will conclude that I engaged in any criminal or fraudulent conduct during 
my tenure at WC.196 
Indeed, many industry experts, analysts, and observers supported BE’s 
contention that he had been a “hands-off” CEO who lacked knowledge of the 
illegality that transpired at WC.197 
However, as the government succeeded in wrangling plea bargains and 
convictions against top WC executives on charges of conspiracy to boost 
earnings reports, securities fraud, and filing false statements, the myth of BE as 
wildly successful but out-of-the-loop corporate cheerleader crumbled, and he 
was convicted in March 2005 of securities fraud, conspiracy, and filing false 
                                                
192 See generally J. Randel Kuhn, Jr. & Steve G. Sutton, Learning from WorldCom: Implications 
for Fraud Detection through Continuous Assurance, 3 J. EMERGING TECH. ACCT. 61–80 (2006). 
193 Simon Romero, Turmoil at WorldCom: The Overview; WorldCom Facing Charges of Fraud; 
Inquiries Expand, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/business/turmoil 
-worldcom-overview-worldcom-facing-charges-fraud-inquiries-expand.html. 
194  JETER, supra note 162, at 203.  
195  Id. at 176. 
196  Id. at 183. 
197  Id. at 190. 
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documents with the SEC.198  He continues to deny any wrongdoing. 
3.  ImClone Systems 
a. CEO Sam Waksal 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
  a. Militarism 
 
Although CEO Sam Waksal (SW) possesses a powerful and creative mind 
that inspired him into an academic medical career before his turn to business, he 
is a “nebbish—a nerd—whose desperation to be part of the fast crowd” was so 
apparent it became a running joke.199  His poor self-esteem magnified his 
ambition to the point that he “is prepared to do whatever it takes, at whatever 
cost, to become a ‘player.’”200  To wit, he has always felt the need to “improve 
on the facts” by telling “half-truths or untruths”;201 out of self-consciousness 
over his status as the child of immigrants, he told neighborhood playmates that 
he had an older brother at the U.S. Naval Academy to appear more “middle-
American.”202  The sense he lacked status, and the burning drive to achieve 
admiration and respect, have motivated SW’s behavior since childhood.203 
The need to match the accomplishments of his father, who escaped Nazi 
death camps and spent World War II as a resistance fighter, triggered strong 
ambition and competitiveness; in SW’s own words,  
My father is such an incredible hero.  I feel there is nothing I could ever do that 
could match the things he did.  My parents’ experience affects me every single 
                                                
198 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Ex-WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers; 
Former WorldCom CFO Scott Sullivan Pleads Guilty (Mar. 2, 2004),  available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/March04/ebbersindict2pr.pdf; Krysten Crawford, Ex-WorldCom 
CEO Ebbers Guilty, CNN MONEY (Mar. 15, 2005, 4:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/ 
15/news/newsmakers/ebbers/ (reporting his conviction). 
199  ALEX PRUD’HOMME, THE CELL GAME 156 (Harper Business 2004). 
200  Id. 
201 Id. at 26. 
202  Id.  His desire to seem more “American” cannot be conflated with “nationalism” as it 
manifests a desire to belong but is lacking any other markers for nationalism.  See supra note 35 and 
accompanying text.  The same is true of his pride in his Jewish heritage.  Denker et al., supra note 
35, at 352. 
203  See PRUD’HOMME, supra note 199, at 65 (“Others say that while attaining wealth was 
certainly important . . . [t]he primary motivator for Sam . . . was status.”); see also id. at 323 (“Sam . 
. . was hideously superficial. . . . He wanted to be one of the boys so badly. . . . People would joke 
about it—‘the nerd trying to be fast.’”). 
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day of my life.  It drives me.  When you grow up in a home where the parents 
survived a very terrible ordeal in world history, and a lot of other people didn’t, 
then you look at the world from day one in a very different way . . . I look at the 
world that way, too—in making sure one builds and creates.  It’s a driving 
force.204 
This drive—which SW tasked toward the reaping of a vast fortune—
unleashed an authoritarian form of leadership.  At ImClone, employees knew to 
“play by his rules or else,” and those who remained with the firm toed the 
line.205  A volcanic temper206 coexists uneasily with abundant personal charm 
and extroversion that, when SW deployed them to convince investors to back his 
work, was persuasive.207  The literature does not support the finding that SW 
was a nationalist or a dogmatist, nor an introvert or an isolationist, but SW is a 
competitive, aggressive, authoritarian figure with low self-esteem who 
manipulates facts and uses power to control others in the service of his 
ambitions.  SW thus scores high on six of ten sub-constructs of militarism and is 
scored as a militarist. 
  b. Anomism 
 
SW, the classic scofflaw, had “a sense of urgency about life,” an old friend 
observed.208  “[His parents’] survival had been so miraculous that they had a 
different sense of how to live.  The rules of society didn’t really apply.”209  
Despite his pride in his Jewish heritage, the morality and ethics of Judaism 
escaped him, and a sense of personal entitlement so strong it relieved him from 
the obligations that bound lesser people has manifested in SW’s life.210  His 
dissertation was reportedly written by his mistress—also his graduate 
assistant—with whom he began consorting the first year of his marriage.211  He 
actively seeks out opportunities to challenge public legal authority, perhaps to 
fulfill a neurochemical need for conflict:212  
                                                
204  Id. at 27. 
205  Id. at 54. 
206  Id. at 54, 358. 
207  See id. at xvi (reporting SW’s persuasiveness convinced world-famous oncologists to join 
ImClone’s drug development). 
208  Id. at 26–27. 
209  Id. 
210  See id. at 342 (noting SW’s college roommate stated “[t]he stuff [SW] did was so not Jewish 
. . . . He missed the part that could have saved him.”). 
211  Id. at 30–31. 
212  See id. at 28 (quoting a friend of SW) (“He loves to pull a rabbit out of a hat.  He needs that 
adrenaline rush.”). 
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Once . . .he had been stopped from entering Egypt from Israel because he didn’t 
have the proper visa.  But[,] with a gale of protest and sweet talk[,] he managed 
to wear down the guards and make his way across the border—an achievement 
he was especially proud of . . . because he had used his quick mind and quick 
tongue to “get away” with something forbidden.213 
SW’s recurring refusal to respect legal rules and authorities and a deficient 
moral foundation has caused him lifelong pain; a mistress used the phrase “Tall 
Poppy Syndrome” to explain the pattern:  
Sam is his own, special, unique human being . . . He doesn’t sit back and wait, 
he plows straight through things.  He breaks norms.  And[,] society always 
bashes down people who break rules.  People love to hate him, and always have.  
Like the tall poppy that stands above the rest, they always want to mow Sammy 
down.214 
SW has no specialized training in law and is a deeply amoral person who 
lacks respect for law and for legal authorities.  He scores high on all sub-
constructs of anomism and is scored as an anomist. 
  c. Hostility 
 
SW did not trust others, nor did they trust him.  He told lies “so well, and 
so often, he actually started to believe them himself,” his college roommate 
recalls.215  SW inflated his GPA, proclaimed the results of experiments he never 
completed, and made unfulfilled promises to help others: 
To gain social favor, [SW would] promise to help friends or sorority girls with 
their term papers or class notes; sometimes he’d do what he promised, but often 
he wouldn’t.  He didn’t seem to understand, or care, about the anguish it caused 
people who had counted on him.  “He became known as a flake and a liar,” said 
[his college roommate].  “A ‘star-fucker’—always trying to be near the [pretty] 
people.  In the end[,] he wasn’t a very popular guy.  He burned through 
people.”216 
This burning through people, as well as SW’s public proclamations that he 
would “win the Nobel Prize,” that the grand purpose behind ImClone was to 
“make the world better,” and that those who interfered with him were 
“allow[ing] evil to win,”217 are typical behaviors of narcissists and 
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Machiavellians, as are SW’s arrogance, abrasiveness, and rudeness.  Moreover, 
narcissism is evident in SW’s statement in a 2002 interview, that he believed he 
“was the most honest CEO that ever lived . . . [and that consequently he] could 
glibly do something illegal and rationalize it.”218 
SW’s cynicism and, to a lesser extent, misanthropy, is evident in his 
appeal to his sentencing judge for leniency on the grounds that he had 
demonstrated good citizenship over the years through his charitable 
contributions and had always shown “empathy for the underdog.”219  The judge, 
while noting SW had indeed donated nearly $750,000 to charity in the preceding 
three years, noted further in sentencing SW to the maximum term in prison that 
SW’s contributions totaled less than one-half of one percent of his income over 
the period of $132 million and that much of his ill-gotten gains had been 
expropriated from underdog investors.220  Certainly, the argument could be 
made that SW had labored hard over the decades to help humanity, yet a former 
ImClone senior manager dispenses with this, stating SW was motivated solely 
by greed devoid of any empathic impulse for the victims of the cancer he 
pretended to care about curing: “I don’t think Sam gave a hoot what the 
company did.  He didn’t give a hoot about making ‘great scientific advances,’ or 
‘saving people’s lives.’ . . . You know what Sam’s goal was?  To build a 
company, with himself as CEO, and get rich.  Period.”221 
Thus, SW scores high on all nine sub-constructs of hostility and is thus 
scored as a hostile decision-maker.  
  d. Adventurism 
 
SW was an “ideas man,” and a quick, rather than deep, thinker.  His 
impulsivity would lead him to “make messes” that his dutiful younger brother 
would clean up.222  He was a “notorious spendthrift” and “always in financial 
trouble,”223 and his impulsivity and indiscipline invited financial pain: 
Sam would show up for class late and there’d be no parking places left, so he’d 
just leave his car sitting in the middle of the street; he accumulated so many 
tickets he set a new OSU record and the police hauled him in.  But[,] “his father 
always bailed him out,” said [his roommate].  He never worked.  Never had 
discipline.  It’s really ironic—his parents tried to give him this great life, and 
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they unwittingly created a monster.224 
SW was wildly optimistic.  Although his grades were far below Ivy 
League expectations, his college roommate recalls, “He applied to only one 
medical school—Harvard.  I warned him he didn’t have the grades, and he ought 
to look around more.  But[,] I think he’d convinced himself he’d get in.”225  Not 
only was SW not accepted by Harvard Medical School, but also, in his 
subsequent academic career, he established a pattern of promising paradigm-
rattling results only to fail—often dramatically—to deliver.  SW continued, 
despite contrary evidence, to believe he could impose his will upon the world.226 
To make matters worse, SW was a risk-taker: he had a string of 
extramarital liaisons with lab technicians; he raced motorcycles; he falsified 
data;  and he started a private biotech firm despite the great probability of 
failure. 227  The only path to reward was through risk, and because SW sought 
the greatest possible rewards he took the greatest risks.  Nonetheless, risk was 
something that did not stress SW or cause him anxiety: he, after all, was SW, 
and the normal rules—and normal probabilities—did not apply.228 
In sum, SW is a risk-tolerant, impulsive, optimistic decision-maker who 
believed, despite risky and impulsive decisions, he would achieve the wealth 
and fame he coveted.  He is high on five of seven sub-constructs of adventurism 
and is scored an adventurist. 
e. Summary of IVs: Sam Waksal 
 
Sam Waksal is a militaristic, anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic 
decision-maker. 
 ii. DVs: CLC and ImClone 
 
In the late 1990s, ImClone, having failed to make good on SW’s 
outlandish promises, was in financial and reputational decline, yet SW continued 
to travel first-class, use limousines, and frequent the best hotels and restaurants.  
229  Favored ImClone employees enjoyed open bars and restaurants at firm 
expense, but employees who did not enjoy a close relationship with the CEO 
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were bullied, and sexism and xenophobia were a distinct part of firm culture.230  
Somehow, ImClone not only survived but by mid-2001 had become the 
“undisputed star of biotech,” armed with a license to produce and market “the 
[biological] equivalent of ‘smart bombs’” against cancer.231  Erbitux was 
expected to be worth $1 billion in annual profit if one could believe SW, who 
promised investors that the cancer drug was a “miracle compound” that would 
“save the lives of thousands of dying cancer patients, . . . change the very nature 
of science[,]. . .[and] bring [] not only gold but glory[!]”232  All that remained 
was to acquire the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
SW promised investors that the FDA had placed Erbitux on the “fast-track” to 
approval.233 
However, SW’s claims about the efficacy of Erbitux and its regulatory 
status were wildly exaggerated.  The precursor drug, C225, had been successful 
in only 20% of test cancer patients, and major pharmaceutical firms were leery 
of SW’s claims.234  According to a former ImClone employee: 
It was all lies . . . I felt something important had been betrayed. . . .  I asked 
myself: What am I doing here? . . .  Some people at ImClone thought I was crazy 
to feel that way.  They’d say, “What’s the big deal that the science wasn’t 
right?”. . .  The science didn’t matter there.  What mattered was how fast Sam . . 
. could make a buck.235 
When ImClone refused to make C225 available through a compassionate-
use program—a humanitarian method of helping suffering patients while 
generating additional data that requires only a brief pro forma FDA examination 
for approval—some observers took pause.236  Bristol Meyers Squibb (BMS), 
however, banking on SW’s promises, negotiated a tender offer of $70 per share 
that granted marketing rights to BMS and earned SW nearly $130 million.237  
Although some BMS executives were concerned the valuable asset was actually 
C225 and not ImClone, the BMS audit of ImClone’s data was executed with too 
large a measure of faith in SW.238 
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Immediately after the BMS-ImClone deal to market the C225 derivative 
drug known as Erbitux, ImClone made risk-free “sweetheart loans” to SW to 
allow him to purchase additional shares of ImClone at market price for sale at 
the tender price.239  Wall Street questioned the timing and propriety of the deal, 
suggesting there was “something questionable about these guys cashing out 
before we even know if this drug is going to get approved.”240  Wall Street jitters 
caused BMS to look more closely at ImClone’s clinical data, and BMS 
discovered fundamental flaws—including omitted negative data, fudged efficacy 
statistics, and an inadequate sample size—that would, when discovered by the 
FDA, make approval for general use highly unlikely.241  ImClone and SW began 
losing credibility, and the FDA asked ImClone’s regulatory affairs executives to 
withdraw the application or amend its data.242 
Yet, SW chose to believe the FDA would approve Erbitux because “[t]he 
alternative was unimaginable.”243  Predictably, the FDA issued a Refusal to File 
letter—a statement received in response to only 4% of applications, generally 
those that are “‘scientifically incomplete’ and ‘filled with deficiencies’”—on 
December 27, 2001.244  When news of the “RTF” letter leaked, SW lashed out at 
the FDA and attempted to convince investors that data problems would be easily 
remedied, but investors concluded ImClone was systemically flawed, SW had 
intentionally misled them into believing Erbitux had been “green-lighted,” and 
nothing now would prevent its disapproval by the FDA.245  What investors did 
not know was that on December 26, 2001, anticipating the RTF letter and owing 
$65 million on margin secured by ImClone stock, SW sold his ImClone shares 
and advised family and friends246 to do the same before news became public.247  
Although SW knew the SEC monitors insider stock trades: 
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[H]e didn’t stop to think about what he was doing; he was just acting.  For years 
he had shuffled money offshore, or through an account he had secretly 
established in [his daughter’s] name—he’d forged her signature—and he figured 
it would all work out in the wash.  He was doing good for humanity; his drug 
was about to change cancer medicine.  So what if he cut a few corners?248 
In short order, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce issued a 
letter that indicated an investigation of ImClone and SW over issues arising 
from clinical trials of Erbitux had begun on January 18, 2002.249  On January 24, 
2002, the SEC launched its own investigation “to determine whether there ha[d] 
been any violations of the federal security laws,” and the next day the Justice 
Department announced an investigation to determine whether ImClone misled 
investors.250  The subcommittee subpoenaed SW, who during the course of the 
investigation asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and 
offered only the following through counsel: “Dr. Waksal firmly believes that 
any allegations against him are unfounded and that he did nothing improper.”251 
Although it is doubtful that had SW been a more generous contributor to 
politicians he might have avoided congressional ire, SW gave a total of only 
$160,000 over the years in political contributions and, thus, had few, if any, 
powerful friends in Congress.252  Representative Billy Tauzin (D-LA) was 
clearly not one, and he offered a much more critical version of the events 
surrounding Erbitux: 
It appears . . . that ImClone[,] . . . excited by preliminary response rates in very 
sick colon cancer patients, . . . tried to take a mediocre clinical trial and gussy it 
up . . . But[,] when it came to crunch time to get FDA approval, the failure of 
ImClone’s key executives to ensure the quality of its clinical trials collided with 
the hype.  And, all the while, ImClone’s insiders were lining their own pockets 
with millions, as ImClone’s publicly traded stock soared on false, public 
promises!253 
Various investigations revealed SW had illegally failed to report fifty 
trades of ImClone from 1992–2002, destroyed documents, and made false 
statements to Congress.254  He was forced out as CEO in May 2002, and in June 
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was arrested by the FBI on a charge of insider trading.255  In August 2002, SW 
was indicted for destruction of evidence, perjury, obstruction of justice, bank 
fraud, filing a false SEC report, and financial fraud;256 he pled guilty to six of 
thirteen charges in October 2002 and was incarcerated.257  He has apologized, 
accepted blame, and expressed remorse for betraying investors.258  ImClone 
remains in operation, and the FDA has approved Erbitux for treating head and 
neck cancer.259 
4.  AIG 
a. CEO Hank Greenberg 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
  a. Militarism 
 
At seventeen, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg (HG) lied about his age to join 
the U.S. Army, and on D-Day, June 6, 1944, he landed with his Ranger battalion 
on Omaha Beach.260  The next spring, his unit battled the Nazis to liberate the 
Dachau extermination camp.261  HG is “notoriously impatient and short-
tempered” and aggressive,262 and at the American International Group (AIG), 
the insurance firm he served as CEO for thirty-seven years, a “cult of 
Greenberg” arose from his “force of personality” and “fierce determination to 
get his way.”263  HG is a demanding and explosive man, and an “archetypal 
autocrat, one who knew every detail of [AIG’s] operations and, incredible as it 
seems, persisted in trying to micromanage the business even as it grew to nearly 
$100 billion in annual revenues.”264  As CEO of AIG, HG was a driven man, 
determined to defeat competitors and lead AIG to preeminence in the global 
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insurance industry.  When presented with obstacles by foreign governments, he 
drew upon extensive connections in Washington to “threaten trade sanctions, cut 
off aid, and take whatever other dire actions it could find.”265 
  HG had great self-confidence as AIG CEO but has a “chip on his 
shoulder” and has low self-esteem consequent to not having been accepted by 
“the WASP establishment” or “upper-class Jewish circles.”266  He is neither an 
introvert nor isolationist, and, although his leadership of AIG was oriented 
solely towards profitability, no evidence suggests dogmatism.  However, HG is 
a nationalistic, competitive, ambitious, aggressive, authoritarian figure with a 
favorable attitude toward power, and scores high on seven of ten sub-constructs 
of militarism.  Thus, HG is scored as a militarist. 
 
  b. Anomism 
 
After World War II, HG earned a law degree and served in Korea as a 
JAG prosecutor and defense counsel and, in the course of his training and 
practice, was exposed broadly to an array of legal regimes, including corporate 
law.267  Despite his significant legal training, however, HG, perhaps as a 
consequence of AIG’s “intense political involvement, and of having to live in a 
world defined by myriad rules,”268 developed cynicism with regard to law.  
According to a biographer: 
AIG shaped the rules to its interests; when not, it bent them to its purposes . . . In 
many cases, it operated as close to the edge as it had [] to achieve its business 
goals . . . [HG] may have pushed the envelope on finite insurance contracts or 
stretched accounting principles to report the earnings he wanted.  If someone did 
object, the company could defend, rationalize, or explain away just about any 
action.  Greenberg would make his stock reply to just about every criticism 
(“You just don’t understand insurance”), and then the lawyers and lobbyists 
would make the problem go away.269 
Indeed, over the years, HG taught his executives to “approach government 
and regulatory problems in the same aggressive way they attack business issues 
in general,”—to “persuade, cajole, or . . . intimidate officials at all levels 
anywhere in the world.”270 
Still, although he did not adhere as scrupulously to the letter of the law as 
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regulators believed necessary, it is perhaps easier to cast HG as a director of 
creative, albeit self-interested, legal interpretation than it is to brand him a 
scofflaw disrespectful of law and legal authorities.  That this is so is particularly 
apparent when one compares HG’s stewardship to that of other CEOs: 
 [HG’s] actions were nothing like those of the other boardroom bad guys, 
who tried to fool investors by grossly distorting their numbers.  Instead, if 
Greenberg did anything, he was simply injecting a little Botox into the balance 
sheet and fine-tuning the earnings reports to maintain the kind of image he found 
so supremely important.  Not so long ago, that kind of earnings “management” 
rarely brought more than a modest reprimand.  The rules changed after Enron, of 
course, but Hank must have assumed that the changes, like so many other 
regulatory annoyances, weren’t really relevant, or[,] if they did apply to him, he 
could bluff his way through them as he had so often in the past.271 
Thus, while it may be fair to conclude HG scores high on amoralism, and 
perhaps on disregard for legal authorities, it is less clear that he should be 
regarded as disrespectful of law, and HG is a trained lawyer.  HG thus scores 
high on two of five sub-constructs of anomism and is scored as a non-anomist. 
 
  c. Hostility 
 
HG was a celebrity CEO at a firm where the standing joke was that “AIG” 
is an acronym for “All Is Greenberg.”272  He is a selfish master manipulator with 
a “Jekyll and Hyde” personality273 and has a misanthrope’s touch for making 
others feel ill at ease. 
[W]hen you are with Hank, you are on edge.  Even in a room full of 
people where you are across the room talking to others, you can never quite 
forget he is there.  The force of his personality and the fear people have of him is 
always present. . . . While it is mainly employees who are scared or at least 
tense, it can also be directors, clients, officials[,] or casual acquaintances. . . . 
Whether he could change his personality enough to put others more at ease, I do 
not know.  Whether he would want to, well, that I doubt.274 
Under HG, executives joked that, while they liked to hold AIG stock, they 
would never own a policy.  AIG’s underwriting philosophy was, very simply, to 
charge high premiums and pay as few claims as possible—a theory and practice 
very profitable to shareholders but unfavorable to customers.275  Other 
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stakeholders were subordinated to shareholders as well.  Employees were afraid 
of HG and his appalling temper, and few felt empowered to venture their own 
opinions;276 furthermore, while AIG had a long history of hiring, training, and 
promoting local nationals to managerial positions, “[t]here is simply not a 
history of significant black participation in the company.  A retired senior 
personnel executive told me that in his experience insurance had never been one 
of the industries where African-Americans saw opportunities.  And[,] clearly in 
AIG there was not an aggressive policy of recruiting them.”277 
Only after HG resigned did AIG seriously begin to promote diversity in 
hiring to U.S.-based positions.  Although it is difficult on the basis of available 
information to conclude HG is generally distrustful or ethnocentric—particularly 
in light of his deep passion for China and its people and his friendships across 
the globe278—there is reason to believe he lacks the capacity or the desire to 
express an empathic understanding of and appreciation for other people.  In sum, 
HG scores high on seven of nine sub-constructs of hostility and, thus, is scored 
as a hostile decision-maker. 
 
  d. Adventurism 
 
Insurance is the applied study and management of risk, and the ultimate 
financial risks—loan defaults and policy claims—cannot be perfectly predicted.  
HG gets bored easily and likes to take risks, believing—usually quite 
correctly—he can beat the odds.279  He calmly seeks and achieves unfair 
advantage by rationally evaluating risk, and, although he has a temper, it is one 
he controls and manipulates to suit his purposes.280  He manages stress well and 
is described by many as unflappable. 
HG scores high on only three of seven sub-constructs of adventurism—
risk tolerance, internal locus of control, and maleness—and, thus, is scored as a 
non-adventuristic decision-maker. 
 
 e. Summary of IVs: Hank Greenberg 
 
HG is a militaristic, non-anomistic, hostile, and non-adventuristic 
decision-maker. 
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ii. DVs: CLC and AIG 
 
Under HG’s leadership, AIG grew to become the fourth largest firm on the 
Forbes 500 list and the largest insurer in the world.281  In his thirty-seven years 
as CEO of a global business, HG developed a “highly evolved culture of . . . 
exploitation” that rested on cultivating relationships with political leaders and 
regulators and, ostensibly, leveraging those relationships to gain favors for 
AIG.282  While the ultimate leverage might well have been bribery, and, 
although U.S. firms operating overseas “have no choice but to adapt to the 
customs of the countries where they operate,”283 no allegation of political 
corruption has been made against AIG.  Rather, AIG was successful under HG . 
. . because it “reward[ed] success, reward[ed] profit, ignore[d] background, 
creed, nationality, and put[] up with a lot of individual idiosyncrasies as long as 
[the performers] produce[d].”284  Although AIG rewarded performers with 
salary and perquisites,285 these were limited by HG’s frugality.  HG lives 
modestly, although he enjoys a daily massage and comfortable travel 
arrangements,286 and one of the greatest employee incentives might have been 
the loyalty HG exercised in the company’s time of need: in the event of 
employee abduction or arrest, “[n]o stone was left unturned, and money was 
never an object” in securing their release and safe return.287  Although profits 
were his lodestar, for HG the security and safety of his employees, if not their 
enrichment, was his “first priority.”288 
However, despite all its political capital and its concern for its employees, 
cracks in the AIG armor began to appear in 2003, when AIG was forced to pay 
$10 million as sanction for refusing to cooperate, under subpoena, with 
authorities investigating accounting fraud involving illegal exchanges of cash 
with Brightpoint, a cellphone manufacturer.289  In 2004, New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer brought bid rigging charges against AIG and a number of 
executives, accusing the firm of issuing artificially high bids on one piece of 
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business to cause its award to another insurer only to have the other insurer 
reciprocate the benefit on future business.290  Four AIG executives pled guilty, 
and, although no evidence implicated him, HG found a prime place on Spitzer’s 
investigative agenda.291  The year 2004 brought more bad news when it was 
revealed AIG had been forming SPEs to absorb $762 million in non-performing 
assets and create a healthier balance sheet than the firm had earned.292  At the 
eleventh hour, during the summer of 2004, HG rejected an agreement with the 
Justice Department and SEC that would have settled the case and issued press 
releases decrying these agencies’ investigations as unethical.293  However, when, 
in October of 2004, the board of directors learned HG’s gambit had failed to 
dissuade federal investigators and had instead increased the price of the 
settlement from $20 million to $126 million, it called for his resignation, which 
he tendered in 2005.294 
In February 2005, AIG received subpoenas in an SEC accounting fraud 
investigation, and two AIG executives negotiated guilty pleas.295  In March, 
Spitzer subpoenaed AIG documents involving manipulation of financial 
transactions to falsely add $500 million to AIG’s reserves while using Caribbean 
subsidiaries as SPEs to keep debt off AIG’s balance sheet and understate the 
leverage of its operations as well as the magnitude of the risks it had insured.296  
When Spitzer discovered AIG executives were planning to move documents out 
of U.S. jurisdiction, he threatened obstruction of justice charges.297  AIG fired 
executives who planned to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination before the SEC, an invocation HG made on April 12.298  AIG 
announced accounting errors stretching back fourteen years, and, on May 2, it 
restated earnings for the 2000–2004 period.299  In May 2005, Spitzer, alleging 
AIG executives had routinely engaged in financial and securities fraud from the 
mid-1980s on,300 substituted civil for criminal charges against AIG and top 
executives, including HG.  More than $2.7 billion in income was removed from 
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AIG’s books after improper accounting entries were reversed.301  
HG denied the merits of all civil charges against him,302 although, in 2008, 
he settled shareholder claims for $115 million,303 and, in 2009, he accepted a 
$15 million fine in exchange for dismissal of SEC litigation.304  Although he 
remains free, his reputation has been damaged, and “few executives have fallen 
so far so fast.”305  AIG has fared even worse, although arguably because the firm 
took risks against which HG repeatedly issued warnings.306 
5. HealthSouth 
a. CEO Richard Scrushy 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
  a. Militarism 
 
Richard Scrushy (RS) is a self-described “good old boy” from Alabama 
who began adulthood as a high-school dropout bricklayer living in a trailer with 
his pregnant girlfriend.307  He was a loner who had few friends and participated 
in few school activities, but, motivated by the addition to his family and the 
desire for a better life, RS returned to school to earn a certificate in respiratory 
therapy.  Friends and co-workers describe him as a man with an abundance of 
energy and “chutzpah,” and when new federal legislation passed in 1983, 
changing the system of Medicare and Medicaid billing and resulting in greatly 
reduced profits to hospitals, RS formed a company, which became HealthSouth 
                                                
301  Id. at 12.   
302  Id. at 175. 
303  Brian Baxter, Hank Greenberg and Former AIG Execs to Pay $115 Million to Settle 
Chancery Court Suit, AM. LAWYER (Sept. 11, 2008), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 
2008/09/hank-greenberg.html. 
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305  SHELP, supra note 260, at 2.   
306  AIG suffered near-death in Fall 2008 when the collapse of housing, stock, and labor markets 
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2014 A THEORY OF CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE 397 
 
(HS).308  By 2001, HS was the largest national operator of rehabilitation 
facilities and outpatient surgery centers, treating 100,000 patients per day and 
producing annual revenue of $4.3 billion.309 
As CEO, RS’s monumental ambitions were set toward creating the 
“biggest provider of surgery in the world,”310 and, to accomplish this, a good old 
boy from Alabama morphed into an autocrat.  HS surgeons were told that to 
make the business “lean,” all their purchasing and recordkeeping would be 
performed by headquarters, and HS would require conformity in all surgical 
supplies, even if this meant surgeons would use unfamiliar equipment—a 
condition that enhances risk to patients.311  RS was a “consummate 
micromanager” who ruled lower-status employees with an equally iron-first: his 
rules dictated everything from artwork—approved company posters and a 
portrait of Richard Scrushy in every waiting room—to mandating that Coca-
Cola be the only beverage allowed in the facility—and requiring all financial 
records to be relocated from facilities to firm headquarters.312 
Although he made passing attempts to elicit feedback from employees and 
involve them in decision-making,313 RS’s micromanagement took bizarre twists 
reminiscent of Captain Queeg:314 
While he was lying in bed one night, [RS] decided that he must come up with a 
plan to ensure that all HS facilities were pristine.  He put together a [fifty]-point 
checklist ([twenty-five] points on each page so that it would be easy to read) and 
called in his top people.  “We’re going to design [fifty] points,” [RS] told them.  
“And[,] it’s going to start with picking up trash in the parking lot.” . . . [RS] 
called it a “pristine audit” and hired an outside firm, Ernst and Young, to make 
unannounced visits to evaluate facilities from the patient’s perspective . . . The 
auditors measured everything, from the cleanliness of and neatness of the 
parking lots, restrooms, carpets, walls, and equipment to the attitudes of the 
receptionists and the taste of the food.  If the auditors found anything amiss, they 
reported to HS, and the company required that the facility immediately correct 
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310 Id. at 3. 
311  CAST, supra note 309, at 21. 
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314  In the 1951 Pulitzer Prize-winning novel by Herman Wouk entitled The Caine Mutiny, an 
idiosyncratic martinet named Philip Francis Queeg captains a World War II minesweeper into a 
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398 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VIII:II 
 
the problem.315 
Apologists for RS suggested HS was fortunate to have a “person driving 
this company who, to this day, outworks people with his intensity and 
schedule,” and RS reassured shareholders by telling them HS was not merely 
interested in becoming profitable or simply “America’s best-performing 
healthcare company,” but rather “the nation’s best-performing company of any 
kind.  Period.”316 
Nothing in the literature describes RS as a nationalist, and he is neither 
aggressive nor beset with low self-esteem nor an isolationist, but he is plainly a 
natural introvert who sees the world in black and white and an authoritarian who 
relishes bending employees and rivals to his whims.  As such, RS scores high on 
six of ten sub-constructs of militarism and is thus scored a militarist. 
 
  b. Anomism 
 
RS is a relatively uneducated man; he lacks formal legal training, even if 
he clearly knew he was engaged in illegal conduct: at his trial on financial and 
securities charges, the Justice Department alleged that RS told other co-
conspirators, “Ever get caught, you’re on your own.”317  The data suggest RS is 
an amoral person motivated by money and power and not by superordinate 
norms or principles.  In response to employee concerns that a business strategy 
RS had proposed—adjusting HS’s financial statements in light of earnings 
shortfalls—would not pass legal muster, RS “simply said, ‘Fix it.’”318 
When dealing with legal authorities, his response was identical.  To build 
a private rehabilitation facility in New Mexico required the approval of a state 
board, and, when a board member asked RS whether HS had ever built such a 
facility before, RS, who had only recently applied for a certificate of need to 
convert a nursing home into a rehabilitation hospital, stated, “Sort of.  We’ve got 
one in South Carolina.”319  RS’s falsehood did not escape the attention of the 
board member, who announced the HS gambit was “the biggest smoke-and-
mirror presentation I’ve ever heard, but you know what?  I’m going to vote for 
these guys because I like them.”320  In another instance, RS spent political 
capital to allow HS to bypass state certificate-of-need laws and begin uncertified 
operations.  In sum, RS lies without qualms to regulatory authorities, even if he 
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does so charmingly. 
RS is an amoral decision-maker with no legal training who evinces 
disregard for law and for legal authorities.  He scores high on all five sub-
constructs and is thus scored an anomist. 
 
  c. Hostility 
 
Although RS had a close relationship with the Birmingham African-
American community,321 and while he claimed to read every patient’s letter 
personally to provide the best possible service,322 in reality RS viewed HS 
customers and employees as “little people.”323  Willingness to create public 
perceptions deeply at odds with reality typifies RS, and this cynical approach to 
people and business did not escape all observers: Aaron Beam, an early recruit 
by RS to his management team, reported that after his interview with RS “[he] 
went home and told [his] wife that [he] just interviewed with the biggest con 
artist [he had] ever met or the most brilliant young man [he had] ever met.”324 
RS is clearly a narcissist who wildly pontificated to investors HS would 
“get to where Coke [was] quicker than they did,” and claimed to have “visions” 
at night when he would “close [his] eyes, and . . . see more HS facilities than 
[he] could count, with people and patients walking in and out and being treated . 
. . a sort of . . . spiritual thing.”325  Fortune magazine recognized at least a part of 
his grandiosity, dubbing RS “The Insatiable King Richard” for his opulence and 
his “seemingly paranoid behavior that would alternately alarm and annoy many 
who worked at headquarters.”326  By the 1990s, RS traveled in a chauffeured 
armored BMW complete with bodyguards and began building “vacation 
mansions” in Florida and Alabama.327  Employees began to suspect—
correctly—RS had bugged their phone lines to ensure nothing was being said 
against their “King.”328  
                                                
321  Id. at 206. 
322  RODENGEN, supra note 313, at 41. 
323  CAST, supra note 309, at 44. 
324  RODENGEN, supra note 313, at 22. 
325  CAST, supra note 309, at 55, 89. 
326  Id. at 14, 24. 
327  Id. at 29. 
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In fact, a sense HS’s financial house was not in order began to worry 
investors in the early 1990s, when analysts suggested HS was too highly 
leveraged as a result of its aggressive acquisitions policy.329  RS’s protestations 
to the contrary, coupled with increasingly cozy relationships with political 
cronies—board member Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio was chosen by 
President Bill Clinton to serve as his congressional health care lobbyist, and RS 
was part of House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s corporate kitchen cabinet, which 
developed an alternative to the Clinton health plan330—assured investors for a 
time.  However, when HS shares fell on discovery of a train of illegalities, rather 
than concede problems RS stated the shares were worth “north of $20” to assure 
investors only to sell $70 million of his own shares to “diversify” before the 
price dipped to $7.331 
Although nothing suggests he is an ethnocentrist, and despite his 
professions of concern for the wellbeing of people, RS is a deeply distrustful, 
narcissistic, cynical, Machiavellian, and hostile misanthrope who lacks empathy 
and is committed to personal aggrandizement.  Thus, he scores high on eight of 
nine sub-constructs of hostility and is scored a hostile decision-maker. 
 
  d. Adventurism  
 
RS had enough business acumen to recognize opportunity in the 
transformation of the federal Medicare reimbursement regime, and, as a risk-
taking entrepreneur, he capitalized upon an absence of outpatient rehabilitation 
options.332  Still, RS is not highly risk tolerant: he thinks and studies before 
acting333 and was as cautious in hiring as he was in acquiring new businesses.334  
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Although he might be considered high in optimism, he must also then be 
adjudged low in stress and high in internal locus of control, for, in his words, “I 
always knew it would work . . . Some people thought I was crazy, but some in 
the business knew I wasn’t.”335  In summary, RS is a deliberate, if optimistic, 
decision-maker with an internal locus of control who is neither particularly 
anxious nor stressed during decision-making.  Moreover, his does not have a 
particularly high-risk propensity.  He thus scores as high on only three of seven 
sub-constructs of adventurism and is thus scored as a non-adventurist. 
 
  e. Summary of IVs: Richard Scrushy 
 
Richard Scrushy is a militarist and anomist who is hostile but not 
adventuristic. 
 ii. DVs: CLC and HealthSouth 
 
The first handwriting on the proverbial wall suggesting RS and HS were 
manipulating financial data was scrawled in 1998, one year after RS collected 
$111 million in salary, when HS first restated earnings.336  Articles critical of HS 
and RS appeared, and, in 2001, RS found his firm paying a large sum to settle a 
civil suit brought by the Justice Department alleging violation of Medicare 
regulations governing patient billing for physical therapy services.337  
Undaunted, RS accepted a $6.5 million bonus in 2002 and exercised stock 
options worth $56 million even as earnings per share dropped 28%.338 
However, the undoing of RS came in 2003, when the SEC began 
investigating whether HS had illegally delayed disclosing to the public the 
negative financial effects of new Medicaid and Medicare billing regulations on 
its financial statements.339  A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) raid on 
corporate headquarters led to formal charges on March 19, alleging HS had 
artificially inflated $2.7 billion in profits over a five-year period through 
fraudulent accounting.340  Ten top HS officers, caught internally referencing 
fraudulent accounting and financial manipulations as “pixie dust” and filling 
“the hole,” pled guilty to fraud, and HS stock was delisted and devalued.341  
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Nevertheless, RS became the first corporate executive to be tried under SOX.342  
RS, denying any legal knowledge of changes to Medicare regulations and 
disputing that he or other executives had committed any illegal acts, pled not 
guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud, money 
laundering, aiding and abetting, false SOX certification, and false statements to 
the SEC.343 
In other words, RS rested his fate on the “blame the other guy” defense: he 
had not ordered anything illegal and did not have actual knowledge that others 
had done anything illegal, and, thus, although he was CEO, he did not bear legal 
responsibility for the actions of others.  RS leveled blame for the fall of HS at 
the feet of auditors, his own CFO, and the corporate compliance committee, and, 
in a surprise verdict, was acquitted in June 2005, when jurors determined there 
was a “lack of substantial evidence and witness credibility,” as well as 
insufficient criminal intent, to convict.344  RS, fired from HS, remains a party in 
civil litigation brought by shareholders and regulatory agencies.345  HS remains 
in operation under a new executive team. 
6.  Sunbeam 
a. CEO Albert Dunlap 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
  a. Militarism 
 
Albert Dunlap (AD), former CEO of Sunbeam, was a quiet, lonely child 
who grew up poor in Hoboken, New Jersey.346  He had few friends and spent his 
time playing alone in his room.347  For AD, his self-described unhappy 
childhood could only be overcome by “brute struggle of which he was uniquely 
capable,” and this lesson left AD—“Chainsaw Al”—an angry man, “defiant and 
raging at all that came his way.”348  Anger became entrenched as AD’s dominant 
emotion and aggression his default trait at an early age.  As a business 
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acquaintance recalls, “[h]e was the most unpleasant, personally repulsive 
businessman I ever met in my life.  Every conversation began in a normal tone 
of voice and ended with the man yelling, red-faced and furious, at whoever was 
standing in front of him.  It was unbelievable.”349 
At West Point and in his brief Army career, AD maintained his rage and a 
record of academic underachievement,350 and he carried both forward into a first 
marriage that ended in divorce from Gwyn Dunlap on grounds of extreme 
cruelty.351  During the brief relationship, he would “erupt in tantrums and storm 
about the apartment inspecting the furniture for fingerprints,” and even during 
periods of “normalcy” AD related to his family more as commander than as 
husband and father.352  The worst is revealed in the petition for divorce, which 
AD did not contest.  That document notes AD denied Gwyn food and maternity 
clothes, brandished a Bowie knife at her while expressing his interest in 
discovering the taste of human flesh, threatened her with guns, and expressed his 
hope that she would die so he might collect her insurance death benefit.353 
AD’s aggressive authoritarianism and his delight in the abuse of power 
found expression in the workplace as well.  His shift superintendent “enjoyed 
snarling at his subordinates,” a behavior AD found endearing and deemed 
worthy of emulation.354  Throughout his career, AD inspired fear and loathing in 
his subordinates355 and strong dislike in his colleagues, and few doubted he 
would abstain from any action necessary to achieve his ambitions.  AD has 
underdeveloped personal affiliations, generally and within his immediate family.  
He liked to insult his wife’s parents and thought it fun to give the middle finger 
to her mother at church services.356  When his parents died, he chose not to 
attend their funerals, and in his autobiography neither merits more than a few 
lines.357  It would be a stretch to conclude from the available information that 
AD had any genuine friends. 
AD scores high on all ten sub-constructs of militarism and, thus, is scored 
as a militarist. 
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  b. Anomism 
 
AD is a breaker of rules, norms, and principles par excellence.  Even 
though his wealth and status gained him membership to prestigious clubs, no 
one would play tennis with him because he “cheated so outrageously—and got 
so abusive of opponents who questioned him.”358  Upholding even the most 
trivial and symbolic of social norms, such as keeping Christmas gifts secret until 
Christmas, were too much to expect of AD, as his wife discovered when she 
returned early from a trip to find him carefully rewrapping presents he had 
unwrapped earlier.359  More strenuous legal obligations stood no chance: no 
sooner did AD join the Nitec Paper Corporation than he established secret 
offshore accounts in Switzerland and Bermuda to bank profits from illegal 
transactions, labeling them as “consulting fees.”360  Similarly, from the moment 
he joined Sunbeam, he treated his position of trust as an opportunity to violate 
almost the entire canon of corporate law governing finance and securities to raid 
the wealth of its investors.  In short, AD is the archetypal anomist—disrespectful 
of law and legal authorities, formally untrained in law, and devoid of moral 
strictures. 
 
  c. Hostility 
 
Even in his youth, AD was a “hostile and arrogant” jock with an “ego the 
size of the United States,” and, as he entered adulthood, AD remained 
“oblivious to how he was viewed by those all around him.”361  Those who knew 
him in business, such as a supplier for Nitec, describe the selfish man even more 
colorfully in terms that suggest narcissistic personality disorder: “Frankly, he 
was a world-class asshole.  He’d stiff you for months on bills then get abusive 
the second you asked for payment.  He was just the worst.  There must have 
been something wrong with him.”362 
To AD, people were tools to suit his purposes.  He married his second 
wife only when told by his boss that he would go farther in business if he did so, 
and even then AD pressured her to marry before December 31 to reap a tax 
deduction; having accomplished his objectives, AS divorced her in less than a 
year.363  His dislike for fellow men was general and transparent: he was an equal 
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opportunity misanthrope, using and abusing people without regard to race, 
religion, ethnicity, or culture.364  Throughout his business career, AD managed 
to inspire the loathing of virtually all his subordinates, and, when Nitec’s VPs, 
desperate to rid themselves of him, threatened mass resignation if he were not 
fired, AD saw opportunity.365  Aware of his supervisor’s implication in illegal 
banking activities and other corporate fraud, AD leveraged that information to 
negotiate an overly generous severance package.366  When Nitec internal 
auditors soon discovered “massive falsifications and fraudulent accounting 
entries on the company’s books” the board refused to issue the severance check, 
and AD’s suit for breach of contract settled years later for $50,000.367 
AD is disinterested in and hostile to others.  When he became CEO at 
Scott Paper and fired half the employees, an interviewer inquired as to whether 
it gave him pause to do what she believed was a distasteful task.  AD brushed 
aside the suggestion.  Pointing to the rising price of Scott’s stock, he declared, “I 
created $6.5 billion of value.  And[,] for that I received less than 2[%].”368  
Then, basking in his newly found fame as the CEO of the moment, he added, 
“There are only a handful of superstar executives.  You’ve got to compare them 
with the other superstars.  You can’t compare them with the worker on the 
floor.”369 
Naturally, CEO AD included himself in this elite group who need not 
concern themselves with lesser men.  AD thus scores high on all nine sub-
constructs and is scored a hostile decision-maker. 
  
 d. Adventurism 
 
AD has a penchant for diving into things before testing the waters and 
brought this impulsivity to bear on the turnaround of ailing companies, itself a 
risky enterprise.  Rather than analyze, evaluate, decide, plan, and execute, AD 
simply cut lines of business, fired employees, reduced capacity, and shrunk 
costs, earning the epithet, “Chainsaw Al.”  He is “quick, glib, and boast[s] the 
attention span of a gnat,” and risk seemed not to register with him.370  His 
cocksure certainty that all he touches will turn to gold belies an optimism and an 
internal locus of control not always supported by reason and economic reality.  
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His personal demeanor suggests stress and anxiety are frequent, if not constant, 
companions that goad him to rage when criticized or otherwise challenged.371  
AD thus scores high on all five sub-constructs of adventurism and is scored an 
adventuristic decision-maker. 
 
  e. Summary of IVs: Albert Dunlap 
 
Albert Dunlap is a militaristic anomist who is hostile and adventuristic. 
 ii. DVs: CLC and Sunbeam 
 
When AD was hired as CEO of Sunbeam in 1996, the share price had 
fallen from $20 to $12, and, in hopes of a quick turnaround, the board offered 
him the overly generous compensation package of $1 million in salary, 50,000 
shares of stock, 750,000 in-the-money options, and perquisites that included a 
full-time bodyguard and chauffeur.372  Predictably, “Chainsaw Al” fired half the 
employees, closed two-thirds of the warehouses, eliminated most of the 
factories, and scrapped 87% of the product line.373  In response, Sunbeam’s 
share price rose to $30 by April 1997.374 
However, “an increasingly fishy smell had begun to emanate from 
Sunbeam’s financial reports,” suggesting the turnaround had come at the price 
of a conspiracy to defraud shareholders.375  Although profits were growing 
dramatically, little cash worked its way to the financial statements because 
Sunbeam had forced distributors to accept deliveries of goods, even when 
previously shipped goods had not sold, and then recording unsold shipments as 
revenue—an illegal practice known as “channel stuffing.”376  Thus, although 
recorded revenue was robust, actual revenue was nil, and accounts receivable 
were growing at a rate of 500%.377  Sunbeam “appeared to be experiencing a 
dramatic surge in profitability, but it was actually going broke.”378 
In1998, Sunbeam’s purchase of a competitor, Coleman, earned AD a 
revised contract of $2 million annual salary, $15 million in Sunbeam stock, and 
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$44 million in options.379  Within days of the merger, however, AD’s ruse 
collapsed.  Sunbeam issued a press statement describing “changes in inventory 
management” to remedy its failure to meet first-quarter earnings expectations 
and announcing an e-statement of past earnings,380 and investors began dumping 
shares.  Shareholders filed lawsuits, alleging fraudulent accounting of earnings 
and artificial inflation of the stock price, which sent the share price into a 
downward spiral.381  The SEC initiated civil proceedings against Sunbeam and 
AD, alleging he “was the guiding presence at Sunbeam”382 when the firm 
committed fraud to exaggerate its earnings from 1996 to 1998 and he created 
“[a] false picture of a rapid turnaround in Sunbeam’s financial performance.”383  
AD tried unsuccessfully to explain to analysts the stock would rebound, and, 
when asked by a PaineWebber analyst if he would return his bonus, grew 
furious and threatened to “come after” the questioner.384  Following an 
emergency meeting of the board of directors, in which AD alleged a shareholder 
conspiracy to drive down the price of Sunbeam to take over the company, the 
board fired AD on June 15, 1998, and surrendered control to AD rival and major 
Sunbeam investor, Ron Perelman, to avoid civil suit.385  In 2001, its equity gone, 
Sunbeam declared bankruptcy.386 
The firm emerged in 2002 and now operates privately under the name 
American Household.387  AD agreed to pay $15 million to settle shareholder 
suits and an additional $500,000 to settle SEC litigation.388  No settlement 
required AD to admit any wrongdoing, although he agreed to be barred from 
working as an executive at a public company.389 
                                                
379  Id. at 296. 
380  Id. at 297. 
381 Id. 
382 Neil Roland and Judy Mathewson, with Robert Schmidt, Sunbeam Ex-CEO “Chainsaw Al” 
Dunlap Settles SEC Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 4, 2002, at A1. 
383  Id. 
384  BYRON, supra note 81, at 298. 
385  Id. at 299. 
386  Id. at 300. 
387  Kelly Greene, Dunlap Agrees to Pay $15 Million to Settle Lawsuit Filed by Sunbeam 
Shareholders, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1011029024354167520. 
388  Sunbeam Emerges from Chapter 11, Changes Its Name, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 2002, http:// 
www.articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-12-20/business/0212200226_1_sunbeam-products-sunbeam-
corp-jerry-w-levin. 
389  Roland & Mathewson, supra note 382, at A1. 
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7.  Tyco 
a. CEO Dennis Kozlowski 
i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
  a. Militarism 
 
In his youth, Dennis Kozlowski (DK) was just another “face in the 
crowd[,] an easygoing, average Joe—not much more than a kid with ho-hum 
grades and a smile when he could make somebody laugh. . . . Many didn’t 
remember him at all.”390  Despite his obscurity[,] he yearned for adulation, 
which he gained to some extent by playing guitar in a band, the Hi-Tones, and 
by playing football and basketball, the latter well enough to earn a scholarship to 
Seton Hall.391   
It is unclear how he spent his immediate post-undergraduate years—a 
resume gap might suggest service with Air America flying helicopters in 
Cambodia, although no official records exist.392  He began his Tyco career as an 
assistant controller, moving up the ranks to become CEO in 1992.393  However, 
attaining the top position at Tyco did not release DK from the insecurity of 
childhood poverty in Newark, New Jersey.  Perhaps there is some ground for it: 
DK is described as “[c]rude, tasteless, and unencumbered by the graciousness 
and sense of style that a more cultured upbringing might have provided.”394  
Moreover, he is dull and uncharismatic, so much so that his large cash donations 
to charities earned him nothing more than a string of polite “thank you” 
letters.395 
DK resolved not to let his humble upbringing impede his social climb, 
and, where facts were in the way, he vaulted them, albeit clumsily.  Tyco press 
releases claimed he had earned an MBA when in fact he only took a few 
evening courses,396 and, in describing his newly-found riches, DK referenced his 
wine collection by the number of bottles, rather than the quality of their vintage.  
Yet, even these measures could not make him popular or quench his desperate 
“obsession” with becoming like General Electric CEO Jack Welch, whom he 
                                                
390 BYRON, supra note 81, at 31–32. 
391  Id. at 33. 
392  Id. at 80. 
393  Id. at 305. 
394  Id. at 308. 
395  Id. at 310. 
396  Id. at 80. 
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viewed as a “member of the Establishment” that had denied him admittance.397  
His undoing resulted from increasingly conspicuous consumption that could no 
longer be hidden from investors and regulators. 
Nothing in the relatively sparse literature suggests DK was a nationalist or 
held a favorable attitude toward power, and available sources do not make note 
of unusual aggression or dogmatism.  His leadership style was unremarkable.  
He is a competitive striver who, despite social awkwardness, seeks out the 
company and approval of others, and it is apparent he has low self-esteem.  
Thus, DK scores high on only three sub-constructs of militarism—
competitiveness, ambitiousness, and low self-esteem. 
 
  b. Anomism 
 
Although DK earned a BA in accounting and began his professional career 
as an auditor, he has no formal legal training.398  He demonstrates no adherence 
to a strong moral code either in his public or private life: while serving as Tyco 
CEO, DK had affairs with a series of women—some subordinates—and 
appeared with them publicly to humiliate his wife.399  Although his extravagant 
abuse of authority for personal gain resulted in a long litany of criminal and civil 
charges—evidencing a disregard for law—it is difficult, in light of his conduct 
subsequent to arrest, to judge whether DK was similarly disdainful of legal 
authorities.  He may have simply been a very adult and very wealthy version of 
the proverbial kid caught with his hand in a cookie jar.  In sum, DK scores high 
on all five sub-constructs of anomism save one—disrespect for legal 
authorities—and is thus scored an anomist. 
 
  c. Hostility 
 
In addition to infidelity,400 which suggests narcissism, a lack of empathy, 
and Machiavellianism, DK found other forums to express the dark side of his 
personality.  After a promotion, he sponsored a dinner for Tyco executives to 
announce the firing of the man he judged the worst warehouse manager that 
year.401  If there is no evidence of misanthropy per se, DK absorbed 
ethnocentrism when, as a boy, he and his anti-Semitic father frequented Polish 
                                                
397 See id. at 27 (noting, upon DK’s arrest, “few business reporters had yet even heard of the 
company he ran . . . and fewer still had heard of his name.”); id. at 309 (noting DK’s obsession with 
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398  Id. at 78. 
399 Id. at 207. 
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American organizations where “griping among the men about how the blacks 
were taking over Newark”402 dominated the discourse.  Further, DK is numb to 
the externalities of his personality; to wit, he often walked about Tyco 
headquarters, eating pizza, oblivious to the fact “grease and cheese [were] 
splattering onto the carpets as he passed.”403  Thus, DK scores high on six of 
nine sub-constructs of hostility and is scored as a hostile decision-maker. 
 
  d. Adventurism 
 
Tyco appointed DK for his reputation as a cost-cutter but underestimated 
the degree of risk he would accept on behalf of the firm.  He achieved early 
successes not because of, but in spite of, himself.  He did no research and simply 
relied on intuition, wishful thinking, and an overinflated perception of his 
judgment, leaping to conclude deals with little real forethought.  DK saw few 
deals he did not like, and his reaction time was so quick that normal oversight 
procedures stood little chance.  As a top advisor recalls, 
There were times when deals were flowing through at a rate of two and even 
three a week[,] and the board just wasn’t able to keep up.  A lot of times they’d 
have to vote on them before any due diligence was even done.  Sometimes things 
would get so frantic that there wouldn’t even be time for an actual meeting of the 
board, and the vote would have to take place via conference calls.404 
There is no evidence DK experienced anxiety; to the contrary, his 
optimism and impulsivity were so great there was little time to be anxious.  DK 
thus is an adventurist who scores high on all sub-constructs of adventurism, save 
anxiety. 
 
  e. Summary of IVs: Dennis Kozlowski 
 
DK is a non-militaristic decision-maker who is anomistic, hostile, and 
adventuristic. 
ii. DVs: CLC and Tyco 
 
Tyco is the leading manufacturer of electronic industrial components, 
medical devices, and security systems.405  No later than 1995, DK began to raid 
                                                
402  Id. at 31. 
403  Id. at 308. 
404  Id. at 301. 
405  Profile: Tyco International PLC (TYC), REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/ 
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Tyco to achieve an extravagant lifestyle that included the purchase of properties 
in Florida, Massachusetts, and New York; the collection of art masterpieces, 
jewels, and yachts; the throwing of lavish parties; and the donation of large sums 
to charities.406  Much of the wealth extracted from Tyco came pre-approved by 
the firm, albeit with the firm as co-conspirator: through the Key Employee Loan 
Program (KELP), DK received a zero-interest real estate loan of $19 million, 
which Tyco forgave the next year as a “special bonus” while paying him an 
additional $13 million to pay real estate taxes—and neither the loan nor the cash 
were disclosed, as required by law, as executive compensation.407  All told, DK 
received at least $270 million such payments gratis through KELP, and total 
equity looted by DK reached approximately $600 million by 2002.408 
Ironically, what proved DK’s undoing was not his defrauding of Tyco 
investors but his decision to use company headquarters to drop ship art 
purchased with $13 million in Tyco funds for his Fifth Avenue apartment.  
Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau opened a tax fraud 
investigation, and, in 2002, DK was arrested and charged with evading $1 
million in New York sales tax, securities fraud, and larceny.409  In turn, Tyco 
filed a $600 million fraud suit against DK.410 
At his criminal trial, DK conceded his compensation package was “almost 
embarrassingly big” but denied having committed crimes.411  Nevertheless, DK 
was convicted on all charges in 2005, including twenty-two counts of grand 
larceny for accepting $150 million in unauthorized bonuses.412  He was released 
from prison in January 2014.413  In the civil action, he was found liable and 
ordered to reimburse $400 million to shareholders.414  Tyco remains in operation 
under new management. 
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8.  Halliburton 
a. CEO Dick Cheney 
 
 i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
  a. Militarism 
 
Since boyhood, Dick Cheney (DS) has pursued “activities that allowed 
him either to be alone or to excel.”415  After earning scholarships in football and 
baseball to attend Yale University,416 DC eventually abandoned his doctoral 
studies in political science for the hypercompetitive world of politics, first as a 
staffer to Donald Rumsfeld and then as a member of Congress, Secretary of 
Defense, and, ultimately, vice president.417  With the exception of a desultory 
period when he flunked out of Yale and labored as a “lineman for the county,”418 
DC has led a public life characterized by a driving ambition to acquire power 
and authority and great skill in wielding both.419  He is a strategic thinker who 
“dr[ives] policy the way commanders are taught to drive operations in the field, 
calculating the mission, enemy, troops, terrain[,] and time available.”420  As a 
congressman, DC “never saw a defense program [he] didn’t like,”421 including 
arming the Contras and deploying the Strategic Defense Initiative.422  Although 
he believed himself too uncharismatic to win the presidency, as vice president 
DC structured his office to maximize power by requiring that he personally vet 
and “tee up” every decision for President George W. Bush.423  Further, by 
                                                
415  STEPHEN HAYES, CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND 
CONTROVERSIAL VICE PRESIDENT 19 (2007). 
416  DAN BRIODY, THE HALLIBURTON AGENDA: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND MONEY 192–93 
(2005). 
417  CHITTICK, supra note 19, at 167. 
418  HAYES, supra note 415, at 28–38. 
419  BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 34 (2008) (DC is “pretty 
damn good at accumulating power, extraordinarily effective and adept at exercising power.”) 
(quoting James A. Baker). 
420  Id. at 67. 
421  PRATAP CHATTERJEE, HALLIBURTON’S ARMY: HOW A WELL-CONNECTED TEXAS OIL 
COMPANY REVOLUTIONIZED THE WAY AMERICA MAKES WAR 37 (2009).  Similarly, as vice 
president, DC led the Administration’s successful effort to overcome objections from liberal 
Republican senators and block the International Criminal Court and Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties.  
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 63–64. 
422  LOU DUBOSE & JAKE BERNSTEIN, VICE: DICK CHENEY AND THE HIGHJACKING OF THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 54 (2006). 
423  HAYES, supra note 415, at 302–15.  Foremost was DC’s decision to assume command in the 
absence of President Bush in the hours after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and order U.S. 
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creating special task forces and imposing a culture of secrecy, DC battled 
successfully to restore to the executive power he believed had been usurped by 
Congress and the judiciary.424  
Interestingly, although he has lived in the public arena, and despite his 
tremendous success in exploiting a Washington insider’s access to the “corridors 
of power,” DC is an “unrelentingly secretive” introvert who is uncomfortable in 
the spotlight, possesses much “anti-charisma,” and prefers to be either alone 
with his thoughts and books or the “silent strength behind a benefactor.”425  
Although he is witty and skilled in developing and maintaining relationships 
when they facilitate political objectives,426 DC is simply “not a very social 
person.”427  This may be due to DC’s dogmatism: while he declaims the popular 
tendency to create rigid dichotomies in regard to policy choices,428 and although 
there is a distinction between adherence to principles and rigid ideology, DC 
“seldom indulge[s] in ambivalence” and would rather lose than sacrifice 
principle to political expedience.429  DC has either friends or enemies—there is 
no middle ground.  When the State Department took contrary positions, he 
described it as an “al Qaeda cell[,]”and foreign governments were either with or 
against the United States in the War on Terror.430  When events disconfirm his 
theories, DC remains “unyielding and unbending” and anchored to his “set of 
beliefs.”431  Moreover, according to a colleague, DC “doesn’t believe in 
negotiations.  He’s completely rigid, states his position, and concedes 
nothing.”432 
Although DC never expresses anger publicly and is widely known for his 
calming, collected presence,433 he may suffer from low self-esteem.  Despite his 
universally recognized intellectual capacity, after he flunked out of Yale for the 
second time he quickly accrued two arrests for driving under the influence, 
                                                
military forces to shoot down hijacked civilian aircraft that might be employed as guided missiles.  
GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 119, 129–30. 
424 GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 82–83 (describing DC’s view of executive power as 
Hamiltonian in that it is “absolute within its constitutional sphere” and “supreme outside [it].”). 
425 BRIODY, supra note 416, at 218, 194, 197. 
426 DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 48–49 (describing DC as “calculating” in the 
development of relationships). 
427 GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 383 (quoting former President George W. Bush). 
428 BRIODY, supra note 416, at 205. 
429 GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 68. 
430  Id. at 171, 225. 
431  Id. at 336, 384. 
432 DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 58. 
433 See, e.g., BRIODY, supra note 416, at 194 (reporting colleagues describe DC as “low key,” 
“bland,” and “calming”). 
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worked a blue-collar job, and failed to complete graduate school.434  Further, 
although his long record of service from the Cold War through the War on 
Terror testifies he is a nationalist who believes in “American Exceptionalism,” 
he secured five deferments to avoid military service in Vietnam on the ground 
he “had other priorities in the 1960s.”435 
While he is not an aggressive person, DC is an ideologue as well as a 
competitive, nationalistic authoritarian and introvert who holds a favorable 
attitude toward the use of power to achieve security and exert influence in the 
world on his own behalf and on behalf of the United States.  Despite his 
influence over people and events, he is an isolated individual with a measure of 
low self-esteem.  Accordingly, DC scores high on nine of ten sub-constructs of 
militarism and is thus scored a militarist. 
  b. Anomism 
 
Although DC was involved in church activities as a youth, as an adult he 
is largely secular and, in public life, has “resolutely avoided discussions of 
faith.”436  As a young adult, DC was disciplined at Yale University for alcohol-
related offenses and for disrupting campus activities, and he was arrested twice 
for driving under the influence.437  He secured deferments to avoid Vietnam 
service but only by gaming the draft rules and enrolling in a community college 
to preserve his ineligibility.438  Although DC has no formal legal training and, 
like many Westerners, is deeply skeptical of regulation and of Congress, he is 
profoundly aware that law is a ubiquitous and powerful instrument.439  While 
CEO of Halliburton, DC sharply differentiated legal compliance from ethical 
behavior and directed his subordinates and legal team to adhere scrupulously to 
the former while ignoring the latter.440  Upon discovering in 2000 that the 
Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the election of a 
president and a vice president domiciled in the same state, DC took a day trip 
from his primary residence in Texas to register to vote in Wyoming, where he 
maintained a vacation home; to do legal battle in Florida during the 2000 vote 
                                                
434  Id. at 193. 
435  HAYES, supra note 415, at 44 (quoting DC). 
436  GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 52. 
437  See CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 31 (describing DC’s administrative troubles at Yale); 
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recounts, he and the president-elect traveled on Halliburton corporate jets.441 
Moreover, when DC concludes that law poses obstacles, he evinces the 
capacity to reinterpret, modify, and even violate the rules at issue.  When a 
reporter threatened to leak classified information regarding U.S. submarine 
espionage against the Soviet Union, DC, then Chief of Staff to President Gerald 
Ford, suggested authorizing a burglary to retrieve information from the 
reporter’s home.442  While vice president, DC understood instinctively that the 
exercise of power would depend upon the capacity to frame legal issues.  Within 
minutes after the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked on 
September 11, 2001, DC requested his legal counsel to draft “extraordinary 
powers” to be wielded by the White House in the coming War on Terror.443  DC 
approved and authorized a new legal framework drafted by subordinates that 
founded and justified a series of controversial steps, including the Authorization 
for the Use of Force, “enhanced interrogation” of detainees, the USA PATRIOT 
Act, and the claim of broad executive powers to violate treaties and domestic 
law.444  DC directed the National Security Agency to “forget about the law” 
when responding to a query as to what else, besides spying on U.S. citizens 
under the “Terrorist Surveillance Program,” could be done, and he directed the 
executive branch to keep much of this new legal regime secret from the 
legislative and judicial branches.445  In sum, DC is an amoral decision-maker 
with no legal training whose conduct evinces disregard for law and legal 
authorities despite his deep intellectual capacity to shape the creation, 
interpretation, and application of law.446  He is high on all sub-constructs of 
anomism and is scored an anomist. 
 
  c. Hostility 
 
To DC, the world is “an inherently dangerous place . . . populated by four-
year-olds with automatic weapons.”447  He is distrustful of others and believes 
little without independent verification.448  His exploitation of the rules regarding 
the draft to avoid military service, and his doubts about the sincerity and 
trustworthiness of not only Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost 
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agenda but also of liberal Republicans in Congress, suggests a strong thread of 
cynicism.449  Nothing in the literature suggests DC is ethnocentric;450 on the 
contrary, he is hostile without regard to group or affiliation and is openly 
contemptuous of public opinion.451  For DC, the world consists solely of friends 
and enemies: sticks are more useful than carrots, hard power is better than soft 
power, and war is central to human existence.452  Moreover, particularly as his 
cardiac health has degenerated, DC’s longstanding distrust and introversion may 
have trended toward misanthropy.453  DC is a vindictive, unempathetic person 
who keeps a “blacklist,”454 uses power to settle petty scores,455 and fires 
employees who present him with conclusions incompatible with his 
worldview.456  DC is neither selfish—he gratefully embraces the role of loyal 
sidekick to his political benefactors and extends that loyalty to a cadre of 
subordinate cronies457—nor is he a narcissist or a misanthrope—he is famously 
“low-key,” self-deprecating, and quietly competent,458 and gets along well with 
others when it suits him.  However, DC is the archetypal Machiavellian for 
whom politics is the continuation of war by other means.  He is a nakedly 
amoral hypocrite who resorts to deceit,459 media manipulation and smear 
                                                
449  See HAYES, supra note 415, at 201–03 (Gorbachev); GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 63–65 
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458  GELLMAN, supra note 419, at 2. 
459  See id. at 219–20 (reporting, when leaving a 2002 briefing from DC on intelligence 
suggesting Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), House Majority Leader Dick 
Armey felt a “very deep sadness about [his] relationship with [DC]” because he “deserved better . . . 
than to be bullshitted by him.”).  When chairing the vice presidential search committee, DC solicited 
and received extensive personal background information from potential running mates, only to 
accept the nomination himself and later use information gleaned in the process against spurned 
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campaigns,460 stealth and misdirection, and “the dark side”461 to prevail over 
opposition, yet rails against others who use the same strategy. 
In sum, DC scores high on five of nine sub-constructs of hostility and is 
thus scored as hostile. 
 
  d. Adventurism 
 
DC is a “worrier” who plans extensively to guard against the worst 
possible outcome of every decision.462  He is emotionally reserved and disfavors 
surprises.463  His cardiac illness suggests he internalizes significant stress when 
making exigent decisions such as the order, in the absence of President George 
W. Bush, to authorize U.S. military aircraft to destroy hijacked civilian aircraft 
to prevent their use as guided missiles on September 11, 2001.464  Still, despite 
his pragmatism, DC is possessed of enough optimism to believe he can change 
the world by taking risks and exerting his relentless will, to include, most 
significantly, the “constructive destabilization” of Middle East regimes such as 
Iraq.465  Thus, DC scores high on six of seven sub-constructs of adventurism and 
is scored an adventurist. 
 
  e. Summary of IVs: Dick Cheney 
 
Dick Cheney is a militaristic anomist who is hostile and adventuristic. 
ii. DVs: CLC and Halliburton 
 
                                                
potential nominees—fueling speculation this had been DC’s plan and reinforcing a perception of DC 
as “gratuitous, petty, and vindictive.”  Id. at 4–6, 28–29. 
460  When Joseph Wilson, husband of CIA clandestine officer Valerie Plame, published an op-ed 
disputing DC’s claim Iraq had been attempting to acquire uranium from Niger, DC allegedly advised 
his Chief of Staff, Scooter Libby, to leak the fact of Plame’s covert status to the media to pressure 
Wilson and then successfully resisted congressional demands for the transcript of his FBI interview 
regarding the matter, wherein he was questioned as to whether, as widely believed, he was the 
source of the illegal leak.  See id. at 364–65 (chronicling the Plame/Libby scandal). 
461  In a staff meeting after September 11, 2001, DC stated the U.S. would “have to work . . . the 
dark side” and “[a] lot of what need[ed] to be done [t]here [would] have to be done quietly, without 
any discussion, using sources and methods that [we]re available . . .  [and] any means at [their] 
disposal . . . to achieve[their] objectives.”  Id. at 160. 
462  Id. at 19 (noting, in DC’s experience, “you usually end up with the least worst option.”) 
(quoting DC). 
463  Id  at 17, 86, 95.  DC never gets angry and is “not the hugging kind” according to GWB.  Id. 
at 328. 
464  See id. at 119–20 (chronicling and analyzing DC’s actions and orders on September 11, 
2001). 
465  Id. at 242, 252. 
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Although he had no private-sector experience, DC was hired as CEO of 
Halliburton (H), an oil services company, in August 1995 to leverage the 
extensive influence he developed in Congress and as Secretary of Defense from 
1989 to 1993.466  During his tenure at H, DC spent “countless days on the road, 
using his contacts to court key business players around the world, especially in 
the Middle East[,]”467 expanding government contracting, and doubling 
revenues in five years.468  DC’s retirement in 2000 with a $20 million severance 
package was framed as that of a “triumphant CEO, a self-reliant insider-turned-
outsider who competently and ethically grew his company while increasing 
shareholder value.”469  However, closer examination supports an inference that 
luck and spin kept a messy legacy quiet long enough for DC to return to politics.  
In addition to fraud,470 commentators allege political cronyism and collusion 
with officials beholden to DC in the steerage of government contracts to H,471 
although proof of it is “a little like trying to build a murder case without the 
murder weapon.”472  By 2003, H was the primary U.S. Army contractor—up 
from 19th—and the no-bid process whereby H secured contracts—LOGCAP—
had been implemented by DC as Secretary of Defense in 1993.473  LOGCAP, a 
monopoly that pays a guaranteed profit for construction, food service, sanitation, 
laundry, postal, energy, prison, and other services to the U.S. government, was 
created to enhance military logistical capability and efficiency by shifting these 
functions to one civilian contractor.474  From inception, LOGCAP has been 
controversial: DC’s Department of Defense awarded it to H, the very company it 
asked to draft the proposal,  and, as a “cost-plus” contract, it is a de facto blank 
                                                
466  See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 106–08 (describing H as devastated by 
declining 1980s oil prices and reporting DC was hired in the hope his “Rolodex” would reinvigorate 
H).  Still, despite DC’s contacts, his lack of private sector experience was so remarkable that the 
price of H fell on news of his appointment.  BRIODY, supra note 416, at 191–92. 
467  CHITTICK, supra note 19, at 167. 
468  BRIODY, supra note 416, at 204. 
469  DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 104–05. 
470  During DC’s tenure, H engaged in systematic inflation of project costs, use of substandard 
materials, overstaffing, excess production, and other acts of waste, fraud, and abuse for which it 
entered into settlements with the Justice Department subsequent to DC’s departure.  See generally 
CHATTERJEE, supra note 421.  By 2004, H was under investigation by the Department of Defense, 
the SEC, Justice, and the GAO for acts and omissions during DC’s tenure.  BRIODY, supra note 416, 
at 234. 
471  See, e.g., DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 152–64. 
472  BRIODY, supra note 416, at 224. 
473  DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 153.  While Secretary of Defense, DC asked H to 
develop a classified report on how a single private firm could develop logistical capabilities in the 
event of military overstretch.  Id. 
474  CHATERJEE, supra note 421, at xvi (chronicling the shift to civilian logistical support and the 
creation of LOGCAP); BRIODY, supra note 416, at 184–88, 198–206 (detailing the creation, award, 
and controversies of LOGCAP). 
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check making H the “government quartermaster.”475  Whereas H lost money 
before LOGCAP, from 1995–2000, H earned $2 billion for LOGCAP in Bosnia 
and Kosovo.476  
More serious are allegations DC exploited his office to steer a LOGCAP 
contract to restore Iraqi oil production, awarded to H prior to the 2003 
intervention by the United States.477  That the close relationship between H and 
the Department of Defense benefited DC, and that neither DC nor H are fully 
forthcoming about the extent and timing of these benefits,478 fuels speculation 
the 2003 invasion was motivated by financial self-dealing.479  The dubious 
constitutionality of DC’s secretive Energy Policy Development Group (EPDG) 
formed to achieve environmental deregulation and removal of sanctions against 
oil producing nations,480 the revelation EPDG began studying maps of Iraqi oil 
fields in 2001, and H’s retaliation against whistleblowers481 reinforced a 
perception of a scofflaw firm marshaling influence to spark an unprovoked “war 
for oil.”  During DC’s tenure, H suffered other scandals, including violating 
sanctions,482 bribery,483 violation of labor laws,484 and accounting fraud.485  In 
                                                
475  DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 160. 
476  BRIODY, supra note 416, at 198. 
477  See id. at 221 (alleging violation of federal law in the award of the Restore Iraqi Oil 
contract); DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 158–60 (analyzing adverse actions taken 
against officials who protested legal violations in the bid and award process).  Whether DC 
participated in the award of contracts to H, ordered or permitted his staff to do so, or otherwise knew 
or should have known is contested.  See id. at 153 (discussing unsuccessful discovery in litigation).  
DC claims he “never went near the Defense Department” while vice president and never lobbied on 
behalf of H.  Id. at 152–53.  The Defense Department defends the award on “national security” 
grounds.  Critics suggest bid and award meetings conducted after the secret award were a “sham,” 
and DC’s claim of ignorance is incredible.  See id. at 158–60. 
478  Although DC claimed to have severed all financial ties to H after resigning in 2000, H made 
six-figure payments to DC from 2000 to 2005, and DC cashed in stock options to earn over $18.5 
million—interests that, according to the Congressional Research Service, constituted a “continued 
financial interest” and a “potential conflict.”  CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 49.  As late as 2006, 
DC retained stock options in H worth $4 million.  DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 105. 
479  See, e.g., CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 28 (reporting this allegation). 
480  See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 7–11 (discussing the creation of and 
controversies surrounding the operation of the EDG). 
481  See FBI Interviews Halliburton Whistleblower, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 2004, http://www. 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-11-24-halliburton-whistleblower_x.htm; Walker v. 
Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (2002). 
482  Although DC opposed unilateral U.S. trade sanctions on the ground they hindered U.S. 
competition with foreign firms, he claimed to have a “firm policy” against violations.  DUBOSE & 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 17; 111–12; see also id. at 115 (reporting H helped found a lobbying 
group, “USA Engage,” to fight sanctions); id. at 116 (noting DC lobbied for a waiver from 
application of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996).  However, while DC was CEO, H created 
fictitious foreign subsidiaries out of glorified post office boxes and used them to trade illegally with 
Libya, Iran, Burma, and Iraq.  CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 45–46.  In 1997, H settled with the 
Commerce Department over charges it violated the U.S. Export Administration Act fifteen times in 
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respect to these misdeeds, DC claims ignorance.486 
Moreover, it might fairly be said that a culture of corruption established 
during DC’s tenure survived his departure: since 2000, dozens of H employees 
have been charged for crimes involving official duties,487 abuse of foreign 
migrant laborers has embarrassed the Department of Defense,488 and federal 
agencies and Congress have launched investigations.489  Under the pressure of 
these scandals, the share price of H—$49 when DC resigned in 2000—plunged 
to $15 by 2002,490 and H has labored to “extricat[e] itself from its former CEO’s 
                                                
transactions with Iran.  When it was revealed in 2000 H had done over $70 million in business with 
Iraq between 1997 and 2000, DC pled ignorance.  DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 117.   
483  Beginning in 1995, a subsidiary of H paid $180 million in bribes for favorable treatment in 
contracts connected to construction of a natural gas facility in Nigeria in violation of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act.  See Barbara C. George & Kathey Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton 
Co./TKSL’s Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption 
Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503 
(2006) (detailing investigations).  An investigation by the Nigerian government led to parallel 
investigations by the Justice Department and the SEC in 2004.  Id.  H acknowledged in subsequent 
SEC filings that it had produced documents and made employees available to the SEC for 
deposition.  Id. at 245.  DC denied any knowledge of bribery during his tenure at H.  DUBOSE & 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 114.  By 2006, the investigations had stalled, and, although by its 
own admission H had violated the FCPA, no evidence implicated DC beyond the “should have 
known” standard.  Id. at 112. 
484  A Labor Department investigation revealed, during DC’s tenure, H charged some costs of 
senior executive pension and bonus plans to its workers’ pension fund and failed to pay pensions 
owed to employees.  CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at 50. 
485  While DC was CEO, H—in concert with its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen—changed its 
accounting practices in violation of GAAP to postpone revealing losses on over-budget construction 
projects and artificially inflate after-tax profits, and failed to inform stockholders.  BRIODY, supra 
note 416, at 213.  The SEC opened an investigation in July 2002, and H restated earnings and settled 
twenty-nine shareholder lawsuits over financial violations in June 2003.  Id.  Among the practices 
questioned were the creation of fifty-eight SPEs during DC’s tenure.  Id. at 227.  In 2004, the SEC 
fined H $7.5 million and imposed fines on H executives; no action was taken against DC.  DUBOSE 
& BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 118. 
486  See BRIODY, supra note 416, at 288 (questioning whether DC can credibly claim to have not 
had knowledge of any of the misconduct). 
487  CHATTERJEE, supra note 421, at xv. 
488  In 2006, General George Casey issued an order, “Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in 
MFI-I,” ordering contractors and other persons and entities within DOD jurisdiction to cease 
deceptive hiring practices, charging excessive fees to foreign workers, and permitting substandard 
living conditions and wages.  Halliburton/KBR Scandals, ALLGOV, http://www.allgov.com/ 
departments/department-of-defense/defense-criminal-investigative-service?agencyid=7361 (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
489  In 2004, Congress issued subpoenas to investigate the relationship between the UN Oil for 
Food Program, H, waste and fraud in LOGCAP, and the Bush-Cheney decision to intervene in Iraq 
in 2003.  David Teather, Congress Inquiry Links Cheney Aide to Halliburton Deal, GUARDIAN (June 
14, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jun/15/usa.dickcheney. 
490  Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, H stock soared to $66 per share but since fell to $44 
per share—more than $5 less than when DC departed in 2000.  See In 1 Year, Halliburton’s Stock 
Doubles as Troop Deaths Double, HALLIBURTON WATCH (Sept. 20, 2005), at http://www. 
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mismanagement.”491  In 2007, H relocated to Dubai—a no-tax jurisdiction with 
looser regulatory standards—although it remains incorporated in the United 
States and engages in extensive LOGCAP contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
9.  Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities 
a. CEO Bernard Madoff 
 i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
  a. Militarism 
 
Bernard L. Madoff (BM) was born in New York City to middle-class 
children of Eastern European Jews in 1938492 and is universally recalled by 
childhood contemporaries as a physically unremarkable, introverted 
individual493 disinterested in current events.494  Although he participated in 
extracurricular activities, including swimming, basketball, playground 
monitoring, and lifeguarding, BM was and remains a loner.495  BM is quiet, 
distant, and aloof.496  He is an intensely secretive person who keeps his own 
counsel and did not display the trappings of his wealth to make or keep 
friends;497 on the contrary, he grew “cranky” when obligated to socialize498 and 
did so solely to achieve business objectives.499  His introversion and isolationism 
may be a function of low self-esteem: he was considered “dull” by schoolmates 
and rejected by the opposite sex due to his lack of intellect500 and relative 
poverty.501 
The foregoing may account for a high degree of ambition: BM discovered 
his road to happiness was paved with cash.  As a youth, he ran a lucrative 
                                                
halliburtonwatch.org/news/stock_troop2.html (postulating H’s share price depends on U.S. military 
success in foreign conflicts).  
491  DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 422, at 105–06. 
492  ANDREW KIRTZMAN, BETRAYAL: THE LIFE AND LIES OF BERNIE MADOFF 16 (2010). 
493  Id. at 14–15. 
494  JERRY OPPENHEIMER, MADOFF WITH THE MONEY 48 (Wiley 2009). 
495  See id. at 31–32. 
496  Id. at 89–90. 
497  Id. at 118. 
498  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 60. 
499  See ERIN ARVEDLUND, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE 19 (2010) (describing BM’s social 
networking as an undertaking designed to safeguard his business). 
500  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 20. 
501  See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 140 (indicating BM experienced embarrassment as a 
child because his family’s economic circumstances would not permit him to wear “trendy” clothes). 
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sprinkler business and was “the image of a driven young man” who “radiated an 
entrepreneur’s spirit.”502  Through long, hard hours doing manual labor and 
trading stocks in struggling firms, he discovered a gift for making money, and, 
in his cultural milieu, this conferred a sense of status and a belief he could “be 
one of them, the big shot, the Jewish prince who could dole out favors and 
advice, . . . a great power in the Jewish world of his fathers.”503 
BM enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1960 primarily to avoid the 
draft, rather than out of a sense of patriotic duty or nationalistic beliefs.504  He 
then attended the University of Alabama and Hofstra University on swimming 
and Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships.505  College 
classmates described an “assured, authoritarian” demeanor and noted BM had 
few friends.506   Nothing in the literature suggests he has any ideological 
commitments or other aspects of dogmatism.  In sum, BM scores high on seven 
of ten sub-constructs of militarism and is thus scored as a militarist. 
 
  b. Anomism 
 
Prior to his arrest in 2009, BM had no criminal background whatsoever,507 
although he was a suspected cheat at the golf course,508 a confirmed cheat in his 
marriage,509 and a frequent sexual harasser of his female employees.510  An 
ingrained disregard for law and legal authorities may have been bequeathed by 
his parents, who ran illegal stock trading operations out of the family home and 
may have elicited BM’s participation in this venture.511  BM enjoyed pretending 
                                                
502  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 15. 
503  Id. at 26–27, 39, 74. 
504  Id. at 36.  BM later exaggerated a medical condition to acquire a medical discharge and avoid 
additional service as was his obligation, reinforcing the impression he is not especially patriotic.  See 
id. at 167. 
505  See id. at 30, 36. 
506  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 58. 
507  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 9. 
508  See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 92 (reporting BM reported golf scores that never 
varied below eighty or above eighty-nine—returns from the links that mirrored his fictitious market 
returns and raised skepticism). 
509  BM was a serial adulterer during his marriage to Ruth, often meeting women—including 
prostitutes—for trysts at his office and paid “hush money” to prevent disclosure.  Id. at 62, 185; 
KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 111–12. 
510  BM made “sophomoric sexual comments” and was so inappropriate with female employees 
that he paid cash severances to several to avoid lawsuits.  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 111–12. 
511  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 9.  The SEC closed down the operation in 1963.  Id. at 35. 
Commentators refer to an “ethically and morally bankrupt household” where BM’s “values, 
principles, behavior, sense of right and wrong, ideals, and standards were established.”  
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 29. 
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to be a “wise Jewish elder,” but he is a self-confirmed “lox and bagels” Jew who 
did not attend synagogue, celebrate religious rituals, or otherwise participate in 
his faith.512  BM does have some legal training—he attended law school for one 
year, primarily to earn a draft deferment, only to drop out and form his 
business.513  However, he has no specific training in corporate law, and the 
extent of his knowledge of the field appears to have been confined to a group of 
pliant lawyers on retainer with whom he shared little information about his 
business.514  BM thus scores high on four of five sub-constructs of anomism and 
is scored as an anomist. 
 
  c. Hostility 
 
As a youth, BM was a “happy-go-lucky guy,”515 and friends report that 
even in adulthood BM had a “great sense of humor,” was “very considerate” and 
personable,516 and shared freely of his wealth.517  Others suggest BM is more 
emotionally complex and variable and, “in his inner sanctum, he c[an] be 
gregarious, coarse, generous, gentle, rude, and sometimes vicious.”518  With his 
employees, he vacillated between paying off their mortgages and honeymoons, 
throwing elaborate office parties, and otherwise treating them as valued 
members of a team with making crude sexual jokes, hurling insults, and 
degrading them.519  With potential clients, he was “so rude, he was a bastard,” 
perhaps out of a natural proclivity, or perhaps to maintain the air of phony 
exclusivity essential to his business.520  With his social equals, BM fostered the 
impression he was a “[g]od [and] . . . [he] was special, so unique,”521 and he 
boasted often he was the “most powerful man on Wall Street.”522  Whether BM 
                                                
512  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 96–97. 
513  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 64–66. 
514  See KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 66 (describing the relationship between BM and his Wall 
Street attorneys). 
515  Id. at 24. 
516  DEBORAH STROBER & GERALD STROBER, CATASTROPHE: THE STORY OF BERNARD L. 
MADOFF, THE MAN WHO SWINDLED THE WORLD 72 (2009) (describing BM as “loved and 
respected.”). 
517  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 210.  Others note BM was unenthused about the “charity 
circuit.”  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 58. 
518  Id. at 110. 
519  See id. at 104–09 (describing the bipolarity of BM’s treatment of his employees). 
520  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 159 (speculating on why BM behaved as he did with 
potential clients). 
521  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 96 (quoting Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel, an acquaintance and 
client of BM). 
522  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 18. 
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is suffering from narcissistic personality disorder, as some surmise, is unknown, 
but most believe a latent misanthropy and deep absence of empathy surfaced in 
his personality, producing some “inner need to screw the system in a grand way 
that no one had ever done before.”523 
Given the nature of his criminal enterprise, it is unsurprising BM made a 
practice of hiring only those he deemed insufficiently smart to be able to 
discover the workings of his Ponzi scheme.524  In addition to his lack of trust, 
BM exhibits elevated cynicism, narcissism, and Machiavellianism.  Even while 
running the largest Ponzi scheme in history, BM boasted on his website that his 
clients “[knew] that Bernard Madoff ha[d] a personal interest in maintaining an 
unblemished record of value, fair dealing, and high ethical standards that ha[d] 
always been the firm’s hallmark.”525  After he dropped out of law school, the 
U.S. Army ordered him to report for active duty to fulfill his ROTC scholarship 
obligation, and BM, realizing he would be sent to Vietnam, “suddenly suffered a 
medical malady” in the form of an ulcer, which led to a medical discharge.526  
Deception is a life-long trait: in grade school BM gave a report on a nonexistent 
book to avoid punishment for failing to execute the assignment, and, as an adult, 
he spun a “rags-to-riches” story out of whole cloth, claiming to have grown up 
poor on the Lower East Side, rather than middle-class in Laurelton.527  He is an 
“incredibly shrewd man in understanding human psychology” and manipulates 
others to serve his narcissistic ego.528  There is, however, no evidence BM is 
ethnocentric.  BM thus scores high on nine sub-constructs of hostility and is 
scored as hostile. 
 
  d. Adventurism 
 
BM is not impulsive, but he suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorder 
and is manic about appearances, cleanliness, and order.529  He is an optimist 
with an internal locus of control who has long believed it possible to structure 
                                                
523  Id. at 81–82 (quoting a long-term friend of BM); KIRTZMAN, supra note 494, at 74 (“[BM], 
who grew up feeling inferior, may well have looked on [his victims] . . . as societies of judgmental 
Jews he wanted to impress—or get his revenge on.”). 
524  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 117 (“You could have a great job at [BM] if you were a 
semimoron, because . . . you didn’t ask too many questions.”). 
525  Id. at 3. 
526  Id. at 64–66. 
527  Id. at 22–23. 
528  STROBER & STROBER, supra note 516, at 80–83 (discussing diagnoses by psychiatrists who 
believe BM suffers from narcissistic personality disorder, fractured ego, and other maladies). 
529  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 117.  Doors left ajar, window blinds not properly aligned, and 
colors other than black and gray were all triggers for BM’s obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).  
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 125. 
2014 A THEORY OF CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE 425 
 
the world to create happiness by acquiring its primary determinant: money.530  
As a schoolboy he manifested a “devil-may-care” attitude and “didn’t take 
anything overly seriously,”531 and later in life he demonstrated “no anxiety, 
guilt, or remorse” in connection with his swindles,532 even when SEC 
investigators probed his operations in 2004.533  However, BM has an abnormally 
large appetite for risk, as illustrated by his decades-long criminal enterprise and 
by an anecdote from his college years that describes him joyriding down icy side 
streets, just missing parked cars, solely for a thrill not shared by his 
passengers.534  Attendant to this is elevated stress: despite his optimism, BM 
“always had a sense of worry about him,”535 and he has persistent facial tics.  
BM thus scores high on five of seven sub-constructs of adventurism and is 
scored an adventuristic decision-maker. 
 
  e. Summary of IVs: Bernard Madoff 
 
Bernard Madoff is a militaristic anomist who is hostile and adventuristic. 
 ii. DVs: CLC and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities 
 
Until his arrest in 2009, BM and his financial services firm Bernard L. 
Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) were relative unknowns beyond Wall 
Street.  When BM dropped out of law school in 1960, he created BLMIS, which 
was then a one-man boutique firm specializing in trading penny stocks.536  With 
seed money and Jewish community contacts provided by his father-in-law, BM 
grew BLMIS rapidly by promising investors supra-normal market returns of 
18%, and “[t]his was to be the template for all of [BM’s] future [business]: 
friends and family were guaranteed a certain return on their money annually, 
and, pleased and grateful, they were converted into an instant sales force . . . 
They came with indubitable references and glowing reports about the young 
[BM].537 
Claiming to use a sophisticated “spit-strike conversion strategy”—a hybrid 
                                                
530  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 28 (stating, for BM, “money [is] his key to happiness.”). 
531  OPPENHEIMER, supra note 494, at 41. 
532  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 8. 
533  See id. at 148 (describing BM as without “nervousness or . . . remorse” when duping SEC 
investigators in 2004). 
534  See id. at 33 (noting BM’s unusual “appetite for risk and his apparent belief he was 
impervious to its consequences.”). 
535  Id. at 61. 
536  Id. at 37. 
537  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 45. 
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stock and options hedging approach that produced consistent returns based on 
equal parts science and timing538—BM lured wealthy investors from Jewish 
social networks with promises of guaranteed money.539  Yet, BM delivered 
remarkable returns over the next four-plus decades—even during bear 
markets—only because he was not really trading.  BLMIS was partitioned to 
create a legitimate brokerage business that at its peak traded 10% of the total 
shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)540 and, more importantly, 
created a cover for a separate, secretive, and illegal “investment advisory” 
business that pretended to invest through a London trading office but in fact did 
not.541  BM received cash deposits from investors542 in brokerage accounts and 
deposited the cash in his personal JPMorgan Chase bank account.543  BLMIS 
employees created a fictitious paper trail to support the appearance the 
investment advisory fund was functioning lawfully and to deceive SEC 
auditors.544  In reality, BLMIS was the biggest private sector Ponzi scheme ever, 
paying earlier investors with the contributions of more recent rubes but 
skimming enough from the take to reap immense personal wealth.  BM easily 
fooled regulatory authorities during numerous audits and investigations,545 and 
new investors, if they suspected insider trading, were unwilling to ask why the 
                                                
538  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 66 (describing BM’s claims about his investment strategy).  A 
hedge fund is a complicated arrangement that functions by making bets on securities an investor 
believes will increase in price while at the same time making other bets—”options” to purchase or 
sell shares—on securities the investor believes will decrease in price.  These “longs” and “shorts” 
offset and return a reasonable but stable yield to the investor over time, and a portfolio of such bets 
earns a profit. 
539  See id. at 73–74 (describing BM’s investors as a “highly networked” group of wealthy Jews 
who trusted BM as a fellow “member of the tribe” and an “extended family member[]” with “shared 
responsibility to look out for [them].”). 
540  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 70. 
541 KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 176.   The “investment advisory” business was illegal because 
it was not registered as a separate entity from the brokerage as required by SEC regulations, and, 
thus, BM kept its existence secret from all but a very few.  Id. at 146. 
542  In addition to individuals lured into his scheme through family and social networks, other 
investors included “feeder funds”—“financial octop[i]” that, in effect, were co-conspirators with 
BLMIS and worked as sales agents to draw and pool investment capital.  Id. at 44; 88–94. 
543  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 176 (detailing BLMIS’ Ponzi scheme). 
544  See id. at 171, 181 (describing how BLMIS covered its tracks to deceive auditors). 
545  Private audits of the investment advisory business were strictly prohibited on “trade secrets” 
grounds, and SEC investigators were undermanned, underfunded, and undertrained in the 
architecture and operations of hedge funds to be able to discern illegality.  KIRTZMAN, supra note 
492, at 198, 229.  Moreover, BM, as one of the founders of the NASDAQ exchange, had generated 
competition with the NYSE and was thus perceived by the SEC as having interests in alignment with 
its own.  See ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 33, 77 (explaining reasons for SEC failures to detect 
BM’s illegal operations); KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 65 (suggesting BM’s status as a NASDAQ 
founder blinded investigators).  An SEC investigation concluded in 2007 with no enforcement after 
BM committed perjury by denying allegations of fraudulent trades; BM reported later that he was 
“amazed” at the youth and inexperience of SEC regulators.  Id. at 186. 
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goose laid golden eggs.546  The scheme had “an unbelievable performance 
record . . . [with] no resemblance to any other investment manager’s track record 
throughout recorded human history,”547 yet, so long as more money entered 
BLMIS than was being withdrawn, the ruse endured.548 
However, in 2008, a perfect storm of housing, manufacturing, credit, 
stock, and employment market collapses triggered a liquidity crisis that drove 
many investment advisory fund investors to withdraw and spooked prospective 
new investors.549  When, in December 2008, BM failed to stem the flood of 
demands for withdrawal of as much as $65 billion due, he wrote checks to 
family members, friends, and employees for the last $300 million in his account, 
confessed his crime to his sons, and was arrested by the FBI for what was soon 
determined to be the biggest fraud in financial history.550  As a result of the 
collapse and bankruptcy of BLMIS, over five thousand investors lost money, 
including luminaries in many fields; some individuals, charities, and financial 
firms were completely wiped out.551  In March 2009, BM pled guilty to eleven 
felonies and refused a plea bargain that would have required him to implicate 
others.552  He was sentenced in June 2009 to 150 years’ imprisonment.553  All 
investors, including feeder fund managers, claim to have known nothing of the 
scheme.554  BM has steadfastly refused to account for missing funds and is 
expected to die in prison.555 
                                                
546  Some blame investors, contending they were willfully ignorant, greedy arrogant, or lazy.  
See, e.g., ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 96, 104–05 (examining investors’ motives and reasons for 
failing to suspect illegality in their unusually good investment returns); KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, 
at 51–52, 157 (“[A] lot of people . . . cast aside all suspicions and all doubt and all fear, and . . . let 
greed overrule all else.”).  For an examination of BM’s Ponzi scheme and an account of the SEC’s 
failure to detect it despite a decade of warning, see HARRY MARKOPOLIS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: 
A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (2010). 
547  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 84 (quoting an interview with Harry Markopolos). 
548  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 165 (opining that the BLMIS scheme might have continued 
indefinitely but for the crash). 
549  See KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 214–21 (chronicling causes of and important events in the 
Wall Street “meltdown” that ultimately imploded BLMIS). 
550  Id. at 224–36 (chronicling the final days of BLMIS). 
551  Id. at 7–8, 244. 
552 Id. at 260.   It is widely believed that BM is shielding family members and other associates by 
refusing cooperation.  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 268–77. 
553 Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
554  KIRTZMAN, supra note 492, at 260. 
555  ARVEDLUND, supra note 499, at 277. 
428 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VIII:II 
 
10.  Countrywide Mortgage/Financial 
a. CEO Angelo Mozilo 
 i. IVs: Scores on Personality Constructs 
 
  a. Militarism 
 
Angelo Mozilo (AM), the son of Italian immigrants, is an “aggressive, 
short, ballsy, street-smart New Yorker” acutely aware he is “not a product of 
privileged Ivy League education and polish,” and “Harvard types would look 
down on him when he was a young man in New York trying to make his 
way.”556  At the age of twelve, he began a career as a “feisty, charismatic, gifted 
salesman” behind the counter of his father’s butcher shop,557 earned a degree in 
business at New York University while working full-time as a mortgage lender, 
and extended a reputation as a “tough guy”558 in 1968 when he founded 
Countrywide Mortgage—later Countrywide Financial (C).  The “bad boy of the 
mortgage industry” is a fierce competitor with a “winner-take-all” philosophy 
toward life and business and has always been determined to realize his ambition 
to be a “major player—one way or another.”559  He is a meritocrat560 who gloats 
over victories” and describes business as a “battle.”561 
AM is a control-obsessed perfectionist who secured his corporate 
headquarters “like a top-secret [military] base” with “guards at every 
checkpoint”562 and insisted his employees be “wholesome, honest, hardworking, 
. . . the best of America,” yet, overt expressions of nationalism conflicted with 
C’s culture, and requests from patriotic employees for time off in recognition of 
Memorial Day and Independence Day were rejected.563  AM was on a “mission 
                                                
556  ADAM MICHAELSON, THE FORECLOSURE OF AMERICA: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE RISE AND 
FALL OF COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS, AND THE DEFAULT OF THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 269 (2009). 
557  Id. at 140. 
558  Bernard Condon, Last Man Standing, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2000, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2000/1127/6614108a.html. 
559  Id.  AM “couldn’t accept being second or third” and sought “dominance” over his 
competitors.  MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS AND 
WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA—AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS 212 (2010). 
560  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 182. 
561  Condon, supra note 558. 
562  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 70–71.  The “mechanisms of Countrywide processes, 
procedures, checking and rechecking, and attention to perfect, verifiable detail had to be on a par 
with or exceeding that of NASA.”  Id. at 111. 
563  Id. at 97, 121, 234. 
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to help Americans achieve the dream of home ownership,” and left no one else 
any “strength, position, [or] power to change [C’s] entire company mission, 
culture, and reason for being.”564  When employees arrived late for meetings, 
they would find the door locked; they experienced pressure to sign a loyalty oath 
and wear a green armband signifying their devotion to C.565  To the external 
world, C was an extension of AM and his personality—a “wonderful, helpful 
neighbor,” but the employees’ role was to put their noses to grindstones and 
execute AM’s mission.566  Despite his competitiveness, aggression, ambition, 
favorable attitude toward power, and dogmatism, AM is a “warm, slick, 
reassuring” character567 with high self-esteem who holds seats on boards of 
directors, boards of trustees, charitable and fraternal organizations, and industry 
advisory groups.568  Still, AM scores high on six of ten sub-constructs and is 
scored as a militaristic decision-maker. 
 
  b. Anomism 
 
Nothing in the literature suggests AM should be scored high on the 
amoralism sub-construct, and AM has no formal legal training.  No evidence 
indicates AM has demonstrated systematic disregard for law or legal authorities.  
C may have contracted with unscrupulous real estate appraisers and developed 
business models that skirted laws and regulations,569 including offering 
“sweetheart deals” to influential friends of AM, but, prior to its collapse, C had a 
corporate compliance culture that required employees to “ben[d] over backward 
to make sure that every [act] was accurate, truthful, legal, and thoroughly vetted 
through the byzantine rules and regulations among the [fifty] states.”570  
Moreover, “[C] had at its center a culture of ethics . . . . Every meeting, every 
report, every lunchroom poster really pounded it into our brains that we should 
always be doing the honest, right thing for our customers, for our shareholders, 
for our values.”571 
Presumably, the corporate culture reflects AM’s personal views on law 
                                                
564  Id. at 23, 54. 
565  Id. at 59, 262. 
566  To drive his employees, AM “mixed equal parts pride and fear.  Some recall him checking 
slips from the company garage to see who was cutting out early.  Employees took the stairs[,] rather 
than waste time waiting for an elevator.”  Condon, supra note 558. 
567  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 140. 
568  Condon, supra note 558. 
569  See MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 324 (suggesting C committed minor ethical violations 
under AM’s tenure but finding nothing attributable to AM). 
570  Id. at 193. 
571  Id. at 192. 
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and compliance; accordingly, AM is scored low on all five sub-constructs of 
anomism and, thus, is scored as a non-anomistic decision-maker. 
 
 c. Hostility 
  
AM is a self-confessed vulgar “son of a bitch” who is volatile emotionally 
and holds grudges.572  He blames rivals for price wars he starts himself,573 
regards opponents as “enemies,” and cultivates a corporate culture where 
attacking the “stupidity or sloppiness” of employees is a sport.574  The “Rommel 
of the mortgage business” is an intensely distrustful, cynical employer who 
made C “Orwellian in its monitoring of employees and steadfast determination 
to push every worker to the grindstone all day, every day.”575  Moreover, he is a 
narcissist who attributes perceived deficiencies in others to “stupidity,” “ego,” or 
unworthiness576 and has made a perpetual tan, French cuffs, and gold Rolls 
Royces his signature style.  His lack of empathy has proven embarrassing.  In 
2008, a homeowner in need of loan modification wrote requesting assistance, 
and, when AM discovered the letter was based on a template provided by a 
homeowners’ advocacy website, AM sent the following note that was later 
distributed worldwide: “This is unbelievable.  Most of these letters now have the 
same wording.  Obviously they are being counseled by some other person or by 
the [I]nternet.  Disgusting.”577 
As the mortgage crisis deepened, rather than “being empathetic to the 
national disaster hitting millions of homes all across the country,” AM led C in 
an “spastic fit of rage” and developed a “Protect Our House” campaign to 
“defen[d] the virtues of [C], lash[] out at any detractors, and mak[e] it 
personal.”578 
The foregoing contrasts with AM’s apparent absence of elevated levels of 
misanthropy, ethnocentrism, and selfishness.  C’s corporate mission is to 
advance the American dream for everyone, “especially . . . the underprivileged 
in our country, through access and opportunity in the mortgage and housing 
systems[,]” and AM took great pride in lowering barriers to home ownership for 
minority and lower-income borrowers.579  Moreover, he is “extremely loyal to 
                                                
572  Condon, supra note 558. 
573  Id. 
574  HUDSON, supra note 559 (reporting AM reported information about rival firms to New York 
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in an attempt to destroy them). 
575  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 60. 
576  Condon, supra note 558. 
577  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 275. 
578  Id. at 259–60. 
579  Id. at 96, 126. 
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his people.”580  Still, AM scores high on six of nine sub-constructs of hostility 
and, thus, is scored as a hostile decision-maker. 
  d. Adventurism 
 
When his father rejected his idea to modify the family butcher shop to 
compete with emerging supermarkets in the 1950s, only to see the business fail 
and his father die of cardiac stress, AM vowed to “never shrink from risk” 
again.581  Accordingly, he gambled throughout the life of C, altering its business 
model to compete on price and market directly to borrowers, expanding as 
interest rates fell and competitors became risk-averse, and creating ever-more 
risky loan products.  An examination of AM’s decision-making suggests, 
although he believes he has the power to succeed through application of 
judgment and hard work, he acknowledges an inability to dictate events: before 
the collapse of C, AM claimed the credit-rating agencies’ requirement that C 
hold more capital than banks limited its growth and profitability.582  Moreover, 
no evidence suggests AM is impulsive; his moves in the markets were planned, 
and, under his leadership, C developed a conservative, slow-moving culture that 
vetted decisions carefully.583  Furthermore, while AM is “intensely 
optimistic”584 and does not appear to experience elevated anxiety or stress, his 
“let the chips fall where they may” attitude—predicated upon a belief, despite 
hardships, events will ultimately redound to his benefit—evidences some 
fatalism.585  In sum, AM scores high on three sub-constructs of adventurism and 
is scored as a non-adventurist. 
 
  e. Summary of IVs: Angelo Mozilo 
 
Angelo Mozilo is a militaristic non-anomist who is hostile but not 
adventuristic. 
 ii. DVs: CLC and Countrywide Mortgage/Financial 
 
AM created C in the late 1960s and, by 2004, with C then the largest home 
                                                
580  PAUL MUIOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE 
MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 119 (2008). 
581  Condon, supra note 558. 
582  See id. (quoting AM as stating the credit-rating agencies placed a “governor on my engine”). 
583  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 102, 111. 
584  Id. at 271.  Even when the real estate market was crashing in 2006, AM insisted he saw 
“early signs of stabilization” and 2008 would be a “hell of a year.”  HUDSON, supra note 559, at 270. 
585  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 258. 
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loan lender in the United States, was widely regarded as the “father of . . . the 
modern mortgage business.”586  However, in an effort to expand market share 
and make homeownership available to borrowers whose credit scores suggested 
they were greater risks, C began marketing “exotic” subprime loan products, 
including a “Pay Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage” (POARM).  The 
POARM—lawful then—allowed a borrower to purchase a house and select from 
a set of monthly payment options that included a negative amortization payment 
of an amount less than interest and principal otherwise due; the assumption was 
the value would continue to appreciate, and, as the borrower’s income grew, the 
borrower would either refinance before the loan re-set to a higher interest rate or 
begin to make payments that decreased loan principal.587  At least one senior 
executive questioned whether the assumption of constant future home value 
appreciation was valid and noted that if not “half the country could be upside 
down on these loans,” but more senior C officials believed the “risk [wa]s offset 
by the opportunity for market share and revenue gain” and if C did not make the 
loans its competitors would.588  When C initiated the POARM program, the 
dissenting executive pronounced, prophetically, he had “just witnessed the 
beginning of the end of [C] and maybe the entire U.S. economy.”589 
By 2006, interest rates ticked upward, loan applications slowed, and 
layoffs began across the mortgage industry.  In the 2006 annual report, AM 
claimed C was a “strong, viable financial company” and he “continue[d] to be 
bullish in the long-term prospects” of the firm despite challenges in the 
“shrinking mortgage market.”590  In August 2007, with housing values in free-
fall, borrowers unable to refinance as a result of unfavorable loan-to-value 
ratios, and foreclosure rates climbing, C, unwilling to admit a structural 
transformation was in effect and determined to compete with Ameriquest 
Mortgage,591 began drawing on its $11 billion credit line.592  Bank of America—
long interested in acquiring C—took a $2 billion equity stake with an option to 
buy if C were ever for sale.593  AM explored the creation of a “loan recall” 
program to achieve a soft landing, but Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae regulations 
blocked the approach; by the end of that year, with C’s credit line  exhausted, 
Bank of America exercised its option and purchased C for $4 billion in January 
                                                
586  Id. at xiii.  In 2005, C funded one of every five mortgages in the U.S.  Id. at 125. 
587  See id. at 10, 15–17, 155 (describing C’s POARM product). 
588  Id. at 21, 204–05 (outlining the reasons C extended POARM loans despite the risks). 
589  Id. at 23. 
590  See COUNTRYWIDE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT. 
591  See HUDSON, supra note 559, at 280 (reporting experts’ belief C would have survived if AM 
“hadn’t become fixated on competing with Ameriquest.”). 
592  MICHAELSON, supra note 556, at 257–59. 
593  Id. at 259. 
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2008.594  
Some suggest AM was unfairly vilified because he was the face of the 
subprime mortgage crisis and all he and C were guilty of was assuming too 
much risk and failing to adapt—an indictment that can be leveled at borrowers 
as well.595  However, as C was collapsing in 2007, AM sold $129 million of his 
shares in C while publicly touting the stock and using shareholder funds to 
repurchase stock to support the share price.596  During the scrutiny that followed, 
it was discovered C had extended “sweetheart” financing, including discounted 
rates and fees, to influential politicians, including members of the House and 
Senate Banking and Budget Committees and a former CEO of Fannie Mae—all 
individuals who exercised regulatory authority over C.597  AM was subpoenaed 
by and berated before congressional committees,598 and shareholders, state 
pension funds, and owners of mortgage-backed securities filed suits alleging 
serial violations of SEC, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac regulations.599  With 
housing values down by 30% in many areas of the country, state and municipal 
revenues diminished, leading to budget deficits that in turn sparked political 
unrest across the Midwest.600  On June 4, 2009, the SEC charged AM with 
insider trading and securities fraud,601 and on October 15, 2010, the parties 
reached a settlement in which AM agreed to pay $67.5 million and accept a 
lifetime ban from serving with any public company,602 thereby avoiding a civil 
trial that might have developed evidence, along with an ongoing FBI 
investigation, to support criminal charges.603  However, this fine is a small 
                                                
594  Id. at 267–272. 
595  Id. at 186, 307–08 (arguing AM and C were not solely responsible for C’s collapse because 
borrowers overleveraged themselves to purchase houses they could not afford). 
596 Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26country.html?pagewanted=all. 
597 Sam Gustin, Countrywide VIP Loans Went to Key Lawmakers: Congressional Report, TIME 
(July 6, 2012), http://www.business/time/com/2012/07/06/countrywide-vip-loans-went-to-key-law 
makers-congressional-report/. 
598  See MUIOLO & PADILLA, supra note 580, at 270–73 (describing the hearing before the House 
Oversight Committee in January 2008). 
599  See, e.g., Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(alleging C “omitted and misstated the credit worthiness of the underlying mortgage borrowers” 
thereby greatly underrepresenting the risk of the investment to plaintiffs); Brill v. Countrywide 
Home Loans Inc., 427 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2005). 
600 Jake Grovum, 2008 Financial Crisis Impact Still Hurting States, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/14/impact-on-states-of-2008-finan 
cial-crisis/2812691/. 
601  See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Mozilo, No. CV09-3994HFWNABX, 2009 WL 3807124, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009). 
602  Per the Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement: “[AM’s] record penalty is the fitting 
outcome for a corporate executive who deliberately disregarded his duties to investors.”  Id. 
603  In February 2011, the United States dropped a criminal investigation into the facts at issue in 
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fraction of the more than $600 million of AM’s net worth, and C reimbursed 
AM $20 million pursuant to an indemnification clause in AM’s employment 
contract.604  AM rejects responsibility and instead “blame[s] everyone from al-
Qaeda to the ratings agencies” for the bursting of the real estate bubble and the 
collapse of C.605 
B.  Analysis 
1.  Methodological Considerations and Limitations 
The ultimate objective in the field of CLC is the specification and testing 
of a theory with explanatory and predictive power.  Theoretical testing requires 
data analysis, but, as the complexity of the phenomenon increases, the 
availability of data decreases.  Some phenomena, such as corporate scandal, 
yield insufficient cases to support the testing of general propositions with 
traditional quantitative analysis.  Indeed, the data universe is limited, at first 
blush, to an “n” of fewer than thirty cases of corporate scandal. 
Moreover, phenomena that are causally linked to human agency and social 
processes are so complex and rooted in specific contexts that quantitative 
methods often obscure nuances, rendering barren descriptions and weak 
explanations.  Although there is pressure to transform contextually-sensitive 
social phenomena, including the study of CLC, into empirical questions 
“answerable” with statistics, and although statistical analysis does afford a 
rigorous assessment of patterns of covariation across a wide range of cases, 
statistical analysis treats cases as aggregates of a limited number of variables 
and generalizes from identifiable patterns of variance.  By drawing a small 
number of independent variables from their natural contexts and relegating all 
others to theoretical irrelevance, statistical analysis marginalizes human agency.  
A fundamental canon in science is that the research question, rather than 
methodological preferences, should drive experimental design.  When few cases 
exist and the hypothesized chain of causation involves human agency, the 
“comparative method” best fosters development and testing of theory. 
2. The Comparative Method 
The comparative method is case-oriented and relies upon comprehensive 
historical research to identify causal factors while simultaneously comparing 
                                                
the civil settlement between SEC and AM. 
604 Gretchen Morgenson, Lending Magnate Settles Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/business/16countrywide.html. 
605  MUIOLO & PADILLA, supra note 580, at 256. 
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each case as a holistic entity to every other case.  Researchers compare and 
contrast combinations of casual factors in one case with different combinations 
in another and, through systematic “eyeballing,” identify patterns of similarity 
and difference in the distribution of outcomes associated with various 
combinations.  Comparativists then identify which of the possible causal factors 
is constant across all cases of a particular outcome and thereby denote degrees 
of isomorphism.  While the comparative method does not prove causation, it 
creates a point of departure for experimental research.  As formalized here, the 
comparative method treats each personality construct as a causal 
factor/independent variable and each outcome as a dependent variable. 
3. Formalization: Qualititative Comparative Analysis 
Events do not simply happen but instead occur only under precisely 
delimited conditions.  Formal methods led researchers to find combustion 
requires oxygen, microbes cause infectious disease, and an absence of Vitamin 
C causes scurvy.  Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) rests upon the axiom 
that, short of laboratory experimentation, which is nearly impossible in the 
social sciences, inductive logic is required to determine necessary and sufficient 
causal factors of outcomes. 
a. Causal Factors and Outcomes 
 
QCA, a methodology developed to investigate questions grounded in 
human agency, permits the investigator of a particular DV, or “outcome,” to 
identify, through interpretation of all existing historical cases of the outcome, a 
broad number, “n”, of probable IVs, or “causal factors.”606  These causal factors 
are measured dichotomously across the universe of cases.  Each case is 
examined for the presence or absence of the causal factor; its presence is 
indicated by a capital letter, for example, “A,” and its absence by a lower-case 
letter, “a.”  The theoretical number of combinations of causal factors is thus 2n 
where “n” is the number of independent variables. 
b. Necessary and Sufficient Conditionality 
 
                                                
606  The term “causal factor” is a misnomer.  Although it is possible to establish associative 
relationships between variables through QCA, it is impossible to prove causation.  An associative 
relationship is a statement that the presence of an IV tends to occur in connection with the presence 
of a DV; it does not mean the DV is caused by the IV, although a causal inference may be drawn.  
Proof of causation requires controlled experimentation to prove the IV, rather than some intervening 
variable, causes the DV to occur and that the association is not simply one of covariance. 
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Each of the 2n cases is placed in a “truth table” matrix that associates 
particular outcomes with particular combinations of causal factors that 
manifested in actual historical cases.  Where cells in the truth table are unfilled 
due to an absence of the particular combination in the historical record, 
experimental research augments history and exhausts all possible combinations 
of causal factors.  While QCA cannot yield completely generalizable laws on the 
basis of very few cases, it nonetheless specifies relationships of necessity and 
sufficiency between causal factors and outcomes that hold across the universe of 
extant cases.  A “necessary” causal factor is one that always precedes a given 
outcome/effect and in the absence of which the outcome/event cannot occur.  A 
“sufficient” causal factor is a factor in the presence of which a given 
outcome/effect must occur. 
c. Prime Implicants 
 
QCA employs Boolean algebra to reduce several combinations of causal 
factors productive of the same outcome(s) to “prime implicants.”  In formal 
logic, an “implication” is formed when two statements are combined by placing 
the word “if” before the first and the word “then” between them.  For example, 
“If I drink this glass of water, then my thirst will be quenched.”  In an 
implication, the statement between the words “if” and “then” is known as the 
“antecedent;” the statement which follows the word “then” is the “consequent.”  
An implication asserts that its antecedent implies its consequent; thus, if the 
statement “I drink this glass of water” is true, it is also true that “my thirst will 
be quenched.”  Implication does not suggest it is impossible to satisfy thirst in 
any other manner, nor does implication imply there may not be other outcomes 
attendant to drinking the glass of water.  It may be argued beer may satisfy my 
thirst, or the water may be poisoned, and, thus, although it quenches thirst, it 
may also produce death.  However, the essential meaning of implication is the 
relationship asserted between antecedent and consequent: if the antecedent is 
true, the consequent is also true.   
A “prime implicant” is a special implicant in which the antecedent is the 
minimum combination of causal factors, which together are either 1) sufficient 
to cause a particular outcome, or 2) necessary to cause a particular outcome 
across the universe of cases, and the consequent is that outcome.  For any given 
outcome, y, for which there is a prime implicant, x, if x is a true statement of 
existing causal factors then either 1) y must occur as a result of the existence of 
x, or 2) x is a prerequisite for the production of y.  A prime implicant can be 
identified by surveying the universe of cases in which a given outcome is 
expressed and eliminating each of the “n” causal constructs for which there is 
more than one possible value from the causal construct combinations associated 
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with that outcome.  Taken together, those constructs that remain in every case in 
which the outcome occurs constitute the prime implicant. 
d. Probabilities: Hypothetical Analysis 
 
When the historical record fails to exhaust all possible combinations of 
causal factors, it is impossible to specify necessary and sufficient causality.  
QCA then analyzes preliminary hypotheses regarding relationships between 
causal factors and outcomes to derive probabilistic statements to inform 
experimental research.  Consider the phenomenon of “successful social 
revolution,” which has occurred three times.  In all three cases the causal factor 
of “collapsing monarchy” was present, but in only two—the Russian Revolution 
in 1917 and the Chinese Revolution in 1949—was “charismatic leadership” 
present.  In the third—the French Revolution in 1789—it was absent.  
Accordingly, while “collapsing monarchy” is a necessary condition for social 
revolution, “charismatic leadership” is not.  However, the preliminary 
hypothesis, “The stronger and more charismatic the leader of the revolutionary 
element, the more successful the resulting social revolution,” is affirmed by two 
of three, or 66.7%, of cases, as is the probabilistic statement, “A successful 
social revolution will be led by a strong and charismatic leader.” 
4. QCA Applied to the Association of Personality Constructs and 
CLC Outcomes 
a. Personality Constructs as Causal Factors 
 
Four personality constructs, each of which is a causal factor and an IV, are 
labeled as follows: 
 
•   militarism: A (presence of construct/factor) or a (absence of construct/ 
factor); 
• anomism: B (presence of construct/factor) or b (absence of 
construct/factor); 
• hostility: C (presence of construct/factor) or c (absence of 
construct/factor); 
    •   adventurism: D (presence of construct/factor) or d (absence of 
construct/factor). 
 
Personality construct scores for each CEO are aggregated to create 
personality profiles for all historical cases of corporate scandal.  Four 
dichotomized IVs yield 24, or sixteen, possible personality profiles.  As Table I 
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illustrates, the presence of each outcome/DV in a case is scored “1,” while its 
absence is scored “0”: 
 
Table I: Personality Construct Scores 
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Enron/ 
JS/ 
ABCD 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
WC/ 
BE/ 
aBCD 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
ImClone/ 
SW/ 
ABCD 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
AIG/ 
HG/ 
AbCd 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
HS/ 
Scrushy/ 
ABCd 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Sunbeam/ 
Dunlap/ 
ABCD 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Tyco/ 
DK/ 
aBCD 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
H/ 
Cheney/ 
ABCD 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
BM/ 
BMLS/ 
ABCD 
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
AM/ 
Counry 
Wide/ 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
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AbCd 
 
Table II illustrates sixty preliminary hypotheses, twenty of which are 
affirmed by 70% or more of cases and eight by 30% or fewer: 
 
Table II: Preliminary Hypotheses 
1 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
financial regulations. 
8/10 
2 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate securities 
regulations. 
6/10 
3 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate executive 
compensation. 
6/10 
4 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate 
the market. 
3/10 
5 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in 
bribery. 
5/10 
6 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to buy political 
influence. 
5/10 
7 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
employee rights. 
8/10 
8 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
environmental standards. 
3/10 
9 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to resist 
enforcement. 
5/10 
10 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn 
reputations as bad corporate citizens.. 
7/10 
11 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate earnings. 6/10 
12 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by Congress. 6/10 
13 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur 
legal penalties. 
7/10 
14 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer legal 
death. 
4/10 
15 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and 
blame others.. 
5/10 
16 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
financial regulations. 
8/10 
17 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
securities regulations. 
8/10 
18 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate 
executive compensation. 
8/10 
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19 The more anomistict he CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate the 
market. 
5/10 
20 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in 
bribery. 
3/10 
21 The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to buy political 
influence. 
3/10 
22 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
employee rights. 
8/10 
23 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
environmental standards. 
3/10 
24 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to resist 
enforcement. 
5/10 
25 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn reputations as 
bad corporate citizens.. 
5/10 
26 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate earnings. 6/10 
27 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by Congress. 6/10 
28 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur 
legal penalties. 
7/10 
29 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer legal death. 6/10 
30 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and 
blame others. 
7/10 
31 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate financial 
regulations. 
7/10 
32 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate securities 
regulations. 
8/10 
33 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate executive 
compensation. 
6/10 
34 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate the 
market. 
3/10 
35 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in 
bribery. 
3/10 
36 The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to buy political influence. 5/10 
37 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate employee 
rights. 
6/10 
38 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
environmental standards. 
1/10 
39 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to resist enforcement. 5/10 
40 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn reputations as 
bad corporate citizens. 
5/10 
41 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate earnings. 6/10 
42 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by Congress. 6/10 
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43 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur legal 
penalties. 
7/10 
44 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer legal death. 4/10 
45 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and 
blame others. 
7/10 
46 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
financial regulations. 
6/10 
47 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
securities regulations. 
9/10 
48 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate 
executive compensation. 
7/10 
49 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to manipulate the 
market. 
6/10 
50 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to engage in 
bribery. 
4/10 
51 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to buy political 
influence. 
4/10 
52 The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate 
employee rights. 
3/10 
53 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
environmental standards. 
5/10 
54 The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to resist 
enforcement. 
4/10 
55 The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to earn reputations 
as bad corporate citizens.. 
5/10 
56 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to restate 
earnings. 
5/10 
57 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by 
Congress. 
7/10 
58 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur 
legal penalties. 
8/10 
59 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer 
legal death. 
7/10 
60 The more adventuristic the CEO, the less likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing and 
blame others. 
4/10 
 
b. Prime Implicants of CLC Outcomes 
 
No outcome is associated with a single personality profile across all ten 
cases, thus it is not possible to identify a prime implicant for any outcome.  
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Although several outcomes are associated with the presence or absence of 
personality constructs across several cases, including in every case in which a 
particular outcome is expressed—for example, “violate financial regulations” 
occurred in seven of ten cases, and in all seven occurrences the CEO scored “C” 
for the presence of the hostility construct.  For none is the presence of a given 
personality construct associated with each case wherein the outcome occurs 
while the absence of that personality construct is associated with each case 
wherein the outcome does not occur—for example, in the three cases where no 
violation of financial regulations occurred the CEO scored “C” for present and 
not “c” for absent on the hostility construct.  Hypothetically, a single personality 
profile could serve as a prime implicant in all ten historical cases across all 
sixteen possible personality profiles.  However, in the ten cases, only four 
personality profiles—ABCD, aBCD, AbCd, ABCd—have been associated with 
corporate scandal.  Where history has not exhausted all possible combinations of 
causal factors and prevents specification of necessary and sufficient causality, 
QCA directs the investigator to perform hypothetical analysis to derive 
probabilistic statements. 
c. Hypothetical Analysis 
 
No Preliminary Hypothesis (PH) is affirmed by all or none of the ten 
historical cases of corporate scandal.  Nonetheless, if there were no relationship 
between any personality construct and any outcome, chance predicts each PH 
would be affirmed by five cases and rejected by five cases.  To affirm a 
particular PH, an arbitrary determination is made that it must be supported by at 
least 70% of cases in which the outcome is expressed; to reject a particular PH, 
and to affirm the null hypothesis expressing the inverse relationship of causal 
factor and outcome, it must be affirmed by 30% or fewer of the cases in which 
the outcome is expressed.  This requirement establishes a sufficiently significant 
improvement over chance that a measure of confidence can be placed in those 
PHs affirmed or rejected.  Reformulated hypotheses, stated as working 
postulates (WPs) are offered in Table III: 
 
Table III: Working Postulates 
WP1 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
financial regulations. 
8/10 
WP2 The more militaristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to 
manipulate the market. 
7/10 
WP3 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
employee rights. 
8/10 
WP4 The more militaristic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate 7/10 
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environmental standards. 
WP5 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to earn 
reputations as bad corporate citizens. 
7/10 
WP6 The more militaristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur 
legal penalties. 
7/10 
WP7 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
financial regulations. 
8/10 
WP8 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
securities regulations. 
8/10 
WP9 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate 
executive compensation. 
8/10 
WP10 The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to engage in 
bribery. 
7/10 
WP11 The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to buy 
political influence. 
7/10 
WP12 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
employee rights. 
8/10 
WP13 The more anomistic the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate 
environmental standards. 
7/10 
WP14 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur 
legal penalties. 
7/10 
WP15 The more anomistic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing 
and blame others. 
7/10 
WP16 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
financial regulations. 
7/10 
WP17 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
securities regulations. 
8/10 
WP18 The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to manipulate 
the market. 
7/10 
WP19 The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to engage in 
bribery. 
7/10 
WP20 The more hostile the CEO, the less likely his/her firm will be to violate 
environmental standards. 
9/10 
WP21 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will incur 
legal penalties. 
7/10 
WP22 The more hostile the CEO, the more likely s/he will be to deny wrongdoing 
and blame others. 
7/10 
WP23 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to 
violate securities regulations. 
9/10 
WP24 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to inflate 
executive compensation. 
7/10 
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WP25 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to 
violate employee rights. 
7/10 
WP26 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he will be subpoenaed by 
Congress. 
7/10 
WP27 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely s/he and his/her firm will 
incur legal penalties. 
8/10 
WP28 The more adventuristic the CEO, the more likely his/her firm will be to suffer 
legal death. 
7/10 
 
d. Analysis of Associative Relationships 
i. Militarism and CLC 
 
WP 1 confirms the intuition that a CEO who is fixed upon achieving 
wealth, power, and status to the detriment of other ends, including the discharge 
of responsibilities to stakeholders, will violate financial regulations if rules stand 
in the way.  Similarly, as WP 3 suggests, it stands to reason that such a person so 
motivated will run roughshod over the legally-protected rights and interests of 
employees.  Moreover, as violations mount, detection is inevitable in the long 
run, and WP 5 predicts that along the path the odds the illegal conduct of firms, 
or at least some aspects of it, will “leak” into the community and earn them and 
their CEOs reputations as scofflaws increases in direct proportion to the 
frequency of their lawbreaking which, in turn, is a function of CEO militarism.  
Finally, it stands to reason, as WP 6 suggests, firms with militaristic CEOs will 
be more likely to commit legal violations that result in legal penalties. 
In contrast, it is counterintuitive, as WPs 2 and 4 suggest, that militaristic 
CEOs are better environmental defenders than their non-militaristic peers and 
less likely to manipulate the market.  Both findings are likely an artifact of the 
small number of cases, and the former is likely the result of the fact that few, if 
any, include the enterprises—mining, manufacturing, etc.—against which most 
of the existing environmental legal regime is directed. 
ii. Anomism and CLC 
 
Anomistic CEOs—ignorant and even disdainful of law and legal 
authorities and bereft of an internal moral code—will instinctively regard legal 
and moral restrictions on their conduct in purely instrumental terms.  As WPs 7, 
8, 9, and 12 suggest, little, if any, independent weight will be accorded to 
financial and securities laws, customary expectations regarding executive 
compensation, or the rights of employees in their CLC decision-making, and 
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behaviors will be guided largely, or even solely, by other considerations.  WP 14 
indicates anomistic CEOs assume greater legal risk and, therefore, incur greater 
legal exposure, to include the increased likelihood of prosecution, and, with 
prosecution, conviction.  Finally, it is consistent with the general description of 
anomism that, as WP 15 anticipates, the anomistic CEO, who knows and cares 
little about the legal regime he or she is accused of violating and has never felt 
impressed by any sense of legal obligation, will deny any knowledge of or 
responsibility for his or her wrongdoing and seek to attribute any such 
responsibility to other parties.  Although there is a human tendency to deny 
responsibility for one’s mistakes, this tendency is strongest in the anomistic 
CEO, who does not believe in the law, and, if in fact the law exists, is sure he or 
she is above it. 
WPs10 and 11, however, are counterintuitive.  An anomistic CEO is 
precisely the sort expected to engage in buying political influence and outright 
bribery, notwithstanding any legal prohibition.  Still, at least insofar as WP 10 is 
concerned, only a small number of cases are available for study and the practice 
may largely be limited to international firms doing business overseas.  Similarly, 
the finding in WP 13—an anomistic CEO is less likely to engage a firm in 
violation of environmental law—is difficult to explain and may be driven in part 
by the limited number of cases and the lack of representation in the sample by 
extractive and manufacturing firms that engage in operations with potential 
environmental impacts. 
iii. Hostility and CLC 
 
It stands to reason, as WPs 16 and 17 postulate, that self-absorbed, 
delusional, amoral CEOs who distrust and dislike humanity would treat “lesser” 
people as tools for grabbing wealth and power in contravention of financial and 
securities laws.  Hostility may warp CEO judgments.  It also should follow, as 
WP 21 anticipates, that such selfish and hostile personalities subordinate firm 
interests to their own in ultimately futile attempts to stave off detection and 
punishment.  And, as WP 22 indicates, when confronted with evidence of their 
wrongdoing, hostile CEOs are psychologically predisposed to preserve 
delusions of perfection and nobility, deny wrongdoing, and blame the “little 
people” who have failed them. 
The finding in WP 18 is likely an artifact of too few cases.  Only five 
firms—Enron, WorldCom, AIG, Halliburton, and Countrywide—possessed the 
kind of market clout that could disturb the efficient operation of markets, and the 
majority of these firms did wield this clout.  Had more firms with market power 
and hostile CEOs been available for study, intuition suggests the direction of 
this relationship would be reversed.  WP 19 is also counterintuitive; we would 
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expect that the more hostile a CEO is the more likely he or she would be to look 
upon bribery as nothing more than necessary business expense paid to achieve 
gains, particularly as against those unwilling to pay.  It may be that hostility is 
no absolute bar to the exercise of prudent discretion, or that parties seeking 
bribes are more cautious in their dealings with CEOs they recognize as hostile 
and tend to refrain from conduct in which they suspect their would-be co-
conspirators would later implicate them.  Because the analysis of the ten cases of 
corporate scandal yield only three instances of bribery, it is premature to claim 
much strength for the associative relationship implied by WP 19.  The same 
must be said for WP 20; the ten cases reveal only a single attempt to violate 
environmental laws, and the prediction that the more hostile the CEO the less 
likely his or her firm will violate environmental standards may be the product of 
insufficient data. 
iv. Adventurism and CLC 
 
WP 23 states impulsive, optimistic gamblers who repose great faith in 
their capacity to control events and absorb stress are, as CEOs, compelled to 
undertake business strategies that afford the prospect of significant benefits—
specifically, violating securities regulations—while presenting significant risks 
in the form of financial and legal consequences to themselves, their firms, their 
shareholders, and their communities.  As WPs 24 and 25 predict, seeking 
inflated compensation and abusing subordinate employees for selfish motives 
are behaviors associated with the adventuristic CEO because the payoff to the 
CEO is great and the potential penalties—the loss of face and the loss of human 
capital to the firm—seem small in comparison.  WP 26, which postulates that 
the more adventuristic the CEO the more likely he or she will be subpoenaed by 
Congress, illustrates that, although risk and optimism are necessary parts of a 
business strategy and although some of the greatest human triumphs have been 
attained by the assumption of great amounts of risk—aviation and the discovery 
of drugs for cancer are but two—risk can also lead to business failure, and to the 
sort of financial and accounting shenanigans designed to shield failure from 
investors.  WP 27 and WP 28 illustrate a strong association between 
adventurism and legal penalties, as well as the legal death of the adventurist’s 
firm.  Apparently, not only Congress but also shareholders eager to recoup 
losses and prosecutors motivated by visions of higher office take a dim view of 
CEO adventurism. 
e. Outcome Maximizing Associations and Combinations 
 
Although no CLC outcome has a prime implicant, several are associated 
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with personality profiles that share at least one personality construct score across 
at least 70% of associated profiles.  WP 1, “The more militaristic a CEO, the 
more likely his/her firm will be to violate financial regulations,” is supported by 
seven of ten, or 70%, of cases, while six of seven, or 86%, of personality 
profiles associated with the presence of the outcome “violate financial 
regulations” contain the personality construct “A,” “militaristic,” and, thus, 
reinforce WP 1.  Nineteen Outcome Maximizing Associations (OMAs) meet or 
exceed the 70% confidence level on both measures: WPs 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28. 
An “Outcome Maximizing Combination” (OMC) represents that construct 
or aggregation of constructs that yields the greatest probability, relative to all 
others, that the corresponding outcome will occur.  Each construct that generates 
an OMA for an outcome is included in the OMC for that outcome.  Constructs 
that do not meet this threshold are excluded from OMCs, and it is assumed that 
these constructs have no greater influence than chance on the associated 
outcomes. For example, for the outcome “violate securities regulation,” three 
WPs—WP 9, “The more anomistic the CEO the more likely his/her firm will be 
to violate securities regulations,” WP 19, “The more hostile the CEO the more 
likely his/her firm will be to violate securities regulations,” and WP 27, “The 
more adventuristic the CEO the more likely his/her firm will be to violate 
securities regulations”—are OMAs.  Therefore, “anomism,” “hostility,” and 
“adventurism,” indicated by the score BCD, form the OMC for “violate 
securities regulations.  However, PH 2, “The more militaristic the CEO the more 
likely his/her firm will be to violate securities regulations,” was supported by 
60% of cases and, thus, did not meet the 70% threshold to be included as a WP 
and, thus, is excluded as an OMA.  Consequently, neither the presence nor 
absence of militarism is part of the OMC for “violate securities regulations,” and 
whether the CEO is militaristic or not has no greater influence than chance on 
the outcome “violate securities regulations.  Table IV illustrates OMCs for all 
CLC outcomes: 
 
Table IV: Outcome Maximizing Combinations 
 Outcome Maximizing Combination 
Financial Violation AC 
Securities Violation BCD 
Inflated Compensation BD 
Market Manipulation None 
Bribery None 
Political Influence None 
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Labor Law ABD 
Enviro None 
Resist Enforce A 
Bad Reputation C 
Restate Earnings ABD 
Subpoena ABCD 
Legal Penalties D 
Legal Death D 
Deny & Blame BC 
 
Each construct is associated with six OMCs, a finding that suggests all 
constructs are equally associated with CLC outcomes.  Yet, as further analysis 
reveals, hostility, and to a lesser extent adventurism, may be the “master” CLC 
personality constructs that harness the greatest explanatory and predictive 
power.  If so, then the capacity to determine the presence or absence of hostility 
and adventurism is a potent tool in CEO selection and retention.  That anomism 
may yield less predictive power is counterintuitive inasmuch as one might 
expect this construct, which most closely taps attitudes, beliefs, and values about 
law and legal institutions, to offer greater insight into CEO behaviors regarding 
CLC.  The fact that beliefs, attitudes, and values held by a CEO regarding law 
may be less salient to explaining and predicting the compliance of his firm than 
his hostility or adventurism is remarkable. 
f. Probabilistic Statements of Association 
 
A “Probabilistic Statement of Association” (PSA) is a synthetic statement 
of the associative strength between a personality construct and a CLC outcome 
across a minimum of 70% of the ten historical cases in hypothetical analysis, as 
well as across a minimum of 70% of cases in which the outcome is actually 
expressed.  A PSA expresses the strength of the associative relationship in terms 
of the probability that a given CLC outcome will occur given information about 
the construct or profile of the CEO who makes CLC decisions.  PSAs do not 
imply the absolute truth of the associative relationship, nor do they identify the 
microprocesses that “produce” outcomes.  Nonetheless nineteen PSAs, 
illustrated in Table V, help extend the reach of data analysis: 
 
Table V: Probabilistic Statements of Association 
1 A militaristic CEO associates with violation of financial regulation in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 
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6 of 7 outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78. 
2 A militaristic CEO associates with violation of employee rights in 8 of 10 cases (100%) and 6 
of 6 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .90. 
3 A militaristic CEO associates with a bad reputation in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 5 of 5 outcome 
occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85. 
4 A militaristic CEO associates with legal penalties in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 6 of 7 outcome 
occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78. 
5 An anomistic CEO associates with violation of financial regulations in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 
6 of 7 outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78. 
6 An anomistic CEO associates with violation of securities regulations in 8 of 10 cases (80%) 
and 7 of 8 outcome occurrences (88%) for an average probability of .84. 
7 An anomistic CEO associates with inflated executive compensation in 8 of 10 cases (80%) and 
6 of 6 outcome occurrences (100%)  for an average probability of .90. 
8 An anomistic CEO associates with violation of employee rights in 8 of 10 cases (80%) and 6 
of 6  outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .90. 
9 An anomistic CEO associates with legal penalties in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 6 of 7 outcome 
occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78. 
10 An anomistic CEO associates with denial of wrongdoing in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 6 of 7 
outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .78. 
11 A hostile CEO associates with violations of financial regulations in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 7 
of 7 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85. 
12 A hostile CEO associates with violations of securities regulations in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 8 
of 8 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85. 
13 A hostile CEO associates with denial of wrongdoing and attribution of blame in 7 of 10 cases 
(70%) and 7 of 7 outcome occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85. 
14 An adventuristic CEO associates with securities violations in 9 of 10 cases (90%) and 7 of 8 
outcome occurrences (88%) for an average probability of .89. 
15 An adventuristic CEO associates with inflated executive compensation in 7 of 10 cases (70%) 
and 5 of 6 outcome occurrences (83%) for an average probability of .77. 
16 An adventuristic CEO associates with violation of employee rights in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 
5 of 6 outcome occurrences (83%) for an average probability of .77. 
17 An adventuristic CEO associates with a congressional subpoena in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 5 
of 6 outcome occurrences (83%) for an average probability of .77. 
18 An adventuristic CEO associates with legal penalties in 8 of 10 cases (80%) and 6 of 7 
outcome occurrences (86%) for an average probability of .83. 
19 An adventuristic CEO associates with legal death in 7 of 10 cases (70%) and 4 of 4 outcome 
occurrences (100%) for an average probability of .85. 
 
PSAs offer explanatory and predictive probabilities for eleven of fifteen 
DVs/outcomes; no PSA can be deduced on the basis of existing data for four 
CLC outcomes at or above the 70% threshold.  For example, PSAs 4, 9, and 18, 
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taken together, suggest the probability that legal penalties were or will be 
imposed upon a firm led into scandal by a militaristic, anomistic, and 
adventuristic CEO is 80%—the average of 78%, 78%, and 83%.  Put differently, 
the probability that a militaristic, anomistic, and adventuristic CEO has or will 
be more likely to make business decisions that result in legal penalties than will 
a non-militaristic, non-anomistic, and non-adventuristic CEO is 80%.  The 
corollary also holds: the probability that legal penalties have been or will be 
imposed upon a firm led by a non-militaristic, non-anomistic, and non-
adventuristic CEO is 20%. 
C. Combined Theoretical Model 
Coefficients of Associative Relationships (CAR) relax the rigor in 
establishing association between personality constructs and CLC outcomes and 
are measured by calculating the average of (1) the percentage of cases in 
hypothetical analysis supporting a particular associative relationship between a 
construct and a particular outcome and (2) the percentage of QCA outcome 
occurrences in which the associative relationship between the construct and 
outcome is expressed.  For example, for militarism and “violate financial 
regulations,” the associative relationship is supported in 70% of cases and the 
militarism sub-construct is present in 6 of 7, or 86%, of occurrences of “violate 
financial regulations.”  Thus, the CAR for the relationship between militarism 
and “violate financial regulations” is .78—the average of .70 and .86.  In Figure 
1, arrows indicate associative relationships between constructs and CLC 
outcomes.  The strengths of associative relationships are indicated by labeling 
each arrow with a CAR ranging from -1.00 to -.50 and .50 to 1.00.  A 
relationship of perfect positive association is accorded a CAR of 1.00; a 
relationship of perfect negative association is accorded a CAR of -1.00.  A CAR 
of .5 or -.5 signifies the equivalent of chance.  This measurement is analogous to 
the correlation coefficients used in regression analysis; however, true 
measurement of correlation is not feasible given the small “n” of cases, and, 
thus, relationships of association are employed to the same end.  Where an 
arrow connects a construct to a CLC outcome labeled with a positive CAR, the 
presence of the personality construct associates with the CLC outcome.  The 
obverse of this stated relationship is also true.  For an arrow labeled with a 
negative CAR the absence of the personality construct associates with the CLC 
outcome to which it is connected.  Again, the obverse of this relationship is also 
true.  In the Model, only those CARs with coefficients greater than or equal to 
.65 are represented: 
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D. General Observations and Caveats 
 
Perfect explanation and prediction of human decisions made in complex 
and dynamic situations characterized by uncertainty and stress transcend the 
current state of science, as do attempts to predict exactly when, where, and how 
future corporate scandals will erupt.  It is important to stress the limited and 
conditional nature of the causal significance of personality.  Nevertheless, 
heuristic testing of the CLC pretheory has generated several associative 
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relationships between CEO personality constructs and CLC outcomes.  These 
relationships, presented in narrative format, are building blocks upon which to 
continue development and testing of the theory. 
1.  “Ideal-Typic” CEOs and Associated CLC Outcomes 
a. ABCD 
 
The CEO who is a militarist and is anomistic, hostile, and adventuristic—
ABCD—is an authoritarian, even imperial, leader and an aggressive competitor 
with prior military service and low self-esteem who will view the use of power 
favorably both within the firm to establish hierarchies and in its business 
strategy to defeat rivals, and will prefer to make decisions in isolation.  He or 
she will have little regard for law or legal authorities, will lack moral or ethical 
qualms about violating obligations regarding finance or securities regimes, and 
will know little of the substance of law generally and even less about corporate 
law.  He or she will not trust others and will regard stakeholders—employees, 
investors, business partners—in solely instrumental terms: their worth to 
him/her will be measured simply by whether they contribute to his or her grand 
visions of wealth, power, and status, and failing any value he or she will express 
a generalized animus toward them, particularly if they are of different social 
groups than him or her.  He or she will be an optimistic gambler whose belief 
that he or she can assert his or her will upon events and bend others to his or her 
aims will impel him or her to take risks and cut corners, and he or she will 
resolve the tremendous anxiety and stress that accompanies this risky behavior 
by trusting blindly and, in effect, rolling the dice that neither he or she nor his or 
her firm will be caught when committing CLC violations. 
The ABCD CEO is more likely than a CEO with any other personality 
profile to preside over a firm that engages in fraudulent accounting, 
misrepresentation of the firm’s financial condition, insider trading, and other 
securities violations.  This CEO creates a culture of lavish compensation 
packages for executives that are indefensible by reference to the marketplace 
while disregarding laws that protect other employees against discrimination, fair 
employment practices, violations of pension and retirement benefits, and 
reprisals for whistleblowing.  Prior to discovery of its substantial and systematic 
violations of law, the firm led by this CEO will earn a bad reputation with 
employees, investors, lenders, customers, vendors, local communities, and 
regulators for unethical and unlawful practices.  These external stakeholders 
may intuitively recognize and naturally resent the ABDC CEO’s decision to 
discount their influence and interests; however, any anxiety and stress that 
attend the prospects of developing a bad reputation are more than offset by the 
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ABCD CEO’s optimistic hope that the profit from such a strategy more than 
compensates the firm for the risk entailed in “going it alone.” Moreover, when 
he or she fails to overcome risks that a less adventuristic CEO would not have 
assumed and the firm stumbles publicly, Congress may well come calling.  
However, this CEO will feel no independent compliance pull.  His or her lack of 
trust in the political and legal system, coupled with the belief Congress is “the 
enemy,” will place the CEO in an adversarial relationship, and he or she will 
likely refuse to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.  Congressional 
committees, frustrated by the lack of voluntary compliance and by the inability 
to attribute business failures to the assumption of understandable risk rather than 
to illegality, will be compelled to subpoena him or her.  This CEO’s gamble that 
neither he or she nor his or her firm will be detected, or if detected, prosecuted, 
or if prosecuted, convicted, will often be a losing bet, for this personality profile 
is most closely associated with the imposition of civil and criminal legal 
penalties. 
Precisely how unbridled, aggressive ambition coupled with a lack of legal 
or ethical foundation and a hostile, instrumental, risk-hungry approach translates 
into these CLC violations, and the consequences that follow, is the stuff of 
future research.  Still, the preceding description readily evokes Jeffrey Skilling, 
Sam Waksal, Albert Dunlap, Dick Cheney, and Bernard Madoff—ABCD CEOs. 
b. (A/a)BCD 
 
The (A/a)BCD CEO may view reason and persuasion, rather than power, 
as appropriate methods for making and implementing decisions, and may prefer 
to build coalitions and affiliations.  His or her successes may be shared 
successes.  However, he or she will have little regard for law or legal authorities, 
will lack moral or ethical qualms about violating legal obligations, and will 
know little of the substance of law generally and even less about corporate law.  
He or she will not trust others and will regard rivals and stakeholders—
employees, investors, business partners—in instrumental terms: their worth to 
him or her will be measured simply by whether they contribute to his or her 
grand visions of wealth, power, and status, and failing any value he or she will 
express a generalized animus toward them, particularly if they are of different 
social groups than him or her.  The (A/a)BCD CEO’s wildly optimistic belief 
that he or she can assert his or her will upon events to gain advantage over 
competitors will impel him or her to take great risks, and he or she will resolve 
accompanying anxiety and stress by trusting blindly and gambling that neither 
he or she nor his or her firm will be sanctioned by regulators. 
The (A/a)BCD CEO is the most likely personality profile to direct a firm 
to violate antitrust laws, fix prices or production levels, commit industrial 
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espionage, and manipulate the market.  He or she is also most likely to preside 
over the bankruptcy or liquidation of his or her firm as a result of having 
engaged in practices made illegal under corporate law.  Ignorance, it seems, may 
spell not bliss but actually danger in a CEO, whose gambles that he or she can 
conspire to restrain fair trade, that his or her firm will not post losses than cannot 
be covered by earnings, and that the firm will remain liquid in the face of 
demanding creditors and unwilling debtors, will prove fatal.  When the firm and 
its leaders are subjected to legal penalties, the (A/a)BCD CEO will deny 
wrongdoing, withhold apologies or remorse, and blame others.  As a superior 
creature who regards the “little people” he or she employs or who hold the 
firm’s shares or live as neighbors as mere objects meant to serve ends, and as 
someone who does not feel any compliance pull whatsoever, the (A/a)BCD 
CEO feels no empathy for those who suffer his or her decisions and must 
displace the blame upon a lesser person better suited to bear it.  Although 
denying blame for our mistakes and casting it upon others may be a function of 
simply being human—few of us are able to openly admit that we are imperfect 
and that who we would like to be and who we are expected to be in social life 
are not always achieved—and while denying wrongdoing may be a rational 
defense that all but the clinically insane or the most honest offer to minimize 
attendant political and legal costs, the (A/a)BCD CEO is least likely of all 
personality profiles to accept any responsibility. 
The present study cannot conclude militarism has a significant associative 
relationship with the outcome “manipulate the market.”  However, three CEOs 
led their firms to commit this CLC violation, and two—Jeffrey Skilling and 
Dick Cheney—are militarists.  Moreover, four firms suffered legal death: Enron, 
WorldCom, Sunbeam, and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities.  Each of 
their CEOs, save for Bernie Ebbers, is a militarist.  Furthermore, two other firms 
led by CEOs with the personality profile (A/a)BCD, namely ImClone and Tyco, 
were able to escape legal death only by the astute planning of a merger partner 
in the case of the former and by a rapid and sound reorganization plan instituted 
by a new executive team and board in the case of the latter. 
c. A(B/b)C(D/d) 
 
The A(B/b)C(D/d) CEO is an authoritarian and nationalistic leader with 
prior military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated from others but 
has fierce ambition and competitive drive and regards the use of power as an 
appropriate means of achieving goals.  He or she will not trust others and will 
regard stakeholders—employees, investors, business partners—in solely 
instrumental terms: their worth to him or her will be measured simply by 
whether they contribute to his or her grand visions of wealth, power, and status, 
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and failing any value he or she will express a generalized animus toward them, 
particularly if they are of different social groups than him or her.  The 
A(B/b)C(D/d) CEO is more likely than those with other personality profiles to 
direct a firm to corrupt business practices by accepting or offering cash, 
services, or gifts to influence business decisions.  This CEO’s drive for power, 
control, and the defeat of his or her rivals, coupled with a disregard for law and 
legal authorities and moral sources of rules, will convince him or her that 
corruption is a part of the human condition and that it is legitimate to gain 
advantage over competitors by unlawful means, and he or she is unlikely to 
experience sufficient anxiety or stress to dissuade him or her from doing so.  
Neither the anomism nor adventurism constructs demonstrated associations of 
sufficient strength for inclusion in the ideal-typic personality profile for bribery.   
d. ABC(D/d) 
 
The ABC(D/d) CEO is an authoritarian, nationalistic leader with prior 
military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated but has fierce ambition 
and competitive drive and regards power as an appropriate method of reaching 
decisions within the firm.  He or she will be a self-absorbed, amoral individual 
who makes decisions in isolation and will not seek to build affiliations with 
others unless they serve his or her goal of achieving and protecting wealth, 
power, and status.  He or she will not trust others and will regard stakeholders—
employees, investors, and even politicians—in solely instrumental terms: their 
worth to him or her will be measured simply by whether they advance his or her 
grand visions of wealth, power, and status, and if they do not he or she will bear 
them an animus. 
The ABC(D/d) CEO is more likely than CEOs with other personality 
profiles to allow or require corporate or employee funds, facilities, or services to 
be used to support political candidates or parties in violation of law.  Despite his 
or her hostility, in the case of powerful politicians who grant patronage in the 
form of desirable laws, generous political oversight, and prosecutorial 
discretion, he or she is willing to pay for their services, and this reflects the 
perceived utility of the political influence purchased and the benefits accorded to 
his or her pursuit of wealth, power, and status, rather than the intrinsic value of 
the relationships.  Adventurism appears theoretically irrelevant.  Five CEOs—
Jeffrey Skilling, Bernard Ebbers, Richard Scrushy, Hank Greenberg, and Dick 
Cheney—bought political influence; all are “hostile.”  Perhaps the purchase of 
political influence is valued even by CEOs who are self-absorbed and 
disinterested in affiliations because they view the value of the relationship 
secured by cash as form of insurance against unfavorable legal, political, and 
judicial results, as a valuable enhancement to the firm’s public reputation, or as 
456 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VIII:II 
 
an advance payment on any potential future liabilities. 
This CEO is also most likely to resist regulatory authorities in the 
implementation and enforcement of corporate law: for the ABC(D/d) CEO, 
cooperation as a rule, and cooperation with legal and regulatory authorities is 
anathema.  Because regulators directly threaten his or her wealth, power, and 
status, the hostile, anomistic militarist will regard them as competitors in a zero-
sum game.  In five cases of corporate scandal in the present study, CEOs 
resisted enforcement, and all five express AC in their personality profiles. 
e. AB(C/c)D 
 
The AB(C/c)D CEO is an authoritarian and nationalistic leader with prior 
military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated but has fierce ambition 
and competitive drive and regards the use of power as appropriate means to 
achieve ends.  He or she is a self-absorbed, amoral individual who will not seek 
to build affiliations with others unless they serve his or her goal of achieving and 
protecting wealth, power, and status.  His or her wildly optimistic belief that he 
or she can assert his or her will upon events to gain advantage over competitors 
will impel him or her to take great risks, and the AB(C/c)D CEO will be too fast 
to assume them and too optimistic to gauge accurately the probable outcomes of 
his or her decisions; the decision to violate environmental standards, which the 
AB(C/c)D CEO is more likely to make than any other personality profile, will 
be an ill-considered choice that takes into consideration neither the likely 
probabilities of detection nor the costs and benefits of noncompliance to the 
firm.  In the ten cases of corporate scandal, only one CEO—Dick Cheney, who 
is scored ABCD—engaged in environmental violations. 
f. AbC(D/d) 
 
The AbC(D/d) CEO is an authoritarian and nationalistic leader with prior 
military service who has low self-esteem and is isolated but has fierce ambition 
and competitive drive and values he use of power to achieve ends.  He or she is 
a self-absorbed individual who will not build affiliations with others unless they 
serve his or her goal of achieving and protecting wealth, power, and status.  He 
or she will not trust others and will regard employees, investors, business 
partners, and even politicians in solely instrumental terms: their worth to him or 
her will be measured simply by whether they advance his or her goals, and if 
they do not he or she will bear them an animus, particularly if they are of 
different social groups than him or her.  For the AbC(D/d) CEO, however, while 
the business arena is for combat, law and legal authorities are important in 
regulating its extremes, and he or she may well be knowledgeable about law 
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generally and corporate law specifically and governed by independent sources of 
moral restraint.  Thus, while he or she may direct the firm to engage in corporate 
illegality that inflates the financial health of the firm and wins wealth, power, 
and status, his or her lack of anomism may attenuate the extent or severity of 
any legal transgressions to which the AbC(D/d) CEO commits the firm.  The 
AbC(D/d) CEO is more likely than other CEOs to lead a firm that restates 
earnings during his or her tenure as a consequence of violations of various 
aspects of CLC.  Of the ten CEOs studied, two have personality profiles that 
include the constructs AbC—Hank Greenberg and Angelo Mozilo—but only 
one was required to restate earnings as a result of the commission of legal 
violations. 
2. Personality Profiles 
a. “The Outlaw” 
 
A CEO with the personality profile ABCD—militaristic, anomistic, 
hostile, and adventuristic—is a corporate disaster incarnate.  “The Outlaw”607 is 
a human predator who will demand inflated compensation, abuse employees, 
violate environmental laws, buy political favors, and direct the commission of 
serious financial and securities violations that will trash the good name of the 
firm, trigger analyst inquiries, require restatements of earnings, incur the wrath 
of Congress and the media, destroy evidence and obstruct justice, and lead the 
firm down the scandalous road to falling stock prices, dwindling earnings, civil 
and criminal penalties, and bankruptcy and dissolution.  The Outlaw will deny 
any wrongdoing and blame others for personal and corporate misfortunes and 
show no remorse for his or her actions.  Although he or she may forfeit some ill-
gotten gains and lose some of his or her freedom for a while, the Outlaw will 
become extremely wealthy in the process and may even live to ride again. 
b. “The Rustler” 
 
The personality profile aBCD—nonmilitaristic but anomistic, hostile, and 
adventuristic—appears almost indistinguishable from The Outlaw at first blush, 
                                                
607  The four personality profiles of the ten CEOs in the present study are assigned names drawn 
from a set of stock characters common to American Westerns that are as stylized and precisely 
defined as the characters of the Italian Renaissance Commedia dell’Arte or the Japanese Kabuki 
Theatre.  The universality of the characters, themes, and conflicts is part of what makes Westerns so 
compelling as art and entertainment, and their use here is meant to invest the experimental profiles 
with meaning and color.  See Western Characters, TV ROPES http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki. 
php/Main/WesternCharacters (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). 
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yet “The Rustler” is less aggressive, less competitive, more likely to work in 
groups, and less in need of stroking to boost self-esteem than his or her cousin.  
Whereas The Outlaw steals by daring daylight raids and seeks worldwide fame, 
The Rustler works by stealth and in the dark and prefers to be nameless and 
faceless as he or she grows the herd.  However, the ultimate result to the firm of 
hiring The Rustler as CEO is similarly destructive: The Rustler will quietly 
violate antitrust laws, fix prices or production levels, commit industrial 
espionage, manipulate the free operation of the markets, and so badly 
mismanage the firm that it will suffer bankruptcy and dissolution.  Of course, 
The Rustler will deny responsibility and point the finger at others for the 
downfall of the firm. 
c. “The Rancher” 
 
“The Rancher”—militaristic but non-anomistic, hostile but not 
adventuristic—is committed to nothing more than the safety of his or her herd 
and its value at market, and he or she is threatened in this by Outlaws and 
Rustlers.  He or she is ready, willing, and able to use force to protect the herd, 
which he or she and his or her cowboys drive hard.  He or she lives on the open 
range, distrusts and dislikes cowboys and Indians he or she does not know, and 
has little to do with townspeople except at market time.  If the Sheriff or his 
Deputy should call upon him or her for assistance, “The Rancher”—committed 
to and reliant upon the rule of law and courts as the first line-of defense of his or 
her stock—will offer his or her support, but he or she otherwise remains aloof 
and out of the fray.  As CEO, The Rancher will generate and expend significant 
political and social capital, and take and pay bribes, to prevent and minimize 
problems the firm might face.  While it may have to restate earnings, the firm 
will not engage in serious violations of the law under The Rancher, who will 
fulfill his or her mission: to shield the firm against predators and husband it to 
abundance. 
d. “The Mayor” 
 
“The Mayor”—personality profile ABCd—is a vainglorious individual 
who abuses his or her office for personal gain without care for the townsmen or 
the rule of law, and the only cause for which he or she will expend personal 
resources is to ensure re-election.  As CEO, The Mayor will violate financial 
regulations, engage in bribery and buy and sell political influence, and obligate 
the firm to restate earnings to reflect the damage done to shareholders.  When 
scandal erupts The Mayor will spend the significant political influence he or she 
has purchased to resist enforcement and avoid legal penalties, but if the firm 
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does incur sanctions The Mayor will scapegoat underlings.  Unseating The 
Mayor as CEO is possible; bringing The Mayor to account for misdeeds is quite 
another matter.  
IV. CRITICISMS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. Criticisms and Responses 
1. Reductionism 
Those with intellectual commitments to theories that regard other levels of 
analysis as more fundamental to the explanation of the behavior of firms may 
dismiss personality as little more than “a magic slogan to charm away the 
problems that [their] intellectual tools don’t handle.”608  Others may take 
exception to the claim that personality, rather than firm, industry, or national 
culture, the powers and makeup of boards of directors or auditors, CMPs, the 
availability of comprehensive and “toothy” legal regimes, or the courage of 
whistleblowers, is central to explanations for firm decisions regarding CLC; for 
these critics, personality constructs are “noisy” variables, and the reductionism 
of PT will invariably be sacrificial of explanatory and predictive power.609 
Indeed, the “perfect” model of CLC might well treat firm behaviors as 
resulting from a combination of causes and in turn amalgamate insights and 
variables from all pre-theories and all levels of analysis.  However, such a model 
would be so cumbersome and so difficult to conceptualize and apply that some 
reductionism would be necessary to permit replication and falsification.  Neither 
the naïve view of CLC as the mere projection of personalities nor the belief 
decision-making is entirely insulated from the effects of personality enjoys 
empirical support.  If firm behaviors could be explained solely by reference to 
the personalities of CEOs, there would be no discernible pattern of behavior at 
variance with predictions derived from the analysis of those personalities.  The 
data do not support this conclusion.  Still, personality is not epiphenomenal to 
CLC: although there may be circumstances in which all CEOs will decide 
identically, decisions as to at least some of the most relevant outcomes appear to 
be influenced by personality. 
                                                
608  HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 23 (1947). 
609  CAMPBELL JONES, MARTIN PARKER & RENE TEN BOS, FOR BUSINESS ETHICS: A CRITICAL 
APPROACH 4 (2005). 
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2. Lack of Parsimony 
Personality theories are difficult to test empirically, and researchers must 
expend labor, time, and resources to acquire knowledge about the subjects of 
investigation, as well as requisite training in psychobiographical research, 
qualitative methodology, and formal modeling.  Critics, however, should 
concede that a theory attempting to offer relevant explanations and predictions 
of CLC, a phenomenon of great complexity, will be similarly complex.  If 
parsimony, rather than explanatory and predictive power, is the measure of 
success, there are grounds for concern.  However, if the present theory harnesses 
as much explanatory and predictive power as can be corralled at present, it 
behooves those who would fault its lack of parsimony to develop the research 
and experimental techniques that will enable collaboration in the field. 
3. Ecologically Fallacious 
Some may fault the present theory for presuming associative relationships 
that obtain within a very small “n” of cases can be generalized to the universe of 
potential CEOs.  Indeed, there may be another set of personality constructs that 
generates better explanatory and predictive power, and it is possible replication 
studies will score decision-makers differently and reach contrary findings.  
Generalizing inductively from a very small number of cases is inherently 
problematic, for anomalous individual cases are more likely to drive findings 
than they will in larger populations.  However, because the data employed 
herein nearly spans the universe of major corporate scandals over the last fifteen 
years, it is not a sample in the scientific sense, and, thus, inferences need not 
necessarily build upon skewed data.  Moreover, the conclusions of the present 
study are conditional and intended to explain a very limited number of context-
dependent cases of corporate scandal and serve as points of departure for further 
research. 
4.  Data Defects and Selection Bias 
The data is not voluminous.  In one case, a single primary source was used 
to develop a CEO personality profile, and the potential for bias and other errors 
is magnified.  Moreover, psychobiographical research, always arduous, is 
especially so when analyzing CEOs who, although they enjoy celebrity, do not 
inspire nearly so much biographical work as do heads of state and entertainers.  
Further, the cases chosen have been included specifically because the CEOs had 
already been mired in corporate scandal.  Many other CEOs about whom as 
much has been written have not, and, although this is not guarantee against their 
guilt, the presumption runs in their favor.  Studies of other CEOs, including 
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those who have not been publicly linked with violations of corporate law, will 
be undertaken in future research to develop and refine the present theory. 
B. Directions for Future Research 
1. Experimental Research 
Only four distinct combinations of the four personality constructs have 
been identified in the personality profiles of CEOs who presided over corporate 
scandals: ABCD, aBCD, AbCd, and ABCd.  However, these four personality 
constructs generate 24, or sixteen, possible combinations.  Twelve combinations 
of the four constructs exist theoretically within a sufficiently numerous 
population but cannot as yet be identified, analyzed, and placed in a truth table.  
When, as here, the historical record fails to exhaust all possible combinations of 
personality constructs, it is impossible to specify necessary and sufficient 
causality in respect of any particular outcome, unless the historical record can be 
augmented either through the passage of time and the availability of additional 
corporate scandals, or by the production of additional cases in an experimental 
setting.  Data associated with experimental profiles and derived from survey and 
simulation research can be integrated with historical data and subjected to QCA. 
2. Additional Dependent Variables and Intervening Variables 
Investigation of associative relationships between personality and 
additional CLC outcomes will expand the scope of the present study.  Moreover, 
future iterations of this research may reveal the substance and process of 
decisions regarding CLC are in effect intervening variables to which greater 
theoretical significance may be attributed. 
3. Quantitative Analysis 
Generation of simulated cases of CLC will allow introduction of 
quantitative methods, including content analysis and pathways analysis, to 
complement QCA.  Multivariate statistical analysis—principal components or 
best subsets regression analysis—may suggest one or more IVs can be dropped 
from the theory without sacrificing explanatory power.  More powerful theories 
may be built by including additional IVs, and the scope may be extended to 
additional DVs.  Integration of variables drawn from other levels of analysis 
may aid in determining the causal significance of personality-level variables 
relative to inputs from the international political economy, the political and 
economic character of states, and the nature of organizational-cultural units. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Why do CEOs rob corporations?  Willie Sutton, were he alive, might look 
around and reply, yet again, “Because that’s where the money is.”610  The 
market value of the top twenty-five Fortune 500 firms is approximately $4 
trillion.  Yet, times have changed since 1934.  The investor class has moved its 
cash from banks into equity shares in public firms.  The crooked class no longer 
grabs its loot by brandishing weapons, informing bank tellers that “this here’s a 
stick-up,” and shooting G-men on the way out; now it cooks the books, talks up 
stock before selling short, and lies to Congress.  Moreover, robbery today is far 
bigger business than in the 1930s when career criminals like Willie Sutton 
became famous for blasting their way out of banks with $20,000 in currency.  In 
the last fifteen years, rogue executives made away with $1 trillion in shareholder 
assets and killed enough jobs to employ the city of Houston. 
In response, prosecutors have claimed several celebrity CEOs as trophies 
and Congress, eager to assuage defrauded voters, has imposed stricter—and far 
more expensive—legal obligations upon public firms.  Yet, despite the valiant 
efforts of legal architects to deter corporate scofflaws, no one seriously believes 
legislative package cobbled together will hand regulators the silver bullets 
necessary to slay the seemingly immortal criminal class.  Wherever the money 
is, the crooks will flock. 
For the same reason, CMPs, statements of new practices from overhauled 
boards of directors, encomiums to ethical decision-making, and other 
paraphernalia of the post-Enron “corporate ethics” era, while packed with 
symbolic meaning, are too often worth no more than the paper upon which they 
are printed or the air into which they are uttered.  One need only read the 
twenty-odd pages of Enron’s Code of Ethics, written long before that firm slid 
into the abyss, to grasp this sobering truth.  Managers understand, or quickly 
learn, crime often pays, but CMPs will not pick up a check, and modification of 
perquisites, bolstering of the independence of auditors, and public support for 
corporate social responsibility initiatives eat at the bottom line. 
 Yet, if the status quo is intolerable, what then is to be done to save 
managerial capitalism from itself?  For the foreseeable future, firms will 
continue to be the latter-day equivalent of banks—where the money is—for the 
vast American middle class.  Does the temptation caused by access to a great 
deal of Other People’s Money invariably corrupt managers, and is law thus 
epiphenomenal to firm behavior?  Access to the vault is far easier to come by 
circa 2014 for corporate executives with prestigious MBAs than it was for 
Depression-era crooks with Thompson submachine guns.  Is the solution 
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inherent in the content or the enforcement of the law itself?  Is there a perfect 
constellation of legal regime, CMPs, and ethics instruction that can 
spontaneously induce a degree of corporate compliance sufficient to overcome 
the urge to simply take the money and run?  Instead of incarcerating Jeffrey 
Skilling for twenty-four years, should we broadcast his public beheading on pay-
per-view television from Enron Plaza in Houston, with the proceeds donated to 
Enron’s creditors?  If our faith in the ability of the academy to implement a 
reformation of the ethics of adult students is weak, and if our taste for the blood 
of white-collar criminals is underdeveloped, we must return to the beginning: 
“Why do CEOs rob corporations?”  If we ask again, emphasizing the third, 
rather than the last, word, it may be possible to provide answers. 
Some CEOs—but only some CEOs—rob corporations.  They do this not 
only because that is where the money is but because that is who they are.  Other 
CEOs dutifully discharge their fiduciary and civic responsibilities while 
enriching their employees, their investors, and the communities in which they do 
business for the very same reason: that is who they are.  It is vexing that one 
cannot readily explain or predict why any given CEO enters the robbers’ den or 
honestly shepherds the firm.  Yet, it is possible, if one learns to read the runes of 
personality, to divine the general path a firm will follow under the leadership of 
any particular CEO.  Undertheorization, and not the inherent greed of mankind 
or the incommensurability of law and business, is truly the bane of CLC.  
Researchers must dedicate energies to the empirical study of the relationships 
between rules and behaviors if the desiderata attendant to compliance—
fundamental fairness and efficiency in the operation of the markets, 
maximization of shareholder wealth, just compensation of the managerial class, 
elimination of political corruption, equality of opportunity, general promotion of 
respect for law, and effective legislative oversight of national commerce—are to 
be secured, in part, through the contributions of scholarship. 
This program need not exclude any school of thought or methodology.  
Although human agency is crucial and individual-level variables are 
indispensable to explanations and predictions of CLC, the most sophisticated 
model will incorporate insights from all pre-theories and variables from multiple 
levels of analysis, including the nature of the international political economy, 
the regulatory and judicial culture of the state, dyadic interactions with other 
states and firms, the organizational cultures of firms, the dynamics of decision 
teams, and even neuroeconomic inputs.  No single method, paradigm, or 
discipline will harvest all that is knowable about CLC.  Each will inform the 
others regardless of its pretensions.  Still, if the present account of the 
relationship is inchoate, the salience of personality to CLC is an existential 
reality.  Without an account of the linkages between rules and behaviors, any 
attempt to enhance CLC by altering the existing regime will succeed only by the 
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intervention of Fortune. 
In other words, achieving substantial compliance with corporate law is not 
merely a matter of the conjuration and codification of proper rules and 
institutions.  Rather, it is to the selection and training of the right people to 
administer, interpret, and implement the normative content animating legal rules 
and institutions to which all stakeholders must direct the bulk of their 
attention.611  Because much of the variation in CLC is attributable to personality, 
manipulation of the legal rules may well be a useless venture without 
simultaneous manipulation of CEO personalities, either through training or, 
more likely, by incorporating analysis of compliance propensities within the 
matrix of considerations governing CEO selection by boards of directors or 
shareholders.  Firms should take seriously the personalities of those whom they 
consider for the position most responsible for shaping the values, decisions, and 
futures of the firm and its stakeholders.  Hostile and adventuristic CEO 
applicants, and to a lesser extent those who are militaristic and anomistic, may 
well gut the firms that hire them, while CEOs with profiles that de-emphasize 
these constructs may well provide the sound and steady leadership that navigates 
legal shoals and stewards firms to good long-term results. 
Unless and until neo-Marxists or Islamic fascists topple the state and 
establish industrial communes or a waqf, corporations will always be “where the 
money is” and will always attract criminals bent on robbery.  However, firms 
may also be fortunate enough to draw enlightened trustees who would safeguard 
their wealth by implementing the most effective of legal strategies: specifically, 
contesting, within established political and legal boundaries, every creation, 
interpretation, and application of law that runs contrary to shareholders’ 
interests, but scrupulously—even monastically—adhering to the letter and spirit 
of authoritative determinations of legal obligation once those determinations 
issue.  The vast majority of would-be CEOs will orient themselves on a 
continuum between these poles.  Accordingly, CLC is a primary constituent of a 
corporate strategy that requires a firm not only to select industries and markets 
in which to compete and methods to develop and sustain competitive advantage 
but to decide whether and how it will live out the meaning of the following 
creed: CEOs—not firms—decide whether or not to comply with law, and their 
choices have profound implications for their firms, their communities, and their 
nations.  Compliance with law is an act not merely of corporate social 
responsibility but of self- and national-preservation. 
For, although both are created with a theoretically infinite lifespan, neither 
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a corporation nor a nation is guaranteed its perpetual existence.  Yugoslavia is as 
dead as Enron, and unitary Iraq is as much on life support as is Sunbeam.  Just 
as rogue dictators—Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein—pried apart 
latent fissures to fracture their nations and bury their peoples under rubble, so 
are rogue CEOs—Jeffrey Skilling and Albert Dunlap—the proximate causes of 
corporate legal tsunamis that extinguish firms and inundate stakeholders with 
debt, unemployment, and despair.  It is for further research to reveal suspected 
parallels in personality and decision-making that explain these two sets of 
rogues and the misery they inflicted upon others.  It is enough for now to note 
the most important lesson of the last fifteen years of political economic history 
stands in stark relief against a backdrop of bloodshed and bankruptcy: in 
business, as in war, decisions about legal compliance form part of a strategic 
calculus and can pave a road to ruin. 
Legal compliance is at the core of corporate strategy, and firms committed 
to survival and prosperity must mind the bitter lessons of the recent past as they 
sift through aspirants to their leadership.  The most effective way to achieve 
compliance is, quite simply, to have individuals comply with the law.  Lest the 
past become prologue, wise firms—no less than wise states—must, when 
selecting the individuals at the apex of their decisional hierarchies, treat 
personality seriously and delve deeper than Willie Sutton into the relationship 
between personality and corporate legal compliance. 
